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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background of the Study 
The increasing number of global acquisitions point to international acquisitions as 
the most important foreign direct investment vehicle for multinationals seeking 
foreign market entry (Brouthers & Dikova 2010; Zander & Zander 2010).  How-
ever, most entry mode studies suggest that multinationals (MNEs) explore all 
entry mode options during internationalization. MNEs are increasingly using ac-
quisitions as growth options. They are also setting up acquisition department/units 
responsible for the acquisition process and decisions. Consequently, it calls for a 
need for researchers to explore acquisition strategies as unique entry strategies 
rather than the dichotomous choice with greenfield investments. 
Cross-border acquisitions face unique challenges due to their international nature 
arising from the liability of foreignness, host country institutional environ-
ment/voids and uncertain business environment. Despite these challenges, the 
total value and number of global mergers and acquisition (M&A) has been in-
creasing in the last two decades at a yearly average of 2 trillion US dollars (Wil-
merHale 2014). There is a gap for researchers to explore how and why despite 
these unique challenges, the total amount of global M&A is on the rise.  
Multinationals exercise their acquisition strategies in terms of equity ownership in 
the form of acquiring it fully (i.e. full acquisition), partially (partial acquisition), 
or in stages (staged acquisition) with the aim to acquire fully over several years. 
There is also an option to increase and decrease equity stake at post-market entry. 
The different acquisition strategies confer different levels of control, risks expo-
sure, human resource commitment, financial resource commitment and degree of 
interdependence between the parent MNE and acquired subsidiary. If MNEs can 
achieve their strategic intent through partial acquisition than a full acquisition, it’s 
viable for researchers to explore how and when firms can utilize the different ac-
quisition strategies in achieving their strategic motives in foreign markets. It will 
also be viable to understand the impact of not opting for the optimal acquisition 
strategies at the time of market entry as extant research on differential perfor-
mance returns on partial and full acquisitions are inconclusive (See, e.g., Eyssell 
1989; Markides & Ittner 1994; Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2007; Zhou, Anand 
& Yu 2007; Swaminathan, Murshed & Hulland 2008; Larimo & Pynnönen 2008; 
Ertuna & Yamak 2011) 
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In summary, this dissertation focuses on acquisition strategies and seeks to under-
stand why and how MNEs choose these acquisition strategies when entering into 
foreign markets. It also aims to understand why these MNEs increase and de-
crease their equity commitment at post-market entry. Finally, it aims to under-
stand the performance differentials between returns to partial and full acquisition. 
1.2 Forms of Acquisition Strategies 
Before exploring previous studies and the research questions for this study, it is 
important to discuss the forms of acquisitions strategies. The intent is to aid and 
strengthen the motivation of the research objective of this study. It also enables 
the readers to understand the scope and focus of this dissertation. 
Figure 1 shows the different forms of acquisition strategy based on Chen (2008).  
Partial acquisition is a form of entry mode strategy and a form of an acquisition 
strategy. In Partial acquisition, the parent firm acquires part of the equity of a lo-
cal firm (Chen 2008) in the form of a direct investment involving some level of 
control different from other financial or portfolio investments where the investor 
does not gain any control of the investment. 
 
Figure 1. Entry Mode Choices (Adapted from Chen 2008) 
From Figure 1, all MNE’s have the option for acquisition or greenfield invest-
ment irrespective of the ownership structure they decide to choose. If they decide 
to set up a wholly owned subsidiary, they can either acquire the entire stake in a 
local firm (full acquisition), or set up an entirely new investment in foreign mar-
kets (full-owned greenfield). If MNEs decide to set up a shared ownership struc-
ture, they can decide to acquire some equity stake from an existing local firm 
(partial acquisition). Alternatively,  MNEs can establish joint ventures by sharing 
ownership of greenfield investments with local partners. 
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The classification of entry mode choice according to Chen (2008) does not take 
into cognizance staged acquisition and other complex acquisition structures. As a 
consequence, it does not depict all possible acquisition types and not suitable for 
this dissertation. Hence, the dissertation is focused on acquisition strategies; there 
is a need to develop a new archetype of acquisition strategies used by multina-
tionals in foreign markets. 
Acquisitions can be classified in terms of the equity stake acquired during market 
entry (Parent Equity Levels), the number of foreign parents involved in the acqui-
sitions and the number of transactions. The 2X3 matrix shown in Figure 2 below 
shows the classification of acquisition based on equity stake, the number of for-
eign parent and the number of transactions. 
 
Figure 2. Archetypes of Acquisitions Strategies for Foreign Market Entry 
From Figure 2, there is three types of acquisitions for market entry, partial acqui-
sition, staged/sequential acquisition, and full acquisition1. These forms of acquisi-
tions are different in terms of legal status and nature of formation and control. In 
this study, partial acquisition are takeover transactions where the acquiring firm 
acquires less than 100%  (Eyssell 1989; Shahrur 2005; Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-
Canal 2007; Zhu, Jog & Otchere 2011) but more than a 15% ownership in the 
target firm and the target firm continues to list on the public market or exist after 
the acquisition (Eyssell 1989; Shahrur 2005). The 15% equity stake cutoff helps 
                                                 
 
1 Acquisition-Joint Venture and Shared Partial Acquisition is a form of partial acquisition. 
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to differentiate partial acquisition from other financial or portfolio investments 
where the investor does not gain any control of the investment.  
From the literature, the degree of equity stake that constitutes partial equity varies 
by authors. Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2002; 2004; 2007) operationalize 
partial acquisition as acquisitions greater than 50% and less than 100%. Zhu et al. 
(2011) operationalize partial acquisition as acquisitions greater than 5% and less 
than 100%. Chen and Hennart (2004) operationalize partial acquisition as equity 
stake within 50% and 80%.  
The significant structural characteristics of partial acquisition are that, unlike full 
acquisition where target firm is delisted from the stock market, the target firm’s 
entity continuous to exist. Also, in partial acquisition the acquirer equity stake 
becomes part of the existing local firm. According to Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-
Canal (2002; 2004), partial acquisition is similar to full acquisition and interna-
tional joint ventures. Like full acquisition, partial acquisition involves acquiring 
some equity of an existing firm. Like International Joint Ventures (IJVs), they 
involve sharing the control and profits of the foreign unit with other shareholders 
(Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2002; Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2004; Chari 
& Chang 2009). In contrast, partial acquisition is different from IJVs. While IJVs 
are greenfield entries that entail the setting up of a new venture, slower entry into 
the market, and an additional capacity to the industry. Partial acquisition are faster 
entry strategies and do not add additional capacity to the industry (Chari & Chang 
2009). Additionally, while control in IJV is via negotiated management place-
ments and seats on the IJV board, control in partial acquisition is exercised pri-
marily through board seats in the local target firm (Chari & Chang 2009). Partial 
acquisition creates access to all the operations of the company, and they share the 
value and profits accrued to the firm in accordance to their equity stake. 
In some instances, target firms for partial acquisition can be acquired by multiple 
parent MNE’s. Such a type of acquisition is known as shared partial acquisition 
(Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2002; 2004). Shared partial acquisition is a form 
of partial acquisition where two or more foreign partners jointly acquire a local 
firm. Shared partial acquisition requires the establishment of a cooperative 
agreement between the different acquiring firms, and the target firm located in the 
host market. (ibid) It can be made in a single transaction or multiple transactions. 
When an acquisition involves only one foreign acquirer, it is referred to as pure 
partial acquisition (Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2004). In the context of this 
dissertation, pure partial acquisition is same as partial acquisition, which is an 
acquisition with only one foreign acquirer.  
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Acquisition joint ventures are acquisitions involving a parent firm acquiring equi-
ty stake in an already existing joint venture (Tsang 2003). It is a form of partial 
acquisition. Jakobsen (2008) describe it as a type of investment de facto involving 
the partial transfer of ownership rights to an existing organization, Estrin and 
Meyer (2004) refer to this type of entry mode as JV Type II. 
Staged acquisition is a partial acquisition in which the parent MNE has the option 
to acquire full equity ownership (Meyer & Tran 2006). Thus, staged acquisition 
can be described as a waiting option because it initially requires an initial equity 
stake with a contractual requirement to acquire the remaining equity over several 
years (Dapena & Fidalgo 2003; Jakobsen 2008; Meyer & Estrin 2007). Staged 
acquisition could also be a viable strategy for multinationals that do not have the 
available resources needed for full acquisition. Consequently, parent MNEs can 
commit a partial stake with the intention to acquire outright later when resources 
become available. Staged acquisition can also be a means to overcome either tar-
get uncertainty or target market uncertainty by structuring the acquisition deal 
using earnout provisions (Handler & Hirsch 2014). Earnout provisions involve 
structuring the acquisition deal based on certain benchmarks or financial perfor-
mance over a defined period or number of years (Handler & Hirsch 2014). In oth-
er words, earnout provisions involve acquiring a partial stake from a target and 
paying the remaining price of the acquisition based on certain performance out-
comes agreed between the acquiring firm and the target firm.  
Acquisition can also involve target firms with complex ownership structure that 
often makes the acquisition process complex and time consuming. Figure 3 shows 
the characteristics of acquisition targets in terms of ownership dispersion (concen-
trated ownership vs. blockholder ownership levels) and nature of the target (Pri-
vate vs. public firm). 
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Figure 3. Acquisition Target Structure and Acquisition Strategies 
The complex nature of target ownership structures makes staged acquisition a 
viable acquisition strategy. MNEs can acquire public firms with concentrated 
ownership (presence of employee ownership, several institutional blockholders - 
private equity investors, pension funds etc.), by acquiring a partial majority stake 
from investors/institutional owners willing to sell their shares. It gives them the 
opportunity to make a call option in the stock exchange market for the remaining 
equity stake if they are interested in full ownership of the target firm (Call op-
tions-Staged Acquisition). Concentrated-public owned firm exist in the form of 
transfer of ownership to insiders of the firm or broad transfer into public hands by 
the government (Estrin 2002; Larimo, Marinov & Marinova 2006; Jakobsen 
2008). It often, not limited to the diversity of ownership, may require extensive 
restructuring of the target firm by the acquiring parent, often referred to as 
Brownfields (Meyer & Estrin 2001). In Brownfield acquisitions, partial acquisi-
tion is rarely possible because, on one hand, parent MNE will accept to commit 
such huge resources for extensive restructuring only in cases where they have a 
majority or full equity ownership. On the other hand, such restructuring requires 
majority ownership for the strategic intent of the acquiring MNE to scale through 
the board of directors. Target firm may be family owned firm (Acquisition of 
Family Owned Firms) or partnership business involving two or more blockhold-
ers (Acquisition involving Partnership Owned Firms). The characteristics of these 
acquisition targets reinforce their different complexities during the acquisition 
negotiation and post-integration. For example, Mickelson and Worley (2003) 
through a case study of the acquisition of a family firm showed that family culture 
impacts strongly on the acquisition negotiation as well as the integration process. 
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Full acquisition is an acquisition in which parent MNE’s acquire 100% equity. As 
explained above, the equity levels vary by authors.  The structural characteristics 
of full acquisition are that the parent MNE’s excise a degree of control over the 
target firm and the target firms are delisted from the stock market and become 
part of the parent MNE. Some authors (e.g. Slangen 2006; Slangen & Hennart 
2007) suggest that, fully acquired subsidiary may also have subsidiary autonomy 
and thus using only MNE control as a proxy for differentiating partial and full 
acquisition may not be viable. 
It is important to note that there are other forms and ways to categorize interna-
tional acquisition that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For example, ac-
quisitions can be classified in terms of relatedness of the acquiring firms to that of 
the parent MNE.  For example, conglomerates are a form of growth strategies in 
which an MNE undergo extensive acquisitions and diversification into unrelated 
and related industries (Kerr & Darroch 2004; Olusola & Ojenike 2012). Acquisi-
tion can also be classified in terms of target firm position in the acquiring firms’ 
value chain (vertical & horizontal acquisitions). Vertical acquisitions entail the 
acquisition of a supplier or distributor or expanding forward or backward by con-
trolling additional parts of the value chain (Olusola & Ojenike 2012). Horizontal 
acquisitions entail the acquisition of a company in the same industry such as cus-
tomers, suppliers, etc. (Shahrur 2005). Finally, acquisitions can also be classified 
in terms of MNEs program in acquiring multiple target firms over a period (For a 
literature on multiple acquisitions see Haleblian & Finkelstein 1999, Hayward 
2002; Laamanen & Keil 2008; Chatterjee 2009; Shi & Prescott 2010). Multiple or 
serial acquisitions refer to acquisition program involving a set of inter-related 
acquisitions aimed at specific target firms (Chatterjee 2009). Scholars on multiple 
acquisitions argue that acquisition of a target firm may not be an independent or 
isolated decision to other acquisitions acquired by the parent firm. They suggest 
that multiple acquisition could rather be merely one part of an all-encompassing 
sequence of acquisitions jointly aimed at executing a corporate strategy (Shi & 
Prescott 2010).  
In summary, the focus of this study is on partial, staged and full acquisitions. 
Other forms of acquisitions which are not treated as specific acquisition 
forms/strategies, where necessary, are considered as mechanisms towards the re-
alizations of these trio acquisition strategies. For example, by exploring the Upp-
sala model (Johanson & Vahlne 2009) in later chapters of this dissertation, it is 
argued that target-specific experience (e.g., existence of supplier relationships or 
distributor relationship) prior to the acquisition increases the likelihood of staged 
and full acquisitions rather than partial acquisitions. Such a type of acquisition is 
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referred to as vertical acquisition. The next section explores previous studies and 
discusses the research gaps of the dissertation. 
1.3 Previous Study and Research Gaps 
Acquisitions are a form of entry mode strategies utilized by Multinationals 
(MNEs) when entering foreign markets. While there are limited empirical studies 
focused specifically on acquisition strategies, exploring theoretical lenses applied 
in entry mode choice literature is useful for the background of this study. Explor-
ing theoretical lenses is also viable for the purpose of developing the research 
question for this dissertation.  
During several decades of entry modes studies, International Business (IB) re-
search has somewhat discussed how MNEs choose among varying entry modes 
into foreign markets and how such entry modes are related to performance.  
Scholars have approached these studies from several theoretical perspectives. The 
dominant theories e.g. transaction cost, Dunning’s eclectic paradigm and re-
source-based theories emphasize how firms minimize cost or maximize revenues 
under certain circumstances and with the information and knowledge available to 
managers. They posit that entry mode choices are as a result of locational specific 
advantages, learning and economic motivations. So far, the studies exploring the 
dominant theories have either neglected the possibility for partial and staged ac-
quisition, operationalized all acquisition as the same, or in most cases assumes 
that international joint ventures are same as partial acquisition (e.g. Zejan 1990; 
Hennart & Park 1993; Cho & Padmanabhan 1995; Hennart, Larimo & Chen 
1996; Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Padmanabhan & Cho 1999; Brouthers & 
Brouthers 2000; Xu & Shenkar 2002; Larimo 2003; Chen & Zeng 2004). 
In parallel to these studies are empirical studies suggesting that entry mode choic-
es are decided based on external institutional environment. Institutions are one 
aspect of the external environmental that has gained considerable attention in re-
cent years and have been explored via institutional theory (Henisz 2000; Peng 
2003). There are two streams of studies utilizing institutional theory on entry 
mode studies. The first stream focuses on how institutional pressures of the host 
country or the difference between home and host country institutions influences 
entry strategies of firms (Arslan 2011; Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn 2007). The 
assumption of these studies is that formal and informal institutional environment 
influences entry mode choice of multinationals in foreign markets. They are 
viewed from both North (1990) and Scott (1995) perspective on institutions and 
have been operationalized as formal (regulatory) institutions and informal (cultur-
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al cognitive/normative) dimensions of institutions. Most studies have accounted 
for formal aspects of institutions from secondary data sources (e.g., Arslan 2011; 
Arslan & Larimo, 2011; Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn 2007; Contractor, Lahiri, 
Elango & Kundu 2014), and have ignored managerial perception as drivers to 
decision making. More so, recent studies have suggest that existing conceptual-
ization does not provide all aspects of institutions that influence entry mode 
choice in foreign market, and thus a need for a stronger measure of institutions 
(Garrido, Gomez, Maicas & Orcos 2014). 
The second stream of studies focuses on how firms respond to institutional 
changes of the host country at post entry in pursuit of survival, legitimacy and 
performance (Oliver 1991; Oh 2008; Aklamanu 2014). Both streams have been 
researched from the perspective of institutional-based view of international busi-
ness (Peng 2003); comparative institutionalism (Hotho & Pedersen 2012) and the 
neo-institutional theory (Oliver 1991). The assumptions of these studies are that, 
on one hand, firms respond to dynamics of institutional pressure during post-entry 
by compromising, complying, avoiding, defying, and manipulating host country 
institutional pressures in order to gain legitimacy, survival and performance (Oli-
ver 1991; Oh 2008; Aklamanu 2014). On the other hand, firms remain passive at 
entry as a result of the coerciveness of institutional pressures (Chen & Hennart  
2004;  Akhigbe, Martin & Whyte 2007; Jakobsen 2008; Chari & Chang 2009; 
Estrin, Baghdasaryan & Meyer 2009; Xu, Zhou & Phan 2010;  Arslan  2011;  
Arslan & Larimo 2011; Contractor et al. 2014).  
In summary, studies exploring the dominant theories have either neglected the 
possibility for partial and staged acquisition or operationalized all acquisition as 
the same. While institutional theory have gained attention in entry mode studies, 
studies have not accounted for all possible dimensions of formal and informal 
sources of institutional pressures that influence acquisition entry strategies of 
MNE’s at the time of market entry, and thus a need for a stronger measures of 
institutions. Finally, existing studies assumes that firm responds to institutions at 
post-entry but remain passive at the time of market entry. 
It is argued that, partial and staged acquisitions are a unique entry strategy that 
deserves further attention. Also, firms respond to institutions at the time of entry. 
It is of significance for IB research to uncover the role of institutions in influenc-
ing the choice of partial, staged and full acquisition and the firm-specific capabili-
ties that enhances MNEs response to host country institutional pressures at the 
time of market entry. Furthermore, the recent call for a better understanding of the 
impact of the institutional environment on mergers and acquisitions (Ferreira,  
Santos,  Almeida & Reis 2014), and a need to develop a stronger measures of 
10      Acta Wasaensia 
 
institutions (Garrido, Gomez, Maicas & Orcos 2014) suggest the timeliness of 
this research. Thus, the First Research Gap:  Previous studies have neglected 
partial acquisition as an entry strategy and have either assumed that firms remain 
passive to institutions on entry or have not accounted for all sources of institu-
tional pressures that influence acquisition decisions at the time of entry. 
While researchers and management agree that the initial motives for foreign direct 
investment cannot be isolated from the strategic choice of multinationals in for-
eign market. For example, a typical acquisition process starts from setting up ac-
quisition objectives and motives (DePamphilis 2007). However, several entry 
mode studies (except, e.g. Chen & Hennart 2004; Tahir & Larimo 2006; Chen 
2008) have ignored the role of motives on entry mode choice of multinationals in 
foreign markets. They have assumed that similar motivations drive both partial 
and full acquisition.  
Some studies have begun to look at the differences in the motivations that drives 
partial and full acquisition, but empirical findings are inconclusive because the 
findings are contradictory. For example, Chen and Hennart (2004) showed that 
full acquisitions are motivated for market power consolidation (when partial ac-
quisition is seen as equity less than 80%). Chen (2008) studied the motives for 
international acquisitions and found that full acquisition are motivated for capa-
bility procurement while the motives for partial acquisition (equity cut-off of 
95%) are for other strategic consideration (e.g. access to local assets, speeding up 
entry into rapidly growing markets, control capacity expansions in mature indus-
tries, and also for market power consolidation). The contradictory finding could 
be in part that these studies ignored the existence of staged acquisition. For in-
stance, staged acquisition (partial acquisitions en route to full acquisition) could 
be used to achieve the same objective as a full acquisition. Furthermore, access to 
local assets, speeding up entry into rapidly growing markets, control capacity ex-
pansions in mature industries and market power consolidation are motives that 
can also be gained from full acquisition.  
Parallel to these studies are studies in finance and accounting that have accounted 
for synergy, agency, hubris and disciplinary motivations for acquisitions using 
positive abnormal returns generated by the announcement of the acquisition (e.g. 
Fernandez & Baixauli 2003; Davidson, Cheng, Rowe & Singh 2004; Torabzadeh 
& Dube 2007). These studies have not shown the context how different motiva-
tions can lead to partial or full acquisition. Capturing the motive of acquisition 
based on abnormal returns during the announcement of the acquisition could be 
bias. This is because share-price performance during the announcement of acqui-
sition only expresses the expectations of investors and not the interest or motiva-
 Acta Wasaensia     11 
  
tion of the organization (Larsson & Finkelstein 1999; Schoenberg 2006; Papa-
dakis & Thanos 2010)  
Host country institutions significantly influence entry (Arslan  2011;  Arslan & 
Larimo 2011; Contractor et al. 2014) and post entry strategies (Oliver 1991; Oh 
2008; Puck et al. 2009; Santangelo & Meyer 2011; Aklamanu 2014) of multina-
tionals in foreign markets. It is believe that the existing gap between the role of 
acquisition motives on the choice of acquisition strategies can be bridged by tak-
ing into cognizance that host country institutions do not always exert equal 
amount of coercive pressures on all market entry motives. This is in light of the 
empirical evidence that the interaction of motives of FDIs with host country insti-
tutional environment influences entry mode choice (e.g. Folta 1998; Tahir & Lar-
imo 2006; Paul & Wooster 2008; Roberts, Thompson & Mikolajczyk 2008). I 
argue that the initial motivation for setting up a subsidiary should influence the 
acquisition strategies of multinationals in the foreign market. By combining OLI 
paradigm and the context of host country institutional environment, it is possible 
to show that partial acquisition have specific motives distinct from fully acquisi-
tions depending on the host country institutional environment. Thus, the Second 
Research Gap: The literature on acquisition choice has not accounted for how 
motives of acquisitions, or foreign market entry interacts with home country insti-
tutions in influencing the choice of partial, staged and full acquisition at the time 
of market entry. 
While firms can opt for partial, staged and full acquisitions at the time of market 
entry, they can also increase and decrease their equity stake at post-market entry. 
With regards to increasing and decrease in equity stake at post-market entry, there 
are three respective contributions from previous entry mode studies. These studies 
have accounted for (a) why international joint ventures changes to wholly owned 
subsidiaries (Puck, Holtbru & Mohr 2009) or changes in entry modes (Benito, 
Petersen & Welch 2009); (b) why strategic intentions at the outset differ from the 
actual operations established (Santangelo & Meyer 2011) and (c) the outcomes of 
post entry equity changes (Magnusson 2007; Ogasavara & Masiero 2012).  
While these studies provide some evidence of changes in entry modes and equity 
changes in acquired foreign subsidiaries, they do not account for entry mode 
changes in the context of partial and full acquisition (e.g. Puck et al. 2009; San-
tangelo & Meyer 2011; Benito, Petersen & Welch, 2009). Others (e.g. Magnusson 
2007; Ogasavara & Masiero 2012) did not account for the role of institutional 
changes in the context of changes in equity. As a result, they are limited in ex-
plaining why MNEs do change their equity stake in acquisitions at post-market 
entry. The study by Puck et al. (2009) showed that IJVs are changed into WOS as 
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a result of (a) acquisition of local knowledge by the foreign IJV partner, (b) re-
duction in the level of perceived political, economic, social, and legal uncertainty, 
and (c) as a result of the level of internal isomorphic pressures faced in the IJV.  
Santangelo and Meyer (2011) explored why strategic intentions at the outset dif-
fer from the actual operations established. Their findings suggest that unforeseen 
opportunities induce foreign investors with modest initial objectives to revise 
their strategic intentions at entry and, if favorable conditions emerge, increase 
their commitment to original intentions. They also found out that in the presence 
of institutional voids, investors are prone to invest in ex-ante information search 
that enables them to reduce the likelihood of ex-post commitment decrease. Beni-
to et al. (2009) explored case studies of mode changes and entry mode additions. 
They re-conceptualized foreign operation mode as one consisting of mode pack-
ages in the form of mode continuation, within mode change, mode role change, 
mode additions and deletions and full mode change. Ogasavara and Masiero 
(2012) studied the impact of changes in equity on the survival of Japanese foreign 
subsidiaries in Brazil. Their findings suggest that changes in equity aim at im-
proving the longevity of foreign subsidiaries.  
These three streams of studies have the following limitations. First, the timing of 
increasing commitment decision from IJVs to WOS is different from the timing 
of commitment decisions in acquisitions. The limited duration of IJVs makes the 
conversion of IJVs to WOS more evident than in acquisitions. Duration does not 
limit the decision to increase or decrease commitment decisions in acquisitions. 
Consequently, the circumstances, mechanisms and reasons leading to the change 
from IJV to WOS cannot be generalized for equity changes in international acqui-
sitions. Second, the study by Santangelo and Meyer (2011) focuses on all FDI 
projects and cannot be generalized to acquisition context. Third, the study by 
Puck et al. (2009) and Magnusson (2007) assumes that ownerships are either 
wholly owned or partially owned. Ownership in acquisition is a continuum. Thus, 
it may not necessarily be a full acquisition and may not necessary be divested 
completely. Fourth, the study by Benito et al. (2009) provides a holistic conceptu-
alization that firms do change their entry modes in the foreign market. However, 
they did not specifically address the “how and why” question and specifically, in 
the context of acquisitions.  Finally, Ogasavara and Masiero (2012) showed that 
firms aim to increase their equity stake to improve the longevity of the acquired 
firm. However, they did not account for the determinants or mechanisms leading 
to equity changes of the foreign acquired subsidiaries.  
In summary, these studies have accounted for possibility in entry mode changes 
(Magnusson 2007; Benito et al. 2009; Puck et al. 2009; Santangelo and Meyer 
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2011), and the implications of entry mode changes (Ogasavara & Masiero 2012). 
However, they have so far not accounted for the role of changes in institutions on 
changes in the equity stake of foreign acquired subsidiaries. Thus, the Third Re-
search Gap: Studies focused on the post-entry decision has not accounted for the 
role of changes in host country institutions on why MNEs changes their equity 
stake in acquisitions at post-market entry. 
IB scholars in the past two decades suggest that entry strategies should influence 
foreign subsidiary performance. Scholars have debated the performance of inter-
national acquisitions in various institutional environments. Empirical findings are 
inconclusive due to the sparse of measures of subsidiary performance and the 
negligence of partial acquisition in some of these studies. The first stream of stud-
ies has limitations due to their assumption that share price movement on the an-
nouncement of the acquisition represents acquisition performance (e.g. Lopez-
Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2007; Zhou et al. 2007; Swaminathan et al. 2008; 
Markides & Ittner 1994; Larimo & Pynnönen 2008). Furthermore, their findings 
are contradictory. For example, Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2007) and Zhou 
et al. (2007) found that partial acquisition has a positive relationship to value 
creation. Swaminathan et al. (2008) found no significant relationship to value 
creation. Markides and Ittner (1994) found no significant difference between re-
turn on partial acquirers and full acquirers. Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal 
(2007) found a significant difference between returns to full acquirers compared 
to partial acquirers. As a result of these contradictory findings, Larimo and 
Pynnönen (2008) call for future research on returns to partial acquirers.  
The second stream of studies did not consider partial acquisition in their samples. 
However, they accounted for the achievement of specific projects within the ac-
quisition such as innovative performance (Ahuja & Katila 2001; Cloodt, Hage-
doorn & Van Kranenburg 2006); technology performance (Hitt, Ireland, Harrison 
& Hoskisson 1991; Hagedoorn & Duysters 2002; Grimpe 2007); sourcing per-
formance (Steensma & Corley 2000); introduction of new products (Puranam & 
Srikanth 2007); and greater coordination benefits from integration (Puranam, 
Singh & Zollo 2006).  
The third stream of studies (e.g. Eyssell 1989; Cannella & Hambrick 1993; 
Capron 1999; Reus 2004; Slangen 2006; Park, Glaister & Oh 2009; Ahammad & 
Glaister 2011; Ertuna & Yamak 2011) measured financial and accounting ratios 
but did not account for partial acquisition (exception to Eyssell 1989; Ertuna & 
Yamak 2011) in their study. The two studies that treated partial acquisition found 
(a) no substantive changes in financial performance following positive valuation 
effects in the announcement of partial acquisition (Eyssell 1989); (b) returns to 
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foreign partial acquirers in Turkey display superior performance by virtue of re-
sponding both to the efficiency concerns of transaction cost theory and the legiti-
macy focus of institutional theory (Ertuna & Yamak 2011).  
Share price movement based on event study methodology does not account for 
the long-term actualization of the motives of acquisition nor does it account for 
future profitability of the firm (Larsson & Finkelstein 1999; Papadakis & Thanos 
2010). Rather, it accounts for returns to shareholders and can be influenced by 
other events (Schoenberg 2006). The contradictory findings showing, positive, 
negative and no relationship between acquisition strategies (partial and full acqui-
sition) and shareholder returns point to an important limitation of this measure. 
Thus, far, the returns to partial acquirer’s remain unclear as well as the institu-
tional context were partial acquisition performs better or is the optimal strategy 
than a full acquisition. In other words, are multinationals considering differential 
returns (in terms of achieving their strategic motives) to partial and full acquisi-
tion in different institutional context? Thus, the fourth research gap: Extant 
studies have not shown the institutional context in which partial acquisition per-
form better than full acquisition and have so far operationalized returns to acqui-
sition without taken into cognizance the strategic motives for setting up the sub-
sidiary.  
In summary, the aim of this dissertation is to bridge the gaps in the literature on 
MNEs acquisition entry strategies, changes in equity at post-market entry and 
returns to partial and full acquisition in different institutional context. The disser-
tation integrates institutional theory (North 1990; Peng 2003; Dikova & Van Wit-
teloostuijn 2007; Peng, Wang & Jiang 2008; Arslan 2011; Arslan & Larimo 2011; 
Contractor et al. 2014) and internationalization process theory (Johanson & 
Vahlne 2009). It shows on one hand, why multinationals distinctively utilize vari-
ous acquisition entry strategies at the time of market entry. On the other hand, it 
shows why multinationals increase and decreases their equity stake in acquired 
foreign subsidiary in response to host country institutional environment. Further-
more, the dissertation shows that, the degree to which institutions influence ac-
quisition entry strategies depends upon the initial motives for setting up the for-
eign subsidiary. Finally, the dissertation shows the differential performance re-
turns to full and partial acquisition. 
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1.4 Research Questions and Limitations of the Study 
The above section explored extant literature on acquisition entry strategies, equity 
changes and returns to partial and full acquisition to uncover the research gaps.  
This section states the objectives and research questions for the dissertation. 
The dissertation combines the four research gaps into one research objectives. 
The main research objective of this dissertation is: 
• To understand how and why MNEs opt for the choice of partial, staged 
and full acquisitions.  
The objective of this dissertation is approached and addressed by four research 
questions: 
1 How do host country institutions and MNEs host country capabilities influ-
ence the choice of partial, staged and full acquisition at the time of entry?  
2 How do the motives of acquisitions influence MNEs strategic choice for par-
tial, staged and full acquisition at market entry? 
3 Why do multinationals increase or decrease their equity commitment in inter-
national acquisitions at post-market entry? 
4 How do returns to partial acquirers differ to returns on staged and full acquir-
ers?  
Answers to this objective and research questions will contribute to our under-
standing of why firms opt for partial, staged and full acquisition at the time of 
market entry. It will also contribute to our understanding of why firms decide to 
change their equity stake by increasing or decreasing their equity commitments in 
acquired subsidiaries. By exploring internationalization process theory (Johanson 
& Vahlne 2009), this dissertation will contribute to and extend IB research to the 
continuum and dynamics in entry mode decisions of multinationals in foreign 
markets. Furthermore, by accounting for the role of motives on acquisition entry 
strategies, this study shows how the achievements of these strategic motivations 
depend on the acquisition strategy and host country institutional environment. 
This study has several limitations. First, the study addressed only the acquisition 
strategies of MNEs and did not discuss other strategies. MNEs also have an op-
tion for partial greenfields (IJVs) or full greenfields investments (greenfield 
WOS).  
Second, the empirical aspect of this study focused only on Finnish firms. Alt-
hough the findings of this study can be generalized to other developed economy 
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firms outside Finland, because international acquisitions by Finnish MNEs are 
affected by most of the same trends as acquisitions worldwide (Sarala & Vaara 
2010: 1373). However, limiting the study to only Finnish firms may still limit the 
generalizability of the findings. For example, it has been argued that the motives 
of acquisitions of emerging market economies are different from those of ad-
vanced economies (De Beule, Elia & Piscitello 2014). Thus, the motive of Finn-
ish firms may not be same as the motive of emerging market firms. Also, Finnish 
firms have been described as firms from small and open economies (SMOPEC) 
whose internationalization are said to be different from those of other advanced 
economies due their geographic region and small size (Luostarinen 1970; 1979).  
Third, the boundaries between the different motives of FDIs (market-seeking, 
resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking) are not so clear. 
For example, brands are immobile strategic assets, yet when firms acquire to pro-
duce to serve local markets and retain the strong local brands of the acquired tar-
get, they are still envisaged as market-seeking motives. Also, some scholars for 
example Buckley, Cleg, Cross, Liu, Voss and Zheng (2007) have argued that stra-
tegic asset-seeking are a form of resource-seeking motives. Though, in this study 
care was taken to discuss the influence of each motive on acquisition strategies 
even in case acquisition involving multiple motives. Nevertheless, a reconceptual-
ization of the motives of FDIs will be a timely research agenda for future studies. 
Fourth, the Uppsala internationalization process theory pays less attention to 
firms’ characteristics and focuses more attention on its networks of relationship 
and capabilities it develops from their relationships. As a result, it accounts that 
acquisition decisions result from the firms’ network position. It assumes that all 
the firms network partners contributes equal relationship and relevance to the firm 
and does not account for other firm characteristics that makes one network or 
partner network more important than the other and results in their preference for 
acquisition targets.  
Finally, the empirical data was collected only from the acquiring firm’s managers 
and may limit the findings of this study. Acquired firm managers also play a sig-
nificant role in the acquisition decision. For example, Meyer and Estrin (2007) 
and Jakobsen (2008) argue that sellers’ willingness to sell the company is a key 
determinant of the acquisition decision. Empirical data from both acquiring firm 
and acquired firm managers would aid more empirical contributions. 
It is worth nothing that despite the theoretical and empirical limitations of this 
study, concerted effort was made to address some of them. First, the argument in 
support of the choice of the theory for the dissertation in relation to the research 
questions is augmented in Section 2.4. Also, the theoretical boundaries of the two 
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theories explored, and how they complement each other is discussed in Section 
2.4. Finally, Section 2.4 also addressed the critiques of the choice of theory cho-
sen for this study. 
1.5 Expected Contributions of the Study 
This dissertation is expected to make four significant contributions to theory and 
research in acquisition entry strategies and performance of acquisitions.  
First, the dissertation is expected to contribute to and extend the institutional-
based view of international business strategy (Peng 2002; Peng 2003; Peng & 
Khoury 2009; Arslan 2011; Arslan & Larimo 2011) by accounting for additional 
aspects of institutions that influences acquisition strategic choices. The formal 
aspects of institutions are expanded from merely regulatory pressures to include 
transparency of regulatory institutions and failure in formal institutions. Addition-
ally, rather than using the aggregate measure from Hofstede cultural dimensions 
in analyzing the informal aspects of institutions, this dissertation explored the 
manifestation of informal aspects of institutions on acquisitions by focusing on 
the individualistic vs. collectivistic dimensions of Hofstede that accounts for ac-
quisition negotiation complexities (Graham 1985; McDevitt 2006; Jakobsen 
2008). 
Second, this study is expected to be one of the first studies to account for owner-
ship continuum or changes in an equity stake in foreign acquired subsidiary. By 
exploring the Uppsala model to show why multinationals increase and decrease 
their ownership stake in acquisition, it is expected that the Uppsala model should 
be useful in capturing changes in entry decision over time. The Uppsala model 
explicitly shows what commitments decision increases or decreases as a result of 
the acquisition of knowledge, trust and commitment of both the acquiring MNE 
and target firms. Unlike the critics of Uppsala model (e.g., Reid 1981; Young & 
Wilkinson 1989; Melin 1992; Andersen 1993; Oviatt & McDougall 1994; 2005), 
this dissertation shows that the Uppsala model can be applied to acquisition when 
acquisition strategies are viewed as a continuum commitments decisions involv-
ing changes in equity commitments over time. 
Third, while there are several empirical studies that have distinctively studied 
partial and full acquisition (e.g. Folta 1998; Chen & Hennart 2004; Meyer & Es-
trin 2007; Jakobsen 2008; Chari & Chang 2009; Arslan 2011; Larimo & Arslan 
2011; Contractor et al. 2014), full acquisition and joint ventures (Hennart & Red-
dy 2000; Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2004); this dissertation is expected to be 
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one of the first studies to empirically study staged, full and partial acquisition in a 
single study and provide empirical evidence as distinctive acquisition strategies 
used by MNEs in foreign market entry. 
Fourth, the dissertation is expected to contribute to the stream of studies that 
shows that acquisition entry strategies influence subsidiary performance (Lopez-
Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2007; Zhou et al. 2007). Though the empirical evidence is 
inconclusive, this study is expected to show that there are performance differen-
tials between returns to partial, staged and full acquisition.  
1.6 Key Concepts  
This section discusses several key concepts used in this dissertation. The key con-
cepts were identified based on their significance to the study. They provide the 
readers clear understanding of the various concepts used in this dissertation and 
the limits to which they apply. Key concepts and their definitions are summarized 
in Table 1. 
Table 1. Definition of Key Concepts 
Key Terms Definitions References 
Entry Modes Entry modes refer to the choice of acquisition or greenfield 
investment strategies. Entry mode in the context of this 
study is specifically limited to equity-mode investments. 
Chen (2008) 
Acquisition 
Strategies 
Acquisition strategies refer to the choice for partial, staged 
or full acquisition 
Meyer & Tran (2006); 
Meyer & Estrin (2007) 
; Jakobsen (2008) 
Partial 
Acquisition 
Partial acquisition is takeover transactions where the acquir-
ing firm acquires less than 100% but not less than a 15% 
ownership in the target firm without a legal option to ac-
quire completely over several years. 
Eyssell (1989); Shahrur 
(2005) 
Staged 
Acquisition 
An acquisition entry strategy at the time of entry that re-
quires phased transaction using call options or earnout ar-
rangements aimed at acquiring completely after several 
years.  Staged acquisitions usually start from a partial acqui-
sition, but require a commitment to acquire the remaining 
stake after several years. 
Modified from Dapena 
& Fidalgo (2003); 
Meyer & Tran (2006); 
Meyer & Estrin (2007); 
Jakobsen (2008) 
Full 
Acquisition 
Full acquisition is takeover transactions where the acquiring 
firm acquires 100% ownership in the target firm. 
Lopez-Duarte & Gar-
cia-Canal (2007); Zhu, 
Jog & Otchere (2011); 
Contractor et al. 
(2014)   
Institutions Institutions comprise of  the formal(regulatory) and Informal 
(cultural cognitive/normative) aspects of institutions that 
govern transactions in a society 
North (1990); Scott 
(1995)  
Institutional 
Distance 
Differences in formal and informal environment of MNEs 
home countries and host countries of acquired firms 
North (1990); Peng 
(2003); Estrin et al. 
(2009) 
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Formal 
Institutional 
Environment 
The regulatory institutions of a host country that comprises 
the  regulatory restrictions they impose on foreign owner-
ship, how transparent, corrupt and political risks they im-
pose on foreign businesses 
Modified from Arslan 
(2011); Arslan & Lar-
imo (2011); Contractor 
et al. (2014) 
Informal 
Institutional 
Environment 
The differences in cultural norms and values  between MNEs 
home countries and host countries of acquired target that 
imposes constraints and complexities in communication 
leading to negotiation complexities 
Modified from Arslan 
(2011); Arslan & Lar-
imo (2011); Contractor 
et al. (2014) 
Motives of 
Acquisitions 
Entry motives comprise of market-seeking, efficiency-
seeking, resource-seeking and strategic asset-seeking mo-
tives of foreign direct investments 
Dunning (1993;1998) 
Market-
Seeking 
Market-seeking firms are firms motivated to enter the for-
eign marker with the aim of serving the market in that coun-
try with the sole objective to increase their market size, 
market growth and adapt to local standards and require-
ments 
Dunning (1993) 
Resource-
Seeking 
Resource-seeking firms are firms that naturally aim to access 
specific  resources in the host country at lower cost levels 
then they achieve at present in their home countries  
Dunning (1993) 
Efficiency- 
Seeking 
Efficiency-seeking motives are motives aimed at rationalizing 
production, distribution, and marketing activities through 
common governance of and synergy-building among geo-
graphically dispersed operations. 
Dunning (1993); 
Gorynia, Jan & Ra-
doslaw (2007) 
Strategic-
Asset-
Seeking 
Strategic asset-seeking firms are firms aimed at accessing 
advanced proprietary technology, immobile strategic assets 
(e.g., brands) and other capabilities such as  human and 
intellectual capital  
Buckley et al. (2007) 
Acquisition 
Performance 
Acquisition performance entails the ability of the acquired 
subsidiaries to meet its strategic objectives 
Verbeke, Li & Goerzen 
(2009); Meglio & 
Risberg, (2010) 
Motive-
based Per-
formance 
Measuring the performance of acquisition based on the 
motives of acquisition (market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, 
resource-seeking & strategic asset-seeking) 
Modified from 
Verbeke, Li & Goerzen 
(2009); Meglio & 
Risberg (2010) 
Host Country 
Capability 
Host Country Capabilities are capabilities MNEs acquire from 
knowledge of doing business in a particular host country e.g. 
having a subsidiary and ongoing business operations in that 
specific country.  
 
Modified from Eriks-
son, Johanson, Maj-
kgard & Sharma 
(1997); Chetty, Eriks-
son & Lindbergh 
(2006); Vahlne & 
Johanson (2013) 
Increase in 
Equity Stake 
Increasing equity stake from initial equity stake at entry 
(does not include staged acquisition with already contractual 
requirements to acquire the remaining equity over several 
years) 
Modified from  Mag-
nusson (2007) 
Decrease in 
Equity stake 
Decreasing equity stake from original equity stake or exiting 
from the market (include changes from full acquisition to 
partial acquisition or decreasing equity in a partially acquired 
subsidiaries) 
Magnusson (2007) 
Target-
Specific 
Experience 
Experiences obtained from a previous business relationship 
with a business partner in a particular host country (e.g. 
supplier, customer, distributor, competitor relationship). 
Modified from Johan-
son & Vahlne (2009: 
1416) 
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1.7 Positioning of the Study and Structure of the 
Dissertation 
Two main theories were selected to aid the development of the research con-
structs. These are institutional theory (North 1990; Scott 1995; Peng 2003; Diko-
va & Van Witteloostuijn 2007) and Internationalization Process Theory (Johan-
son & Vahlne 2009). Figure 4 shows the focus of previous IB studies addressing 
the choice of partial and full acquisition. 
 
Figure 4. Focus of the previous IB studies on Acquisition Strategies and Per-
formance 
Previous studies have mainly addressed acquisition choice decisions (partial and 
full acquisition) from different theoretical lenses such as institutional theory, hos-
tage theory of joint ventures, real options theory and agency theory. They have 
approached these studies without taken into cognizance that acquisitions can be a 
continuum decisions en route to full acquisition, where firms can increase and 
decrease their equity decisions over time. 
The performance of partial and full acquisition has been explored via financial 
measures (e.g. share price performance, profitability, etc.) without taken into cog-
nizance the initial motives of setting up the subsidiary. They neglected for exam-
ple that the performance of all subsidiary mandate is not measured by financial 
profitability (e.g. intra-firm sourcing subsidiaries or R&D subsidiaries).  
In the current study, a process theory (Uppsala model) is utilized to capture the 
acquisition process depicting how the parent firm's interactions with their busi-
ness networks leads to different acquisition strategies and changes in the equity 
stake. This is further integrated with institutional theory to capture the institutions 
that regulate economic activities and the choice available to managers in decision 
making (North 1990; Scott 1995; Peng 2003; Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn 
2007). Institutional theory also moderates the outcomes of firms’ interaction with 
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their business networks (Pogrebnyakov & Maitland 2011; Santangelo & Meyer 
2011).  The two theories explored for this study is integrated with the literature on 
motives of market entry, host country experience and acquisition performance to 
discuss the role of motives on acquisition strategies and the actualization of the 
strategic motives for setting up the subsidiary. Figure 5 shows the focus of the 
current dissertation. 
 
Figure 5. Focus of the current study 
Structurally, this dissertation is a monograph study consisting of seven chapters.  
CHAPTER ONE introduces the dissertation and outlines its background. It dis-
cusses the forms of acquisition strategies to provide the readers a better under-
standing of the scope and motivation of the study. Chapter one also discusses the 
research problems, research gaps, research objectives, research questions and also 
the limitations of the study. The chapter concludes with a discussion on expected 
contributions of the study, key concepts utilized in the study, positioning the dis-
sertation within streams of acquisition literature and theoretical paradigms.  
CHAPTER TWO discusses the extant literature on acquisition vs. green-
fields/alternative entry mode strategies. It also discusses the literature on strategic 
motives for acquisition and performance of foreign acquisition. Furthermore, this 
chapter discusses the two theoretical lenses utilized in the study (institutional the-
ory and Uppsala internationalization process theory). The chapter summarizes 
with clarifications on the choice of two theories explored for the study. It also 
discusses the boundaries of the theories and how the chosen theories will be used 
to answer the research questions. 
CHAPTER THREE focuses on the development of conceptual constructs. It 
shows how formal institutional distance (regulatory restrictions, failure in formal 
institutions and regulatory transparency) influences the choice of partial, staged, 
and full acquisition at the time of entry. Also, it shows the role of informal institu-
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tional distance (negotiation failures rooted in cultural distance) on these choices. 
From internationalization process theory, target-specific experience, trust and 
knowledge opportunities are key constructs explored to show how they influence 
the choice of partial, staged and full acquisition. This is further integrated with the 
literature on host country capability a construct rooted in part in internationaliza-
tion process theory. 
CHAPTER FOUR explored the role of institutions, host country capability in the 
differential performance returns to partial, staged and full acquisition. It also dis-
cusses the motive-based performance measure; and develops a more refined ap-
proach to capturing the performance of an acquisition in the foreign market to aid 
future performance studies in IB field. The chapter concludes with a summary of 
the conceptual framework for the study highlighting the determinants of acquisi-
tion strategies, changes in equity stake and performance differentials of acquisi-
tion strategies. 
CHAPTER FIVE focuses on the research strategy and methods.  First, it dis-
cusses the philosophical assumption of the study. Based on the philosophical as-
sumption, case study method was chosen as the right research approach for the 
study. Second, case study as a research strategy for the current study is discussed. 
It also emphasizes the rationale for multiple case studies and its role in theory 
building. Based on this discussion, a theory building model is established that 
details the selection of cases, data collection (interview design), data analysis and 
reporting the collected data. Hence the dissertation uses the critical realism para-
digms, quality criteria in conducting research within this paradigm is utilized to 
evaluate the validity of the study.   
CHAPTER SIX discusses the empirical data in terms of the background of the 
cases. It shows the timing of investment, acquisition strategies (partial/full/staged) 
per case firms, motives of investment of case firms and location of investments.  
Furthermore, within case analysis is done showing the key issues within each case 
firm acquisition. After that, a cross-case analysis is done to show the key findings 
of the study. The cross-case analysis is done using the constructs developed in the 
study. After that, emerging themes are elucidated, generalized and contextualized 
across cases.  
CHAPTER SEVEN starts with discussions on the objective of the study and 
research questions. The summary of findings of the study is discussed in this sec-
tion. Each finding is discussed separately to provide a richer understanding and 
implications. Next, the key contributions of the dissertation both theoretically and 
empirically are discussed. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the practical and 
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managerial significance in management and international business.  Finally, di-
rection for future studies is discussed.  
Figure 6 shows the structure of the dissertation as summarized in the discussions 
above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1        INTRODUCTION 
• Background of the Study 
• Forms of Acquisition 
• Previous Study and Research Gaps 
• Research Question and Limitations of the Study 
• Expected Contributions of the Study 
• Key Concepts 
• Positioning of the Study and Structure of Dissertation 
CHAPTER 2       THEORITICAL BACKGROUND ON ACQUISITION STRATEGIES 
• Literature Review-Acquisition Entry Strategies and Performance 
• Strategic Motives Perspective on Foreign Acquisitions 
• Institutional Theory 
• Internationalization Process Model and Foreign Acquisitions 
• Summary of Theoretical Lenses and Theoretical Boundaries 
CHAPTER 3    ACQUISITION ENTRY AND CHANGES IN EQUITY STAKE 
• The influence of formal and informal Institutions on Acquisition strategies 
• The influence of Target-Specific Experience and Host Country Capability on Acquisi-
tion strategies  
• The Role of Entry Motives and Institutions on Acquisition Strategies 
• Determinants of Equity Changes in Acquired Foreign Subsidiaries 
CHAPTER 4      DIFFERENTIAL RETURNS TO ACQUISITION STRATEGIES 
• The Role of Institutions on Differential Performance of Acquisition Strategies 
• The Role of Entry Motives on Differential Performance of Acquisition Strategies 
• The Role of Host Country Capability on Differential Performance of Acquisition 
Strategies 
• Summary: Determinants of Acquisition Entry, Post Entry and Acquisition Perfor-
mance 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5      RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS 
• Philosophical Justification: Realism 
• Research Approach 
• Case Study Research and Theory Building 
• Evaluating and Analyzing Data 
• Data Evaluation (Quality Approaches to Realism) 
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Figure 6. Structure of Dissertation 
CHAPTER 6      EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
• Empirical Data and Background of Case Firms 
• Within Case Analysis 
• Determinants of Partial, Staged and Full Acquisition at Market Entry 
• Acquisition Entry Strategies: The Role of Acquisition Motives 
• Determinants of Equity Changes in Acquired foreign Subsidiaries 
• Performance Differentials in Partial and Full Acquisitions 
 
CHAPTER 7      CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
• Summary and Findings 
• Theoretical and Empirical Contribution 
• Practical and Managerial Significance  
• Directions for future study 
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON 
ACQUISITION STRATEGIES, MOTIVES, AND 
PERFORMANCE 
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss in more detail literature on acquisi-
tion entry strategies, acquisition entry motives and acquisition performance. It 
provides a better understanding of the scope of previous studies. After the litera-
ture review, the subsequent sub-sections discuss the theories utilized for this 
study, that is, internationalization process theory and institutional theory. The 
chapter concludes by addressing critiques of the chosen theory, the choice of the 
theories selected in relation to the research questions and finally, the boundaries 
of the application of the theories. 
2.1 Literature Review on Acquisition Entry Strategies 
and Performance 
Section 1.3 already discussed the summary of existing studies. This section elabo-
rates more detailed discussion of the existing studies.  
Scientific database (EBSCO, Proquest, JSTOR, Emerald, ScienceDirect, Pal-
grave, and Wiley) was used to make keyword and abstract search for the purpose 
of exploring previous literature. Keyword and abstract search includes words like; 
partial acquisition, acquisition, staged acquisition, toefold investment, equity de-
cisions, equity commitments, institutions and acquisitions, acquisition perfor-
mance, entry mode performance. Also, other relevant articles referred from col-
leagues and conference proceedings were explored. After reading through the 
papers, articles that are relevant to the subject of the dissertation were selected 
and explored. 
It appears that these articles span across three disciplines: international business, 
strategic management, and corporate finance. It is structurally efficient to classify 
previous research within the scope of this dissertation into four research streams.  
These streams are: 
• Studies that focuses on factors that influences the choice of acquisitions 
entry strategies vs. alternative entry mode choice such as greenfield in-
vestments/joint ventures 
• Studies that focuses on the role of motives in acquisition entry strategies 
• Studies that focuses on post-entry decisions or equity changes at post-
market entry 
• Studies that focuses on the performance of acquisitions  
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Table 2 shows the summary of the focus of extant research streams, theoretical 
lenses explored, authors, and the limitations of the study. 
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2.1.1 Acquisition vs. Alternative Entry Mode Choice in Foreign Market 
There are two streams of studies on acquisition vs. alternative entry mode choice 
in foreign market. The first stream of studies on acquisition vs. alternative entry 
mode choice explores the choice of acquisition versus greenfield investments and 
does neglect the possibility for partial acquisition. The second stream of studies 
combine literature for acquisitions versus greenfield investment and for joint ven-
tures versus wholly owned subsidiaries to explain the choice of partial acquisition 
and staged acquisition. 
Studies on the choice of acquisition versus greenfield investments consist of stud-
ies utilizing several theoretical lenses in an attempt to explain foreign acquisition. 
Five theories emanate as the dominant theories utilized to explain the choice for 
foreign acquisitions. These theories are transaction cost/internalization theory, 
resource base theory, information economics theory, industrial organization per-
spective and organizational learning perspective. The transaction 
cost/internalization theory suggests that the choice for acquisition is motivated by 
the strategic motives of the parent MNEs. That is MNEs seeking for proprietary 
technological knowledge tend to opt for acquisition to improve their competitive 
position (Buckley & Casson 1976; Rugman 1981; Hennart 1982; Williamson 
1985). The information economics is rooted in real options theory. Information 
economics discusses how information affects economic decisions (Slangen & 
Hennart 2007: 409). The central argument in information economics is that in-
formation asymmetry influences decisions in transactions (e.g. Hennart & Park 
1993; Hennart, Larimo & Chen 1996). Thus, the larger the information asym-
metry, firms will not possess adequate knowledge of the actual value of the target 
firm and would find it difficult to integrate acquired firms (Ravenscraft & Scherer 
1987) leading to their preference for greenfield investments (Slangen & Hennart 
2007: 409). Similar argument has been made from real options and hostage theory 
of joint venture and MNEs preference for partial acquisition (Folta 1998; Chen & 
Hennart 2004; Chari & Chang 2009) 
The industrial organization theory utilizes industrial organization literature to ar-
gue that entry mode decisions are made with respect to the existing state of the 
target country industry (concentrated industry vs. growing industries) for which 
the MNEs is seeking market entry (Slangen & Hennart 2007). The Organizational 
learning perspective argues that learning contributes to the propensity to develop 
knowledge (Hennart & Park 1993; Andersson & Svensson 1994; Barkema & 
Vermeulen 1998; Padmanabhan & Cho 1999; Harzing 2002) Thus, as organiza-
tions operates in various environment, over time, it will be exposed to varieties of 
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technological knowledge, market knowledge and environmental activities that 
will increase their capabilities and tendencies to acquire knowledge (ibid). Organ-
izational learning perspective suggests that experience and learning are the key 
variables that influence acquisition decisions. For example, scholars suggest that 
previous acquisition experience leads to a greater tendency for acquisitions (Pad-
manabhan & Cho 1999; Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn 2007; Slangen & Hennart 
2008; Arslan 2011).  
These theories/studies have several limitations. First, they are overlapping and in 
some cases contradictory. For example, while the transaction cost economies 
finds a negative relationship between parent’s host-country experience and the 
choice of acquisitions (Hennart & Park 1993), the information economies argue 
that parent’s host-country experience increases the likelihood of acquisitions be-
cause as managers gain more knowledge about host-country, information asym-
metry is reduced, thus the likelihood of acquisitions (Hennart & Park 1993; Hen-
nart et al. 1996).  
The second limitation of these studies is that their arguments for the choice of 
greenfield investments were contingents upon that: in order to avoid the degree of 
risks associated with acquisitions, MNE’s opt for lesser risk or optimize risks and 
benefits. Thus, they neglected that partial acquisition can still be a means to opti-
mize risks and benefits rather than seeking greenfield investments. For instance, it 
is suggested that acquisition is preferred to greenfield when the subsidiary prod-
uct is not related to those of their parents (e.g. Hennart & Park 1993; Hennart et 
al. 1996; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000; Larimo 2003; Chen & Zeng 2004). Some 
other studies suggest no significant relationship (e.g. Zejan 1990; Cho & Pad-
manabhan 1995; Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Padmanabhan & Cho 1999). It 
could be that given the availability of acquisitions targets, when a subsidiary 
product is not related to those of the parent MNE, partial acquisition may be pre-
ferred rather than full acquisition and greenfield investment. This is because the 
acquiring firm may not possess adequate knowledge about the true value of the 
target firm assets. It is possible that the lack of acquisition targets may be the rea-
son some findings suggest that greenfield establishment was opted for when the 
subsidiary product is not related to those of the parent MNE.   
The third limitation of these studies is that they did not consider ownership re-
strictions in its distinctive forms. Rather, these studies (e.g. Cho & Padmanabhan 
1995; Padmanabhan & Cho 1999) suggest that ownership restriction emanating 
from host country institutions led to restrictions on acquisition entry and thus the 
choice of greenfield investments. However, it is pertinent to note that ownership 
restrictions may not necessarily entail restrictions on acquisition entry but re-
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strictions on the amount of equity stake to be acquired by a foreign acquirer. 
Thus, the existence of ownership restriction may influence the choice of both par-
tial acquisition and greenfield investments (partial and full ownerships).  
Finally, these studies lack contextualization as they tend to group together a large 
number of MNE’s foreign market entries and examine them in aggregate form. 
Consequently, they imply that MNE’s acquisitions are influenced by same factors 
(Chang & Rosenzweig 2001). Meyer and Gelbuda (2006) argue that the ahistori-
cal, aprocessual and acontextual nature of such studies limits their explanatory 
power. In summary, these studies have ignored the existence of partial, staged and 
full acquisition as they have treated all acquisition as the same (Xu, Zhou & Phan 
2010). In most cases, most studies dealing with the ownership structure of foreign 
subsidiary considers partial acquisition as joint ventures (Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-
Canal 2004).  
The second stream of studies combines argument for acquisitions versus green-
field investment and for joint ventures versus wholly owned subsidiaries to ex-
plain the choice of partial acquisition and staged acquisition. For example, by 
exploring arguments from information asymmetry, Xu et al. (2010) showed how 
firms in China address their information disadvantage in the acquisition of public 
firms by choosing a sequential acquisition strategy over a single-transaction ac-
quisition strategy. They argued that diversifying firms faced information asym-
metry as a result of lack of the relevant knowledge and experience in the new 
business.  They also posit that private firms in emerging market of China face a 
high degree of information disadvantage than their state-owned counterparts. This 
is because state-owned enterprises (SOEs), in contrast, have better access to in-
formation on target firms due to their links to and support from the government 
agencies. Consequently, they suggest that an acquisition is more likely to be se-
quential if the acquirer is a private firm and if the firm is diversifying into a new 
business area. (ibid)  
Jakobsen (2008) challenged the asymmetric information view on partial acquisi-
tion in three transitional economies (Hungary, Poland & Lithuania). He argued 
that cautious sellers (sellers who desire to attain a share in the expected increase 
in the firm value), rather than buyers, motivate partial acquisition. Thus, reverse 
asymmetric information effect (sellers perception to attain a share in the increased 
value of the firm) overrides buyers informational disadvantage. He showed that 
while previous market knowledge results into partial acquisition, the presence of a 
subsidiary prior to recent entry in the host country results into full acquisition. 
The choice of partial acquisition is seen as often transitory arrangements aimed at 
full acquisition in the form of staged acquisition (Meyer & Tran 2006; Meyer & 
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Estrin 2007; Jakobsen 2008). These authors (Meyer & Estrin 2007; Jakobsen 
2008) argue that partial acquisition are not primarily decided by the investor 
based on cost and benefits, rather an outcome of the bilateral bargaining process 
between buyer and seller. They also suggest that the choice of staged acquisition 
is as a result of the sellers’ willingness and ability to sell the company and the 
buyers’ preference for staged acquisition. It was suggested that the buyers’ pref-
erence for staged acquisition is because the continued involvement of the previ-
ous owner is valuable for the acquirer. (ibid) 
Arslan and Larimo (2011) showed that high informal institutional distance be-
tween home and host countries of parent and target firms lead to a greater propen-
sity for full acquisition. Contractor et al. (2014) found a positive relationship be-
tween high informal institutional distance (high uncertainty avoidance distance) 
for preference of partial acquisition than full acquisition for acquisitions in India 
and China. Arslan and Larimo (2011) showed that high formal institutional pres-
sures lead to a greater propensity for partial acquisition. Similarly, Lopez-Duarte 
and Garcia-Canal (2004) studied the choice between joint ventures and acquisi-
tions in foreign direct investments. Their findings suggest that high country risks 
influence the managerial decision for partial acquisition because they serve as 
appropriate entry mode to deal with the country risks countries. While  Lopez-
Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2004) and Arslan and Larimo (2011) found a positive 
relationship between high formal institutional environment and the choice of par-
tial acquisition, Contractor et al. (2014) found a positive relationships between 
high formal institutional distance and MNEs preference for full acquisition. They 
showed that the joint effect of industry relatedness and high institutional distance 
results in the choice of partial acquisition over full acquisition (ibid).  
Folta (1998) and Chen and Hennart (2004) found a positive relationship between 
the degree of asset specificity of the investment and a greater propensity for full 
acquisition than partial acquisition. Chen and Hennart (2004) utilize the hostage 
theory of joint ventures rooted in the real options perspective and information 
economics to suggest that partial acquisition is chosen by multinationals to reduce 
ex-ante and ex-post cost to compensate the risks and cost of full acquisition. 
Drawing argument from real option perspective, Chari and Chang (2009) ex-
plained that the choice for lower share of equity in local firms are due to (a) diffi-
culty in valuating targets in different industries, (b) problems with integrating 
local firm’s managers in culturally different countries, (c) high cost of separating 
desired assets from non-desired assets in larger firms, (d) greater exogenous coun-
try risks and lower rivalry in the host market. No relationship was found between 
previous subsidiary in the host country, and the share of equity sought.  
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Akhigbe et al. (2007) showed that partial acquisition lead to a greater propensity 
for full acquisition. Cai, Ees, van Veen and Gubbi (2013) combined argument 
from agency theory, transaction cost economics and organizational tendency for 
risk averseness to study the influence of acquirer and target ownership structures 
on the choice of partial and full acquisition by Brazilian firms. They showed that 
target firm ownership concentration (percentage of corporate equity owned by an 
individual or identifiable group) increases the likelihood of partial acquisition of 
the target. They argued that ownership concentration increases the risk averseness 
of the acquiring firm due to concentrated ownership and control from sharehold-
ers. Additionally, they found no support that ownership concentration of the ac-
quirer and the choice of partial acquisition is moderated either by the degree of 
industry relatedness or by the public status of the target. 
In summary, studies exploring the choice of partial acquisition vs. alternative en-
try mode choice have shown that institutional environment, buyer’s information 
asymmetry and reverse information asymmetry, previous relationship with target 
firm, ownership concentration of the acquirer and specificity of target firm asset 
has an effect on the preferential choice for partial, staged or full acquisition. With 
the exception to Jakobsen (2008), these studies have in most cases explained the 
choice of partial acquisition by combining arguments for acquisitions versus 
greenfield and joint ventures versus wholly owned subsidiary. These arguments, 
though with some contributions to literature, insufficiently explain the choice of 
partial acquisition over full and staged acquisition.  
First, they have not accounted for all aspects of institutions that influence the 
choice of partial and full acquisition at the time of entry. This is because they did 
not take into cognizance the issue-specific and context-specific set of formal 
(regulatory) and informal (cognitive and normative) institutions in a given coun-
try (Kostova & Roth 2002) that directly influences the choice of acquisition strat-
egies. Second, these studies assumed that MNEs do remain passive at the time of 
entry and did not account for the role of host country capability and previous ex-
perience with the acquired target that could result in preference for a specific ac-
quisition strategy over another. For example, previous relationship and host coun-
try capability prior to target acquisition should enhance certain firm capabilities 
and their likelihood or preference for certain acquisition strategy (e.g. full acquisi-
tion over partial and staged acquisition). Such capabilities could also enhance 
their ability to integrate successfully the acquired firms and achieve synergies. 
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2.1.2 Strategic Motive Perspective on Foreign Acquisition  
From strategic management and international business studies, the motives of 
FDIs have been dominated by the paradigm studies of Dunning (1988; 1993) 
which is based on exploitation of ownership, location and internalization ad-
vantages of the firm. Dunning (1988; 1993) proposes four different types of for-
eign direct investment motives: market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, resource-
seeking and strategic asset-seeking motives.  
According to Dunning (1988; 1993), resource-seeking firms are motivated to in-
vest overseas to gain access or acquire specific resources. It includes access to 
raw materials and natural resources, access to cheap and semi-skilled labor and 
access to technological capacity, management or marketing expertise and organi-
zational skills in more advantageous conditions (ibid). Market-seeking firms are 
motivated to enter the foreign market with the aim of serving the market in that 
country (Dunning 1993). Firms aim at market-seeking motive in order to follow 
their customers to foreign markets, increase their market size and market growth, 
adapt to local standards and requirements, and reduce transaction cost and psychic 
distance and to establish a presence in leading competitive markets (ibid). 
Efficiency-seeking motives are motives aimed at rationalizing production, distri-
bution, and marketing activities through common governance of and synergy-
building among geographically dispersed operations (Dunning 1993; Gorynia et 
al. 2007). According to Dunning (1993), efficiency-seeking FDI’s aim to take 
advantage of the differences in the cost of factor endowments and to achieve 
economies of scale and scope. 
Strategic asset-seeking motives are motives aimed at protecting and increasing a 
firm competitiveness or core competencies by capitalizing on common ownership 
of a network of activities and capabilities in diverse environments (Dunning 
1993; Yang & Kang 2005). Such strategic-assets include access to technology and 
means of obtaining such technology (Yang & Kang 2005).  FDIs aimed at strate-
gic asset-seeking are aimed at accessing advanced proprietary technology, immo-
bile strategic assets (e.g., brands, local distribution networks) and other capabili-
ties such as  human and intellectual capital (Buckley et al. 2007). 
Nowadays, strategic asset-seeking investments are gaining significance in the 
competitive global economy. This has led MNE’s to refocus their location needs 
from access to markets, natural resources and increasing efficiency to access to 
knowledge-intensive assets and learning. While resource-seeking, efficiency-
seeking and market-seeking motives are aimed at decreasing production cost, 
surmounting trade barriers and utilizing scale economy, the strategic asset-
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seeking motives are aimed at promoting the long-term competitiveness of the 
MNE (Yang & Kang 2005). 
Some studies have explored how the motives for foreign market entry influence 
the choice of acquisition strategies. Sanchez-Peinado et al. (2007) account for a 
positive relationship between market-seeking motives and the choice for full con-
trol modes (i.e. full acquisition and WOS in greenfield investments) for capital 
intensive service FDIs of Spanish multinationals worldwide. Tahir and Larimo 
(2006) found out that low cultural distance, large market size, and high levels of 
economic welfare in the target country increases the probability of choosing WOS 
and undertaking market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDIs in Asian market. 
They also showed that low inflation rate, low level of risks and a high level of 
exchange rate fluctuation in the target country increase the probability of choos-
ing WOS to undertake efficiency-seeking FDIs. Folta (1998) found out that tech-
nological seeking motivated FDIs opt for partial acquisition and international 
joint ventures when there is dissimilarity in business operations, technical sub-
fields, presence of technological uncertainty and fewer rivals in the industry.  
Furthermore, Roberts et al. (2008) examined the motives for FDIs in Eastern Eu-
rope by analyzing foreign entry by full and partial acquisition of 500 largest com-
panies in Polish manufacturing facilitated by privatization programs spanning 
between 1993 and 1998. The results point to market-seeking objective behind the 
location decisions of foreign investors. The partial acquisition in the brewing in-
dustries in Poland (e.g. Carsberg Okoim 1986-2004) suggests market-seeking 
motives. Gorynia et al. (2007) studied the motives and modes of seven case study 
of FDIs in Poland and found out that acquisitions were motivated by market-
seeking and efficiency-seeking motives. 
The following summary can be drawn from studies exploring motives of market 
entry and the choice of acquisition strategies. The relationship between motives of 
acquisition and acquisition strategies is not clear. It is possible that the missing 
link could be established by taking cognizance of the interaction with the external 
environmental (Paul & Wooster 2008; Roberts et al. 2008). Consequently, Sec-
tion 3.1.3 will address the interaction of the strategic motives for market entry 
with institutional theory to show how different acquisition motives and strategies 
are more likely in a particular institutional context compared to others. 
2.1.3 Acquisition Performance Literature 
There are three distinct ways in which extant acquisition research has operational-
ized acquisition performance. First, a stream of studies has operationalized acqui-
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sition performance using share price movement based on event study methodolo-
gy (e.g. Markides & Ittner 1994; Cakici, Hessel & Tandon 1996; Chang 1998; 
Fuller, Netter & Stegemoller 2002; Markelevich 2003; Akhigbe et al. 2004; 
Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2007; Zhou et al. 2007; Larimo & Pynnönen 2008; 
Swaminathan et al. 2008; Aybar & Ficici 2009; Mantecon 2009; Bednarczyk, 
Schiereck & Walter 2010; Brockman, Rui & Zou 2013). The second stream has 
operationalized acquisition performance based on accounting and financial 
measures (e.g. Eyssell 1989; Cannella & Hambrick 1993; Rahman 1993; Capron 
1999; Reus 2004; Slangen 2006; Park et al. 2009; Ahammad & Glaister 2011; 
Ertuna & Yamak 2011). The third stream of studies has operationalized acquisi-
tion performance in terms of achievement of project specific motives and specific 
programs (e.g. Hitt et al. 1991; Steensma & Corley 2000; Ahuja & Katila 2001; 
Hagedoorn & Duysters 2002; Cloodt et al. 2006; Puranam, Singh & Chaudhuri 
2009; Grimpe 2007; Puranam & Srikanth 2007; Lahovnik & Malenkovic 2011). 
The event study methodology assumes that market response to public information 
about the acquisitions based on the efficient market hypothesis (Aybar & Ficici 
2009). That is, markets will understand the true value of an acquisition and will 
respond favorably to the announcement of the acquisitions leading to positive 
abnormal returns (ibid). While few of these studies contrast the influence of par-
tial and full acquisition on shareholder value, their findings yielded contradictory 
findings.  
For example, Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2007) studied the stock market 
reaction of 682 Spanish FDIs within 1990-2003 in EU, OECD (non-EU), Latin 
America, and the rest of the world. Their findings suggested that full acquisition 
create shareholder value while partial acquisition has a non-significant relation-
ship to shareholder value creation. They also found a positive but not statistically 
significant relationship between partial acquisition and shareholder value in coun-
tries with policy instability. Similarly, Swaminathan et al. (2008) found no signif-
icant relationship between partial acquisition and shareholder value. Markides and 
Ittner (1994) studied shareholder value creation within 1975-1988 through USA 
cross-border acquisition in Canada, Continental Europe, UK and Pacific. Their 
findings suggest that partial acquisition is not valued differently from full acquisi-
tion. Larimo and Pynnönen (2008) studied 294 Finnish cross-border acquisition 
and wealth creation within 1986-2006 in USA, Germany, Sweden, Japan and Es-
tonia. Their findings suggest that the abnormal return to partial acquirers needs 
future research. Zhou et al. (2007) studied the influence of information institu-
tions on acquisition strategies performance of USA Firms in foreign markets. 
They found out that firms that choose partial acquisition in opaque information 
environment performed better than firms that choose full acquisition.  
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Other studies (e.g., Cakici et al. 1996; Chang 1998; Fuller et al. 2002; Markele-
vich 2003; Akhigbe et al. 2004; Aybar & Ficici 2009; Mantecon 2009; Bednar-
czyk et al. 2010; Brockman et al. 2013) did not contrast returns to partial and full 
acquisition. However, some provide evidence for the role of institutions, motives 
and acquisitions integration in acquisition performance. For example, Brockman 
et al. (2013) found that in cross-border acquisitions, politically connected bidders 
tend to perform better than non-politically connected bidders in countries with 
weak legal systems or high levels of corruption. Mantecon (2009) found that toe-
hold investments, equity JVs, use of stock as payment experienced excess cumu-
lative abnormal returns in the presence of high integration difficulty and valuation 
uncertainty and investment risks. Markelevich (2003) found that value creating 
mergers (i.e. mergers aimed at synergies) creates more value than agency-
motivated mergers.  
The second stream of studies operationalized acquisition performance using ac-
counting and financial measures such as return on assets, return on investments, 
return on sales, profitability, etc. Most of these studies have treated both partial 
and full acquisition as same (exception to Eyssell 1989; Ertuna & Yamak 2011). 
However, they showed that organizational cultural compatibility, goal similarity, 
business relatedness (Park et al. 2009), knowledge transfer (Reus 2004), resource 
redeployment and asset divestiture (Capron 1999), cultural distance in the pres-
ence of limited integration (Slangen 2006), cultural distance in the presence of 
strong integration capability (Ahammad & Glaister 2011) influences acquisition 
performance. While Cannella and Hambrick (1993) found a negative relationship 
between the departures of executives on acquisition performance, Rahman (1993) 
found no impact. Finally, the two studies that treated partial acquisition found (1) 
no substantive changes in financial performance following positive valuation ef-
fects (Eyssell 1989); (2) returns to foreign partial acquirers in turkey display supe-
rior performance by virtue of responding both to the efficiency concerns of trans-
action cost theory and the legitimacy focus of institutional theory (Ertuna & 
Yamak 2011). 
The third stream of studies operationalized acquisition performance based on the 
achievement of project specific motives and specific programs such as knowledge 
transfer, innovation performance, R&D performance and success of integration. 
These studies did not take into cognizance the varying acquisition types. The con-
clusion of these studies is that certain specific factors increase the achievement of 
specific acquisition motives. For example, Lahovnik and Malenkovic (2011) 
identified transfer of skills, sharing of activities, strategic realignment and com-
plimentary resources as four motives of acquisitions in bank and financial sector.  
Ahuja and Katila (2001) found that the relatedness of the knowledge base of the 
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acquired and acquiring firm leads to innovative performance in acquisitions. On 
the contrary, Cloodt et al. (2006) found a curvilinear relationship to innovative 
performance. Some other studies found a positive relationship between R&D in-
tensity, relatedness of technologies to technology performance of acquisitions 
(e.g. Hitt et al. 1991; Hagedoorn & Duysters 2002). Steensma and Corley (2000) 
found that sourcing imitable technologies through acquisitions results in sourcing 
performance. Puranam et al. (2006) found that structural integration decreases the 
likelihood of introducing new products for firms that have not launched products 
before being acquired and for all firms immediately after acquisition, but these 
effects disappear as innovation trajectories evolve. Grimpe (2007) found that 
standardization of systems; linking R&D units and symbiosis integration strategy 
will lead to the technological success of the acquisition. Puranam et al. (2009) 
found that experienced acquirers are better able to mitigate the disruptive conse-
quences of the loss of autonomy entailed by integration and no evidence that they 
can achieve greater coordination benefits from integration. 
These three streams of literature have important implications on acquisition per-
formance. These studies show that institutions (political strategy, corruption, legal 
environment, national country distance), motives of acquisition and integration 
influences acquisition performance. However, they have two important limita-
tions. First, acquisition performance has been measured in various ways leading 
to contradictory findings. For example, while studies utilizing event study meth-
odology found no significant relationship between partial acquisition and share-
holder value (Swaminathan et al. 2008) or no significantly difference between 
returns to partial acquisition and full acquisition (Markides & Ittner 1994); studies 
utilizing accounting and financial measures found that returns to foreign partial 
acquirers in Turkey display superior performance by virtue of responding both to 
the efficiency concerns of transaction cost theory and the legitimacy focus of in-
stitutional theory (Ertuna & Yamak 2011). The contradictory finding can be at-
tributed in part to the distinct interest of various research disciplines. While event 
study methodology is dominant in finance and accounting disciplines, finance and 
accounting measures is dominant by scholars from strategic management and 
international business. More so, the contradictory finding could be attributed to 
the fact that share price movement can be influenced by other events (Schoenberg 
2006). Share price movement does not account for the long-term actualization of 
the motives of acquisition nor does it account for future profitability of the firm 
(Larsson & Finkelstein 1999; Papadakis & Thanos 2010).  
Second, studies focused on the achievement of specific motives, and specific pro-
grams do not account for the performance of partial acquisition nor did they show 
the context in which full acquisition performs better than partial acquisition. 
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These studies mainly considered all acquisitions to be the same. There is need for 
more refined measures of acquisition performance that takes into account the stra-
tegic motives for setting up the subsidiary in foreign markets as it has been argued 
that the strategic motives for acquiring a subsidiary should play a role in the actu-
alizations of the motives (Verbeke, Li & Goerzen 2009; Meglio & Risberg 2010). 
2.2 Institutional Theory 
The earlier institutional theorists viewed institutions from economic (North 1990; 
1991) and sociological perspectives (Scott 1995). North (1990; 1991) views insti-
tutions as humanly devised pressures that shape human interactions. They reduce 
uncertainty by establishing a stable (not necessarily efficient) structure to human 
exchange (whether political, social or economic). Institutions provide the basic 
structure by which human beings create order and attempt to reduce uncertainty in 
exchange. Institutions are also set up to define the choice set and, therefore, de-
termine transaction and production cost and hence the profitability and feasibility 
of engaging in economic activities. (ibid) North’s perspective on institutional the-
ory focuses on the economic perspective, and the informal and formal dimensions 
of institutions. The informal institutions exert pressures that come from socially 
transmitted information and are part of culture (North 1990: 37). Informal institu-
tional pressures arise from the need to structure interaction to reduce uncertainty. 
They originate from customs, traditions, and codes of conduct. (ibid) Formal In-
stitutions are established to make rules that may increase the effectiveness of in-
formal pressures, modify them, or supersede them (North 1990: 46).  
Scott’s perspective on institutions focuses on the sociological aspects of institu-
tions. Institutions are viewed as multi-faceted systems incorporating symbolic 
systems-cognitive constructions, normative rules, and regulative processes carried 
out through and shaping social behavior (ibid). According to Scott, the cognitive 
aspects of institutions are pre-occupied on how individuals internally represent 
their environments. He posits that the cognitive dimension is pre-occupied with 
our conceptions of who we are and what ways of action make sense for us in a 
given situation. The cognitive dimension is similar to the debate between internal 
conformity vs. external conformity (see DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Cognitive 
aspects of institutions suggest that when organizations are faced with uncertainty 
or they are confronted with what ways of actions that make sense for them in a 
given situation, they tend to mimic industry players or mimic existing form of 
organizations practices in similar circumstances (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).  
Regulatory aspect deals with rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities 
(Scott 1995). Regulatory institutions establish rules, inspect or review conformity 
42      Acta Wasaensia 
 
to them and as necessary, manipulate sanctions, rewards or punishments in an 
attempt to influence future behavior. The normative aspects of institutions are 
pre-occupied with formal rules that introduce prescriptive, evaluative, and obliga-
tory dimensions of social life. They include norms and values that both specify 
how things should be done and define the goals or objectives and the appropriate 
ways to pursue them. (ibid) 
Scott’s perspectives on institutions are somewhat different from North perspec-
tives on institutions. While North’s perspective focuses on the economic aspects 
of institutions, Scott perspective tend to focus on sociological aspects. Recent 
studies in IB suggest that IB scholars tend to combine both economic and socio-
logical perspectives in their study and following Peng and Heath (1996) both per-
spectives are considered in this dissertation as complimentary. Scott (1995) also 
suggests that the two perspectives are complementary. For example, it has been 
argued that the cognitive component is semantically close to culture (Pogrebnya-
kov & Maitland 2011) and has been referred to as cognitive-cultural component 
of institutions (Scott 2001; 2008). Formal institutions in North’s institutional per-
spective is also related to regulatory aspects of institutions in Scott (1995) while 
informal Institutional dimensions in North (1990) is related to the cognitive and 
normative aspects in Scott (1995). 
In international business literature, institutional theory consists of the institution-
al-based view of international business strategy (Peng 2003; Peng, Wang & Jiang 
2008), comparative institutionalism (Harzing & Sorge 2003; Djelic & Ainamo 
1999; Ferner, Almond & Colling 2005) and the neo-organizational institutional-
ism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Powell & DiMaggio 1991; Oliver 1997).  For a 
review of these institutional approaches see Hotho and Pedersen (2012).  
The institutional-based view of international business strategy was introduced to 
integrate the interdisciplinary battle between a sociological (Scott 1995) and eco-
nomic perspective (North 1990) of institutions (Arslan 2011). It comprises of 
Formal and Informal aspects of institutions (North 1990) and also combines ele-
ment of the sociological aspects of institutions (Scott 1995). They posit that insti-
tutions govern transactions in a society and influence MNEs strategies in terms of 
the choice of governance arrangement through which firms’ economic activities 
are organized and their performance outcomes. Institutional-based view of inter-
national business strategy consists of stream of studies from the new institutional 
economics literature. These studies assume that the nature of exchange processes 
or transactions and the amount of frictions that takes place during these transac-
tions are dependent on the institutional context in which they take place (Hotho & 
Pedersen 2012). They argue that host country institutional environment would 
 Acta Wasaensia     43 
  
influence the cost and uncertainty multinationals would encounter when setting 
up their subsidiaries and in gaining access to local resources. Consequently, a 
country with viable institutions will reduce the transaction cost and policy uncer-
tainty in doing business in that country and will enable efficient markets for local 
resources (Delious & Henisz 2003; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng 2009).  
The neo-organizational institutionalism is rooted in sociology and organizational 
theories (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Powell & DiMaggio 1991; Oliver 1997). It 
focuses on organizational forms and organizational practices and how pressures 
exerted by the internal and external institutionalized practices influences firms 
strategies (Oliver 1991; Powell & DiMaggio 1991). 
The neo-organizational institutionalism argues that organizational practices are 
shaped by the interaction between the external environment (formal institutions, 
normative pressures and cultural-cognitive systems) and the organizations leading 
to institutionalization of norms and practices that explains the homogeneity in 
organizational forms and practices across organizations in a particular country 
(Powell & DiMaggio 1991). The neo-organizational institutionalism have been 
advanced in later works by Kostova (1997; 1999) and Kostova and Zaheer 
(1999), and have been used to explain differences in organizational practices 
across different countries and how these differences creates challenges of external 
and internal legitimacy for organization seeking to establish a foreign subsidiary 
and transfer of organizational practices to such subsidiaries (Hotho & Pedersen 
2012). Thus, the central assumption of the neo-organizational institutionalism is 
that differences in institutions explains differences in work practices such as HR 
strategies, corporate social responsibility practices, corruption practices in organi-
zations and variations in entry mode decisions (for example, see Rodriguez, Uh-
lenbruck & Eden 2005; Ramsey 2005; Gaur, Delios & Singh 2007). It has been 
suggested that neo-organizational institutionalism is suitable for studies analyzing 
legitimacy and transferability of particular organizational practices (Hotho & 
Pedersen 2012). 
The third institutional approach to international business is the comparative insti-
tutionalism. It is rooted in political science, the sociology of work and compara-
tive political economy (Hotho & Pedersen 2012). They argue that differences in 
systems of economic coordination and control in market economies such as edu-
cation systems, financial systems and market relations explains the distinctive 
economic logic and types of innovation between nations giving rise to for in-
stance different market structures, processes and comparative advantage in some 
activities for example, between liberal and coordinated societies (Hotho & Peder-
sen 2012: 247). Studies utilizing comparative institutionalism tend to show that 
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MNEs operations in foreign countries are influenced on one hand by their home 
country institutions and on the other hand by the host institutions where they lo-
cate their foreign subsidiaries (ibid). For example, studies have found a positive 
influence between home country and gradual internationalization process (Lu-
ostarinen 1994); home country and type of corporate control mechanism (Harzing 
& Sorge 2003); home country and decision to outsource or diversify in response 
to industry pressure (Djelic & Ainamo 1999). Recent studies on comparative in-
stitutionalism have advanced home and host country institutional effect as creat-
ing duality of institutional logics leading to compromise strategy on implementa-
tion of organizational practices such as corporate diversity policy (Ferner et al. 
2005). Child and Marinova (2014) explored home and host country context of 
Chinese multinationals and argued that the contextualization of Chinese home and 
host country institutions is a more predictor of Chinese firms outward FDI’s. In 
summary, comparative institutionalism can be used to show that home country 
institutions influence the competencies and types of practices of MNEs within a 
particular home country and why they face specific challenges, for example, lia-
bility of home (Steven & Shenkar 2012) when internationalizing into different 
institutional host countries.  
The focus of this dissertation is on how institutions influence acquisition entry 
strategies.  Institutional-based view of international business strategy will be the 
primary focus of the institutional perspective utilized in this dissertation. Notable 
IB scholars utilize institutional-based view perspective to explore how formal and 
informal institutions influence international business strategy. In some cases, they 
combine the cognitive aspects, normative and regulatory aspects in explaining 
why the difference in institutions influences MNE’s international strategy. The 
differences in institutions is in most cases referred to as “institutional distance” 
which measures the difference between host and home countries institutions and 
how they influence MNE’s international strategy (Xu &  Shenkar 2002; Ramsey 
2005; Pattnaik & Choe 2007; Arslan & Larimo 2010; Arslan 2011; Arslan & Lar-
imo 2011; Pogrebnyakov & Maitland 2011; Contractor et al. 2014; Zhang, Zhong, 
Wen & Jiang 2014). Some scholars exploring the institutional-based view of in-
ternational business strategy tend to focus on institutional advancement/decline in 
host countries and how it influences MNE’s strategies (e.g. Lopez-Duarte & Gar-
cia-Canal 2004; Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn 2007). However, both perspectives 
in many occasions reference secondary data sources (e.g., World Bank, world 
competitiveness report, EBRD, etc.) that measures the institutional environment 
of countries on a scale of several factors. Detailed discussions of these studies are 
discussed below. 
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Institutional distance perspective argues that institutional differences between 
home and host countries influence the entry strategy of firms (Xu & Shenkar 
2002; Estrin, Baghdasaryan & Meyer 2009; Arslan 2011) as well as the survival 
of those firms (Gaur & Lu 2007). Institutional distance perspective suggests that 
the greater the differences in institutional environment, the additional cost of do-
ing business in that country vis-à-vis unfamiliarity hazards, and relational hazards 
(Gaur & Lu 2007). Thus, the greater the institutional distance, the greater the lia-
bility of foreignness and problems in managing relationships at a distance (e.g. 
costs of monitoring and dispute settlement) (Xu & Shenkar 2002; Ramsey 2005; 
Pattnaik & Choe 2007; Estrin, Baghdasaryan & Meyer 2009; Arslan 2011). The 
closer the institutional distance the more the similarities in the legal and political 
institutional development of the countries. It is suggested that for advanced econ-
omies, similarity in institutional development should facilitate the processes both 
of searching and negotiating for acquisition targets and of post-acquisition re-
structuring thus should influence the choice of acquisitions. Thus, high institu-
tional differences should lead to the preference for low commitment entry strate-
gies such as partial acquisition and IJVs. (ibid) 
Arslan (2011) found strong support that high formal institutional distance leads to 
the preference for IJVs in entry mode choice of 343 Finnish FDIs into CEE, Asia, 
and Latin America. Similarly, Arslan and Larimo (2011) found out that high for-
mal institutional distance lead to the preference for partial acquisition. Estrin et al. 
(2009) found out that high human resource distance resulted in the propensity of 
experienced investors to pursue acquisitions (partial and full acquisition) and 
IJVs. Arslan (2011) also found out that informal institutional distance lead to the 
propensity of Finnish FDIs in CEE, Asia and Latin America to opt for acquisi-
tions and wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS). Xu and Shenkar (2002) propose that 
other things being equal, an MNE is more likely to enter a foreign market via ac-
quisition where normative and cognitive distances are small.  
Using Scott (1995) institutional perspective, Xu, Pan and Beamish (2004) based 
on a sample of 2,339 Japanese foreign subsidiaries in 45 countries found out that 
larger regulative and normative distances are negatively associated with the extent 
of equity ownership and presence of expatriates in foreign subsidiaries of the Jap-
anese MNEs. 
Notably from these studies is that they measure differences between home and 
host country institution and they posit that these differences are the triggers to 
MNE’s strategic choices in foreign markets. These studies are limited in several 
ways. First, they tend to focus on general level aspects of formal/regulatory, in-
formal/normative aspects of institutions without specifying the issue-specific and 
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context-specific set of formal (regulatory) and informal (cognitive and normative) 
institutions in a given country (Kostova & Roth 2002) that directly influences the 
choice of acquisitions. For example, the operationalization of institutional dis-
tance utilized by Arslan (2011) to discuss the choice between full acquisition and 
greenfield was same measures utilized to discuss the choice between partial and 
full acquisition in Arslan and Larimo (2011). Thus, we cannot assert that the same 
factors that influence the choice of greenfield vs. acquisitions are same factors 
that influence the choice of partial vs. full acquisition. Exporting the same 
measures in different conceptual context (acquisition vs. greenfield & partial vs. 
full acquisition) does not inform us how managers tradeoff between this choices 
and does not inform us the specific issues explaining why multinationals carry out 
their FDIs by taking over existing local firms, but acquiring only partial equity of 
the target. Consequently, scholars (e.g., Huang & Sternquist 2007; Francis, Zheng 
& Mukherji 2009) have called for developing a proper set of measures for as-
sessing the multiple dimensions of institutional environment on entry strategies of 
multinationals in foreign markets. 
Studies within the institutional-based view perspective that focuses on the ad-
vancement in host country institutions argue that the advancement of host country 
institutions to standards obtainable in developed and advanced economies ensures 
adequate institutional protection of investors and protection of proprietary assets. 
The protection of investors and proprietary assets increases the likelihood of ac-
quisitions (Baums 1993; Pagano & Volpin 2005) and hence reduces the need for 
costly governance structures such as full ownership (Contractor et al. 2014). On 
this premise, Dikova and Van Witteloostuijn (2007) studied the entry and estab-
lishment modes in transition economies. They found support that greater formal 
(regulatory) institutional advancement in host countries was positively associated 
with the likelihood of acquisition and establishment of subsidiaries with shared 
ownership. Similarly, Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2004) studied the choice 
between joint ventures and acquisitions in foreign direct investments. Their find-
ings suggest that high country risks influence the managerial decision for pure 
partial acquisition because they serve as appropriate entry mode to deal with the 
high country risks countries.  
Of importance to this dissertation is the formal and informal institutional envi-
ronment of the host country that influences acquisition strategies at the time of 
entry and the dynamic aspects of the institutional environment leading to changes 
in equity commitments in foreign markets. The focus of this dissertation involves 
case companies from developed country institutions of Finland entering into both 
developed and emerging economies. Consequently, the focus is on how the host 
country institutions (developed vs. emerging) influence the acquisition entry 
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strategies of the case firm’s acquisitions. Arguments from Scott (1995) regulatory 
aspects of institutions are used to support discussions on the formal institutional 
dimensions in North (1990). Similarly, arguments from normative and cognitive 
aspects of institutions from Scott (1995) are combined in the informal institution-
al dimensions as they are complementary (Peng & Heath 1996; Scott 1995; 
Pogrebnyakov & Maitland 2011).  
This study takes into cognizance both formal and informal institutional environ-
ment on exploring the influence of institutions on acquisition entry strategies.  
However, it departs from the general measures of formal and informal institution-
al distance based on secondary data sources. Rather, the focus is on the manifesta-
tion of host institutional environment (developed vs. emerging) on the acquisition 
entry strategies of the case firm through their actual impact on firms acquisition 
strategies as presented by the acquisition managers of the case firms.  
The formal institutional environment used in this dissertation is extended to in-
clude transparency/non-transparency of regulatory institutions and failure in for-
mal institutions. Non-transparent regulatory institutions results from inefficiency 
in the regulatory institutions in enforcing laws (such as copyright, patent and 
competition laws) and ensuring transparency in information institutions that gov-
ern financial transparency and disclosure (Balakrishnan & Koza 1993; Hoskisson, 
Eden, Lau & Wright 2000; Whittington 2000; Zhou, Anand & Yu 2007). Failure 
in formal institutions precipitates political risks (such as terrorism, widespread 
institutionalized corruption and disruption of democracy), and they reduce foreign 
direct investments in host countries. Such host countries are incapable of develop-
ing effective formal institutions that should supersede the effectiveness of infor-
mal institutional pressures (North 1990: 46). The informal institutional environ-
ment captures the contractual difficulties rooted in cultural difference between the 
acquiring firm and the management of the target firm in reaching agreement on 
the acquisition (Graham 1985; McDevitt 2006; Jakobsen 2008).  
This study ignores the potential changes in informal institutions on exploring the 
determinants of increase and decrease in equity stake as a result of changes in the 
host country institutions. This is based on the assumption that changes in informal 
institutions takes a very long time (Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn 2007). 
2.2.1 Formal Institutions: Regulatory Restrictions and Transparent 
Institutions 
Formal institutions consist of the legal institutions, laws and regulations of the 
host country that determine transaction and feasibility of engaging in economic 
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activities and hence the profitability and survival of those firms (North 1990; 
Gaur & Lu 2007). They may increase the effectiveness of informal pressures, 
modify them, or supersede them (North 1990: 46). Regulatory institutions are the 
principal mechanism through which formal institutions operate (Scott 1995). 
They are the regulatory aspect of institutions that deal with rule setting, monitor-
ing, and sanctioning activities (ibid). Host governments use regulatory structures 
to monitor and restrict the behavior of firms in a country (Xu & Shenkar 2002). 
These regulatory pressures are coercive and have been said to influence organiza-
tional behavior in terms of entry strategies (Henisz 2000; Dikova & Van Wit-
teloostuijn 2007; Francis et al. 2009; Arslan 2011), survival (Gaur & Lau 2007) 
and performance (Pattnaik & Choe 2007).  
Regulatory Formal Institutions: Regulatory formal institutions can restrict for-
eign investors in certain key industries. They can also restrict the share of equity 
held by foreign bidders as a whole or in certain key industrial sectors (Moskalev 
2010). The share of foreign equity can also be restricted during acquisitions of 
privatized public firms (Roberts et al. 2008) and restricted due to infringement on 
industry competition (Brito, Ribeiro & Vasconcelos 2013). Regulatory re-
strictions can also create the existence of shares without voting rights, and share 
ownership by parties who are reluctant to sell their shares (Slangen & Hennart 
2007), and other institutional ownership such as insurance, pension funds. Regu-
lations allowing the existence of institutional investors as dominant blockholders 
can restrict or even make it difficult for foreign acquirers to acquire full owner-
ship stake in single transactions. In developing countries, regulatory restrictions 
can also make it difficult for foreign acquirers to get domestic credit, make it 
more expensive for foreign acquirers than domestic acquirers (Moskalev 2010).  
Moskalev (2010) showed in their study on foreign ownership restrictions and 
cross-border M&A, that the likelihood that foreign bidders establish cross-border 
M&A’s in which they obtain a controlling stake in the target is greater in the host 
countries with less restrictive cross-border M&A laws. It has been suggested that 
restrictive cross-border M&A laws are more obtainable or higher in developing 
market than in developed markets (Sethi, Guisinger, Phelan & Berg 2003; Khan-
na, Palepu & Sinha 2005). The reasons for such restrictive laws have been sug-
gested to be as a result of coercion of powerful groups on governments to restrict 
foreign ownership (Morck, Stangeland & Yeung 2000) and the fear of host gov-
ernment from foreign bidder’s expropriation by acquiring domestic firms at prices 
substantively below those of similar firms in their home countries.  
Emerging economies often have a restrictive trade environment or trade barriers 
compared to developed economies (Beyer & Fening 2012: 32). These restrictive 
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trade environments or trade barriers are aimed at protecting domestic firms from 
global competition. They include and not limited to restriction on entry modes but 
also barriers such as tariffs and nontariff barriers and local content requirement 
(Beyer & Fening 2012: 32). In such host countries, companies can enter only 
through IJVs or non-equity modes such as exporting or contractual agreements 
(Bayer & Fening 2012: 34). In summary, regulatory restrictions composes of re-
strictions on share of equity, restriction on entry modes, restriction on trade, re-
striction on access to domestic credit for foreign firms and regulations allowing 
the institutional investors as dominant blockholders.  
Regulatory Transparency: Regulatory transparency refers to openness, better 
organization of legal system, communication of regulatory decisions and account-
ability of regulatory institutions (OECD 2011). Regulatory transparency has also 
been coined as a state of institutional maturity (Child & Marinova 2014: 353). A 
transparent regulatory institution helps in maximizing the efficiency and account-
ability of regulations thus eliminate inefficiencies in regulatory frameworks of 
host countries (Globerman & Shapiro 2003). A non-transparent regulatory institu-
tion would be incapable of enforcing legislation (for example, property rights, and 
copyright, patent and competition laws) even though legislation does exist. This is 
because non-transparency promotes inefficiency, unfair and bias practices, and 
thus will be incapable of protecting foreign investment, consumers and public 
interest. 
The focus is on information regulatory institutions that govern financial transpar-
ency, accounting standards, and disclosure. It has been shown that transparency in 
information institutions that govern financial transparency and disclosure (i.e. in 
terms of the amount and frequency of disclosed corporate information), as well as 
its credibility, varies across countries (Bushman, Piotroski & Smith 2004). It has 
also been argued that difference in information institutions (such as accounting 
standards and financial disclosure rules) between parent MNE home country and 
the target firm host country increases the difficulty and costliness of valuation 
process in acquisitions (Whittington 2000). This accounts for the varying degree 
of richness of information from firms’ financial reporting and disclosure in differ-
ent countries (Alford, Jones, Leftwich & Zmijewski 1993; Ball, Kothari & Robin 
2000). Consequently, managers have both the incentive and the ability to misrep-
resent the value of target firm in countries with poor information institutions and 
opaque disclosure rules (Balakrishnan & Koza 1993; Whittington 2000; Zhou et 
al. 2007). 
IB scholars have discussed the differences in information institutions that give 
rise to misrepresentation of value of the target firm under the auspices of infor-
50      Acta Wasaensia 
 
mation economics theory (e.g., Hennart & Park 1993; Hennart et al. 1996) com-
plemented by information asymmetry theory (Akerlof 1970). Strategy and some 
other IB scholars have also complemented this argument in real options theory 
(Kogut 1991; Hennart & Reddy 1997; Folta 1998; Folta & Miller 2002; Garner, 
Nam & Ottoo 2002; McGrath & Nerkar 2004; Brouthers, Brouthers & Werner 
2008; Xu et al. 2010) and argument for partial acquisition in hostage theory of 
IJVs (Chen & Hennart 2004). 
Transparency of Regulatory institutions has been shown to have a positive effect 
on the protection of minority shareholders (Moskalev 2010). These protections 
increase the likelihood for investors to acquire more equity in target firms (Mos-
kalev 2010). Zhou et al. (2007) showed that acquirers tend to choose partial ac-
quisition in countries with poor information institutions and that partial acquisi-
tion perform better than full acquisition in countries characterize with poor infor-
mation institutions. While regulations can exist, the non-transparency of regulato-
ry institutions to facilitate the achievement of more efficient regulatory outcomes 
can have effect in foreign acquisitions. Consequently, the existences of regula-
tions allowing foreign ownership are not sufficient to increase higher foreign eq-
uity participation.  
2.2.2 Failure in Formal Institutions and Informal Institutions 
Failure in Formal Institutions: Failure in formal institutions is often not dis-
cussed in the literature on institution theory in IB studies especially with regards 
to how it precipitates informal institutional pressures and its effect on entry strat-
egies and timing of entry. Recently, IB scholars have begun to see the importance 
of this area of study with a recent call for IB studies to study how conflict, securi-
ty, and political risk influences international business in challenging times. For 
example, Bader and Schuste (2014) showed the importance of expatriate social 
networks in ensuring the psychological well-being of expatriates in terrorism en-
dangered countries. Terrorism is mostly attributed to institutionally failed states 
(Landis 2013). Such attributes among others, for example, instability in govern-
ment policies, political risks and changes in the political system occur as a result 
of a failure in formal institutions. Failure in formal institutions precipitates infor-
mal institutional pressures on MNEs and thus should influence MNEs entry strat-
egies and timing of entry. 
Failure in formal institutions usually arises as a result of instability in government 
policies that affects business activities, changes in the political system, including 
changes of government and widespread corruption in government (Miller 1992; 
Abidde 2009: 25; Baek 2011; Al Khattab, Al-Yatama, Al Khattab & Aldehayyat 
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2012). They are often referred to as political instability (Child & Marinova 2014) 
or “political risks” defined as the impediments that multinationals may face as a 
result of political decisions and activities of governments or other bodies (Howell 
& Chaddick 1994; Bremmer 2005). Failure in formal institutions could precipitate 
undemocratic rule, corruption, social unrest and conflicts, terrorism and wars that 
reduce foreign direct investments in host countries.  
Empirical evidence suggest that firms include terrorism and other political risks 
assessment in decision making on which international markets to enter, in locat-
ing and managing foreign operations (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003; Czinkota, 
Knight, Liesch & Steen 2005; Li, Tallman & Ferreira 2005; Wernick 2006) and 
also in deciding entry mode choice (Brouthers 1995). 
The relationship between corruption and/or country risks/political risks and entry 
mode choice is inconclusive as studies have shown positive, negative and no rela-
tionship. In their study on the influence of international risk on entry mode strate-
gy, Brouthers (1995) found that firms will prefer high control entry mode in less 
risk market and low control or independent entry mode in high risks markets. 
Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2004) studied the choice between IJVs and ac-
quisitions in foreign direct investments. Their findings suggest that high country 
risks influence the managerial decision for pure partial acquisition because they 
serve as appropriate entry mode to deal with high risks countries. Driffield, Mic-
kiewicz, Pal and Temouri (2010) found that greater absolute and relative corrup-
tion increases the likelihood of IJVs to deal with local corruption. Smarzynska 
and Wei (2002) showed that high corruption leads to the preference for joint ven-
tures. Demirbag, Glaister and Tatoglu (2007) explored institutional perspective 
and showed that in an environment with high political pressures and greater cor-
ruption differences between the home and host countries, MNEs will select IJVs 
compared to a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS).  
Tekin-Koru (2006) studied foreign investments from 88 countries of origin estab-
lished in Turkey. The study found that high corruption distance (the difference in 
the level of corruption in the investor’s home country and the host country) leads 
to preference for WOS. Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh and Eden (2006) showed 
that pervasive corruption leads to the preference of WOS; arbitrary corruption 
leads to the preference of IJVs. Duanmu (2011) showed that the higher corruption 
distance it is between home countries of foreign firms and China, the higher prob-
ability their MNEs choose WOS over IJVs. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) showed 
that the impact of corruption on the choice between WOS and IJVs is insignifi-
cant. 
52      Acta Wasaensia 
 
The reasons for these contradictory findings could be that these studies gave at-
tention to the nature of corruption rather than the magnitude, arbitrariness or the 
degree of ambiguity surrounding corrupt transactions (Karhunen & Ledyaeva 
2012). It could also be that these studies did not take into cognizance that firms do 
not remain passive to institutional pressures but rather responds to such corrupt 
environment. Firms can respond to institutional pressures by leveraging their fi-
nancial and relational resources in promoting non-corrupt policy (Karhunen & 
Kosonen 2013). They could also respond to institutional pressure by compromis-
ing and cooperation (Aklamanu 2014), avoiding, defying and manipulating host 
country institutional pressures (Oliver 1991). 
Informal Institutions: North (1990; 2005) defines informal institutions as the 
humanly devised pressures that are embedded in the shared norms, values and 
beliefs in a society. Informal institutional distance combines cognitive and norma-
tive components of institutions in (Scott 1995). Cognitive components of institu-
tions reflect the shared beliefs and perceptions about what constitutes social reali-
ty and meaning in a given society (Scott 1995). Thus, the cognitive component of 
institutions is pre-occupied with our notions of who we are and what ways of ac-
tion make sense for us in a given situation (ibid). Pogrebnyakov and Maitland 
(2011) suggest that the cognitive component is morphologically close to culture. 
It has also been referred to as cognitive-cultural component (Scott 2001; 2008). 
Normative institutions are pre-occupied with formal rules that introduce prescrip-
tive, evaluative, and obligatory dimensions of social life (Scott 1995). They in-
clude both values and norms. They impose constraints on social behavior, and so 
they do influence the way in which people do what they are supposed to do. Nor-
mative institutions are carriers of institutionalized values and are organized in-
formal structures, and co-optative relations linking the organization with salient 
external actors. (ibid) Studies have also used cultural distance measure to account 
for normative institutions (e.g. Delios & Henisz 2000; Yiu & Makino 2002). 
Similar to previous research (e.g. Gaur & Lu 2007) the informal institutional en-
vironment in this study is considered to include both normative and cognitive 
aspects in this study. The aspect of informal institution utilized in this dissertation 
is centered on cultural difference between the acquiring MNE and target firm. 
This is similar to previous research on informal institutional dimension on entry 
mode choice (e.g., Yiu & Makino 2002; Estrin et al. 2009; Arslan 2011). Unlike 
other studies that have measured national cultural differences or business cultural 
distance or cultures open to foreign idea as a constructs for informal institutional 
environment, this study focuses on the manifestations of cultural issues and how 
they influence the choice of acquisition types. First, cultural issues manifest 
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themselves in the form contractual difficulties between the acquiring firm and the 
management of the target firm in reaching agreement on the acquisition (Jakobsen 
2008). Second it manifests itself in difficulties in integrating the acquired firm 
and the parent MNE (Slangen 2006; Hennart & Slangen 2007; Ahammad & 
Glaister 2011).  
MNEs contractual difficulties in negotiating acquisitions in target countries is 
among many specific issues that influence the degree of equity commitment of 
multinationals in foreign market. Jakobsen (2008) suggest that partial acquisition 
is as a result of contractual difficulties in successfully closing acquisition deals 
with the target firm. He argued that it may result as sellers may perceive that the 
deal does not protect the interests of local owners and stakeholders alike. Contrac-
tual difficulties are rooted in cultural differences (Drew 1997; Dina 2010). It has 
been argued that cross-cultural communication is more likely to fail, the higher 
the normative and cognitive distance between the organizations (Ionascu, Meyer 
& Estrin 2004). Differences in scripts, schemas, norms or values hamper infor-
mation sharing between individuals from different cultures and might restrain 
their ability to search for better alternatives. Consequently, in a cognitive and 
normative distant market, obstacles to negotiating with labor unions, local owners 
(e.g. family owners of private firms and other stakeholders) will rise dispropor-
tionately and thus hinders parent firm from acquiring larger equities from ac-
quired firms. (ibid) This has also been shown to increase the likelihood that the 
cross-border acquisition deal will not be completed because of the greater number 
of issues that are likely to be renegotiated (Dikova, Sahib & Van Witteloostuijn 
2010). 
It has also been shown that collective cultures that are concerned with self-face 
are more likely to opt for win-lose negotiations while individualistic culture 
would opt for integrative or win-win negotiations (McDevitt 2006). Negotiations 
involving collectivist vs. individualistic cultures could amplify the possibilities to 
search for better alternatives and could lead to partial acquisition at the time of 
market entry. For this reason, organizations are structuring earnout payments as 
options against contractual failures such that they acquire partial equity at the 
time of entry and pay the remaining equity over several years on pre-determined 
prices based on the performance of the target after 2-3 years during which they 
have gained more knowledge about the assets of the target firm.  
In summary, in addition to regulatory aspects of institutions discussed in institu-
tional-based view of strategy, transparency of regulatory institutions and failures 
in formal institutions do also influence entry mode choices. The extension offered 
in this section allows IB scholars to consider other aspects of formal institutions 
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that influence entry choices. More so, by extending the formal aspects of institu-
tions and focusing on the issue-specific aspects of informal institutions that influ-
ences acquisition strategies, it is believed that these measures will capture the 
multiple dimensions of institutional environment that influences entry strategies 
of multinationals in foreign markets. It is believed that this multidimensional 
framework proposed in this study will provide a better understanding of aspects 
of institutions that influence entry mode choice and aspects of the institutions 
MNEs respond to when entering foreign markets. 
2.3 Internationalization Process Model and Foreign 
Acquisition 
The internationalization process model known as the IP model or Uppsala model 
(Johanson & Vahlne 1977; Johanson & Vahlne 2009) is rooted in organizational 
learning and resource dependence theory. There are several theoretical paradigms 
of this model. The focus of this study is on the 2009 model. However, the 1977 
model is referenced where necessary especially with regards to earlier contribu-
tions and the role of business relationships in the internationalization of firms. 
Though the 1977 and 2009 model has different ontological assumptions, however, 
the basic mechanisms of internationalization in both models are still the same. 
The following discussion will center on (1) earlier contributions of the 1977, its 
criticisms and clarifications, (2) distinction between the 1977 and 2009 model and 
(3) how the 2009 model will be explored in the current study. 
Scholars have used the 1977 model (i.e. Johanson & Vahlne 1977) to argue that 
the choice of acquisition is as a result of learning (e.g. March 1991; Andersson, 
Johanson & Vahlne 1997; Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Hayward 2002; Hale-
blian, Kim & Rajagopalan 2006; Lin, Peng, Yang & Sun 2009). For example, 
Andersson et al. (1997) developed a model of international acquisition from the 
internationalization process model. The model depicts how firms undergo interna-
tional acquisition through learning from a direct/indirect relationship with their 
business partners with/without a local presence. The model shows three ways 
international acquisition can occur via learning (Andersson et al. 1997: 81-82). 
First, international acquisition can result from a direct relationship with a business 
partner when the firm has or do not have a local presence. In cases when it has a 
local presence and a direct relationship with the target firm, the main motive un-
derlying such acquisition is a defensive strategy against a potential competitor. In 
cases when it has a local presence, and no direct relationship with the target firm, 
the main motive underlying such acquisition is to enter new geographical mar-
kets. Second, international acquisition can result from an indirect relationship 
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with a business partner when the acquiring firm has or do not have a local pres-
ence. They argued that this type of acquisition is more prone for efficiency-
seeking motives where the acquiring firm aims to strengthen their market position 
or consolidate the MNE capability network.  Third, international acquisition can 
also result  in a situation where the acquiring firm has no relationship with any 
business partner in the local market with or without a local presence. According 
to them, the first two are organic acquisitions involving incremental steps in the 
internationalization process of the firm while the latter are non-organic acquisi-
tions. (ibid)  
Irrespective of the above attempt to apply Uppsala model in explaining interna-
tional acquisitions, the model is still been criticized for been deterministic (Reid 
1981; Young & Wilkinson 1989; Melin 1992; Andersen 1993). The Uppsala 
model has also been argued to have a stage assumption, as a consequence, cannot 
be used to explain internationalization of born global firms and international ac-
quisitions (Andersson, Johanson & Vahlne 1997; Oviatt & McDougall 1994; 
2005). Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 1412) clarified these criticisms by arguing 
that the Uppsala model does not specify the form that increased commitment 
might take because commitment decisions may increase or decrease depending on 
their performance. Consequently, the model is by no means deterministic (ibid). 
The criticisms that the Uppsala model cannot be used to explain international ac-
quisitions because of its four stage model assumption (from no regular export to 
export via independent agents, sales subsidiary and FDIs) has be clarified that the 
stage model is not part of the Uppsala model, but rather a summary of the empiri-
cal observations on which they based their inductive theoretical arguments (Jo-
hanson & Vahlne 2009: 1420).  
In this study, it is argued that the Uppsala model can be used to explain interna-
tional acquisitions. The IP model is suitable to explain foreign acquisitions, on the 
assumption that an acquisition is much more likely to be successful if it is preced-
ed by some exchange between the acquirer and the target firm (Andersson et al. 
1997; Johanson & Vahlne 2009). Thus, acquisitions without previous relationship 
or experience with the target firm may result in conflicts and a likely chance to 
fail because the parties will have to learn about each other after the acquisition for 
post-acquisition integration to go further (ibid). Furthermore, the advancement of 
the IP model (i.e. Johanson & Vahlne 2009) to one that takes into cognizance the 
role of business networks, trust and knowledge development in business relation-
ships is an attempt to clarify the criticisms of the IP model. It also enhances our 
understanding of the model and provides basic mechanics on how Uppsala model 
can be used to explain international acquisition.  
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The difference between the 1977 model (Basic Mechanism of Internationalization 
Johanson and Vahlne 1977) and 2009 version (The Business Network Interna-
tionalization Process Model (Johanson & Vahlne 2009) is primarily centered on 
the recognition of the role of business networks in internationalization, and the 
advancement of trust in business relationships. The two versions of the IP model 
are shown in Figure 7 below.  The 1977 model is shown in Figure 7[A] and the 
2009 model is shown in Figure 7[B]. 
 
Figure 7. Internationalization Process Model (Johanson and Vahlne 1977; 
2009) 
The 2009 model like the 1977 model (See Figure 7[A] and 7[B]) has the state and 
change variable. The state variable refers to the state that impact on the change 
variable. The state and change variable also impact on each other. While the 
change variable in the 1977 model consists of current activities, the 2009 model 
consist of trust-building and knowledge creation. The 2009 model is one of a dy-
namic process depicting how mutual relationships commitment between a firm 
and its partner networks builds up their knowledge and opportunities. The four 
variables in the 2009 model are network position, knowledge opportunities, rela-
tionship commitment decisions, and learning and creating trust building.  
Network position: The model assumes that the existing business relationships a 
firm occupies within its business network make up the network position of the 
firm. According to Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 1423), the network position 
makes it possible for the firm to identify and exploit opportunities, determine 
which geographical market to enter and the corresponding entry mode to use to 
enter the geographical market. Thus, a firm’s network position is pivotal to how, 
when and where its internationalization process will start (ibid).  
Partial acquisition can also serve as previous/existing relationships that form part 
of a firm's network position. Through partial acquisition acquiring MNEs and 
partially acquired firms can learn from each other, identify and exploit opportuni-
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ties. By complimenting this argument with the fact that firms can have business 
relationship with a target firm before undergoing acquisitions, it is argued that 
partial acquisition and target-specific experience (relationship-specific 
knowledge) can provide a platform (state variable) where knowledge, trust or 
commitment to the firm-specific relationships develops that leads into later com-
mitment decision. The later commitment decision can be increasing commitments 
such as increasing equity stake in the acquisition or decreasing equity commit-
ments depending on the outcome of previous commitment decisions. 
Knowledge Opportunities: The 2009 model assumes that knowledge opportuni-
ties serves as the basis for relationship commitment decisions. Thus, the 
knowledge opportunities that is inherent in firms relationships with its partner 
firms initiates the process of learning, creating opportunities and building trust. 
Depending on the outcomes of learning, the attainment of knowledge oppor-
tunties ultimately changes the firms’ network position to a higher or lower level.  
Full acquisition or increased equity commitments could be seen as knowledge 
opportunities and as an outcome or consequence of trust building and relationship 
the partners develop during their interaction in previous exchange relationships 
(e.g., partial acquisition, Joint venture relationship, customer relationships, sup-
plier relationships, distributor relationships). It could also be seen as opportunity 
that develops (opportunity development) as a result of the interaction between 
partners who build knowledge together and come to trust each other as they 
commit themselves further to the relationship (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). Oppor-
tunity development entails gradually and sequentially increasing recognition 
(learning) and exploitation (commitment) of an opportunity in the existence of 
trust (ibid). The opportunity that develops from this relationship (e.g., full acqui-
sition) may be unilateral, with the parent firm learning about the target firm 
needs, capabilities, markets and networks (ibid: 1419).  It may also be bilateral 
when the two firms in interaction identify an opportunity (e.g., a joint venture or a 
merger or sellers willingness to accept full acquisition). Moreover, it may also be 
multilateral when multiple firms identify an opportunity (e.g., a shared partial 
acquisition). Conversely, in the absence of opportunity development, firms could 
find no reasons to keep their ongoing relationship with the target firm. In the case 
of an already existing partial or full acquisition, the relationship may be dissolved, 
and consequently parent MNE will divest their investments.  
Learning, trust-building and relationship commitment decisions: The nature 
and the presence of direct relationship with existing partner firm drive the dynam-
ic and cumulative process of learning as well as trust building and their subse-
quent relationship commitment decisions.   
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Firms that have valuable network partners or existing relationship in the target 
market or with a target firm in a target market have privileged access to infor-
mation about the market, the target firm, and their business network. This makes 
up the firm network position and thus provides the firm with alliance learning, 
closeness centrality (the extent to which a firm occupies a central position such 
that it has independent access to other network ties) and structural hole position (a 
firm's brokerage locations between two otherwise disconnected firms in the net-
work) (Lin et al. 2009).  Market research may be unable to identify such privilege 
information the firm has access to (Johanson & Vahlne 2009: 1420). Consequent-
ly, the firm enjoys insidership within its network, and opportunity recognition and 
development is likely to be an outcome of the ongoing business activities (ibid: 
1423). It is supposed that firms that enjoy such insidership position will have a 
tendency to increase their commitments or make full acquisition. For example, 
studies have found support that firms increase their commitments or acquire part-
ner firms (e.g., Vanhaverbeke, Duysters & Noorderhaven 2002; Akhigbe et al. 
2007; Fatica 2010; Yang, Li & Peng 2011) as a result of explorative alliance 
learning (Yang et al. 2011). 
When the existing or previous relationships with a target firm is that of a partial 
acquisition without an option to acquire fully, a firm willing to increase their 
commitment or equity stake can still acquire more equity through renegotiations 
with the target firm. If it is a public listed firm, this could be achieved by acquir-
ing the remaining equity from the public market offerings. The firm’s willingness 
to increase equity stake in target firm will result from trust and the positive out-
come of learning and relationships building. Otherwise, the outcome will be the 
one of decreasing commitments in the target firm. Building trust in business rela-
tionship takes time (Madhok 2006: 7) because it is not based on formal agree-
ments but a shared history of at least minimal satisfactory and or successful joint 
business experience (Johanson & Vahlne 2009: 1418). This explains why the in-
crement in commitments decisions in acquisitions may take several years. 
Learning from previous relationship entails learning about partner’s/acquisition 
target’s culture, learning about the partner/target assets, business environment and 
organizational processes. Learning from previous relationship builds the stockpile 
of knowledge the acquiring firm needs to make the next commitment decisions. 
However, knowledge about the partner and the outcome of relationship building 
are not the only factors that impact the commitment decisions of  the acquiring 
firms. For example, Santangelo and Meyer (2011) showed that the process of 
learning, opportunity creation and trust building are moderated by institutional 
influences. Institutional influences lead to the difference between realized and 
intended strategies of multinationals (ibid). Thus, internationalization process is 
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not only influenced by business networks, network positions, and business rela-
tionships; rather institutions moderate the outcomes of state and change variables 
in the internationalization process (Pogrebnyakov & Maitland 2011).  
In summary, the 2009 Uppsala model is the focus of this dissertation. It is ex-
plored and integrated with institutional theory and other literature in this disserta-
tion. In doing so, the focus is on the Internationalization Process Model and not 
the four stages/sequential progressive development in internationalization (from 
no regular export to export via independent agents, sales subsidiary and FDIs). 
More so, certain theoretical boundaries are applied to ensure the explication of the 
assumptions that bound the theory (Andersen 1993). These boundaries are dis-
cussed in more details in Section 2.4.2.  
2.4 Summary of Theoretical Lenses and Theoretical 
Boundaries 
This section clarifies the critiques for the choice of theories utilized in this disser-
tation. It also discussed the appropriateness of theories utilized for the dissertation 
and how they are utilized to address the research questions. Finally, the theoreti-
cal boundaries of the choice of theories utilized are discussed. 
2.4.1 Clarifications on Choice of Theories 
There is also a recent Uppsala model referred to as the 2013 model (Vahlne & 
Johanson 2013). One might argue why the choice of the 2009 model rather than 
the 2013 model? There is also a recent argument by Vahlne and Johanson (2013) 
that the eclectic paradigm cannot be combined with the Uppsala model because 
both studies have different assumptions. Finally, some proponents of the choice 
of theory chosen for this dissertation have argued why not combine argued TCE 
with Institutional theory? Clarifications to these theoretical issues and questions 
are discussed in the following discussions. 
The recent integration of dynamic capability theories (Teece, Pisano & Shuen 
1997; Zollo & Winter 2002; Vergne & Durand 2011) to the internationalization 
process model (Vahnle & Johanson 2013) in an attempt to address the evolution 
of multinational enterprise provides evidence of the central assumption of this 
study. That is, the ongoing interactions between firms and their environment build 
up a firm capability referred in this dissertation as host country capability. The 
2009 model was utilized because it provided specific constructs needed to explain 
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international acquisitions. More so, some constructs in the 2013 model are com-
plimentary to constructs in the 2009 model.  
For example, Vahlne and Johanson (2013) refer to opportunity development ca-
pability as capabilities needed to identify opportunities and to mobilize relevant 
resources both within the own firm and within other firms involved in the oppor-
tunity. Opportunity development capability is not different from the opportunity 
development referred in Johanson and Vahlne (2009) as both result from the in-
teraction between partners who build knowledge together and come to trust each 
other as they commit themselves further to the relationship. They also refer to 
internationalization capability as the capability required to approach and develop 
different markets and locations under various circumstances. These are general 
operational capabilities needed to manage the operations of a firm in diverse mar-
kets which is beyond the scope of this study. Finally, they refer to networking 
capability as relational capability needed to build, sustain and coordinate relation-
ships in a network type context. As with their (2009) model, a firm enjoys a spe-
cific network position because of their relational or network capability. Thus, 
both are complimentary.   
The recent argument by Vahlne and Johanson (2013) that the eclectic paradigm 
cannot be combined with the Uppsala model because both studies have different 
assumptions deserves some clarifications. They argued that while the eclectic 
paradigm is rooted in neo-classical economics primarily for macroeconomic stud-
ies, they cannot be combined with the Uppsala model rooted in behavioral theory 
because they are mainly for micro-level studies. I contend that we cannot make a 
realist argument that macroeconomic theories cannot be combined with microe-
conomics theory to explain the evolution of MNEs because several studies have 
successfully combined or tried to reconcile eclectic paradigm and microeconom-
ics theories. For example, with transaction cost economics to explain the evolu-
tion of MNEs (see Rugman 2010; Dadzie 2012). While this study does not at-
tempt to use the eclectic advantages i.e. Ownership, Location and Internalization 
advantages in explaining the choice of acquisition strategies, it does however ex-
plore the motives of FDIs postulated by this paradigm as it provides a descriptive 
and holistic explanation of the motives of outward foreign direct investment 
(Rugman 2010). As Rugman also suggested, these motives of outward FDIs can 
be successfully combined with internalization theory (microeconomics theory). 
Rugman suggested that market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and resource-seeking 
motives are situations where host country specific advantages matters and home 
country advantage do not matter when determining outward FDIs. In contrast, 
strategic asset-seeking motives are situations in which both host country specific 
advantages and home country specific advantages matters (ibid). 
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Finally, some proponents of the choice of theory chosen for this dissertation may 
argue that combining TCE and institutional theory are more compatible with this 
study than the choice of theories explored because TCE and institutional theory 
are theoretically complimentary to advance IB studies on entry strategies. Brouth-
ers and Hennart (2007) posit that IB field can be advanced by the combinative 
effects of institutional factors with other decision-making criteria, such as TCE 
dimensions. In retrospection, Martinez and Dacin (1999) supported the combina-
tive effects of TCE and institutional theory as they both address the efficiency and 
legitimacy concerns of their respective limitations in providing a full-scale expla-
nation of organizational behavior. This support is shared in recent studies such as 
Puck et al. (2009) and Zhang, Zhong, Wen and Jiang (2014) that combined both 
TCE and institutional theory to explain the choice of conversion of ownerships 
strategies and the choice of control ownership strategies of multinationals.  
TCE does not capture the “How” and “Why” questions leading to the resource 
commitments of parent MNEs. It ignores the sociological aspects (Granovetter 
1985; Martinez & Dacin 1999; Lu 2002) and the complexities of the market envi-
ronment (Zhang et al. 2014: 1) which the integration of Uppsala model and insti-
tutional theory offers a better complementarity than TCE and institutional theory. 
TCE studies explore the reasons behind the transactions not the causes of the rea-
sons leading to these transactions and do not capture other motivations influenc-
ing firms’ strategic behavior when proprietary assets are not their primary motiva-
tion. Asset specificity of the target firm only matters when it affects the primary 
strategic motives of investments of the parent MNEs. A firm with high R&D ca-
pability investing in resource-seeking investments may not be primarily con-
cerned with the specificity of their assets and may still opt for partial and full ac-
quisition. Rather than focusing on the asset specificity of the investment, focusing 
on the motives provides a useful way to capture the primary strategic reasons mo-
tivating the investment decisions of parent MNEs. Finally, construct from TCE 
are already captured within the theories selected for this study. For example, cul-
tural aspects in TCE are already integrated into informal institutions in institu-
tional theory. Experience is captured from the Uppsala model. Asset specificity of 
the investments is incorporated in strategic asset-seeking motives. 
Two main theories were explored to aid the development of constructs and theo-
retical framework to answer the research questions. Figure 8 shows acquisitions 
as events and the levels of analysis that affects the acquisition event. 
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Figure 8. Acquisition as Events and Choice of Theories 
The choice of multiple theories reflects the complex nature of acquisition events 
as they can be viewed on multiple levels of analysis. By integrating multiple theo-
retical lenses, it is possible to address the different phases of the acquisition pro-
cess and capture the multiple levels of analysis that influences acquisition deci-
sions. 
Acquisition is a process that starts from interactions between two or more firms 
and such interaction evolves into several outcomes. Examples includes, IJVs buy-
outs (Puck et al. 2009); learning, development of knowledge opportunities and 
capabilities (Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard & Sharma 1997; Chetty et al. 2006; 
Johanson & Vahlne 2009). Due to this interaction process, it was necessary to 
integrate a process theory “internationalization process theory” to elucidate the 
capabilities parent firms attain due to their interaction with target firms and target 
environment. It has been argued that such firm-type interaction is best studied 
using dynamic theories (Monge 1990). Thus, internationalization process theory 
(Johanson and Vahlne 2009) was utilized because it captures the evolving interac-
tions between firms before the acquisition decision, during and after the decision 
(change and state variables). More so,  it was essential to integrate institutional 
theory and internationalization process theory to answer the research questions of 
this study because empirical evidence suggest that the outcomes of firms interac-
tions is moderated by institutional influences (Santangelo & Meyer 2011).    
There are several studies linking acquisition to industry drivers such as maturity 
of industry, growth of industry, concentration of industry and industry consolida-
tion (Chen & Hennart 2004; Chen 2008). For example, Chen and Hennart (2004) 
found a positive relationship between the concentration of industries and the like-
lihood of Japanese MNEs preference for full acquisition. They argued that their 
preference is aimed at market power consolidation. Similar industry driver but a 
contradictory finding is established in Chen (2008) who  showed that partial ac-
 Acta Wasaensia     63 
  
quisition are aimed at speeding up entry into rapidly growing markets, control 
capacity expansions in mature industries and also for market power consolidation. 
Thus, there are industry drivers leading to acquisitions. Not limited to industry 
drivers, there are also other strategic motivations (e.g., resource motives, acquir-
ing competencies and immobile strategic assets) within the MNE that trigger ac-
quisition decisions. Consequently, the choice of exploring Dunning strategic mo-
tives of FDIs is aimed at capturing all possible strategic reasons that motivate 
acquisition decisions.  
While internationalization process theory focuses on overall process level activi-
ties, the institutional theory focuses on the country levels. The Dunning’s strate-
gic motives capture the manifestation of the industry drivers and other motiva-
tions leading to acquisition decisions within the firm. Thus far, these theoretical 
lenses are complementary to each other and provide additional constructs to cap-
ture events in the acquisition process leading to entry decisions, changes in entry 
decisions and acquisition performance.  
Finally, acquisition decisions involve managerial decision making. A typical ac-
quisition decision making process starts with developing objectives/motives and 
passes through systematic search and screening, negotiation, due diligence, deal 
closure, acquisition integration and post-deal evaluation (Parenteau & Weston 
2003; Carpenter & Sanders 2007; DePamphilis 2007; Garbuio, Lovallo & Horn 
2010). This process steps reflects the need for multiple theoretical lenses. For 
example, setting of motives in the acquisition decision-making process is cap-
tured by the Dunning’s strategic motives of FDIs. Institutional theory captures 
most of the relevant factors explored in the search, screening, negotiation and due 
diligence stages in the acquisition process. Institutional theory predicts the varia-
tion in the degree of FDIs inflows into emerging and developing countries com-
pared to advanced economies (Asiedu 2002; 2006; UNCTAD 2010; Owusu & 
Habiyakare 2011). Institutional theory predicts that the high cost of screening of 
targets and due diligence in developing and emerging economies is due to the 
poor information institutions that govern financial transparency (Balakrishnan & 
Koza 1993; Whittington 2000; Zhou et al. 2007; Moskalev 2010). Institutional 
theory (informal institutions) also captures the potential negotiation complexities 
that may emerge when negotiating acquisition deals in cultural distance markets 
(Graham 1985; McDevitt 2006; Jackobsen 2008). Finally, institutional theory 
depicts the performance of acquisitions (Chacar, Newburry & Vissa 2010; Reddy, 
Locke & Scrimgeour 2010; Ramanathan et al. 2010; Doran & Ryan 2012; Feres 
& Reynaud 2012; Brito, Ribeiro & Vasconcelos 2013).   
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2.4.2 Theoretical Boundaries and Research Questions  
Based on the discussions in Section 2.2-2.4, this section discusses how these theo-
ries are integrated to answer the research questions, the boundaries of the applica-
tion of these theories and their underlying assumptions. Figure 9 shows the two 
main theories integrated with motives of foreign market entry (Dunning 1993) in 
relation to the four research questions (RQ). 
 
Figure 9. Theoretical Lenses in Relation to Research Questions 
To provide answers to RQ1 and RQ3, internationalization process theory is com-
bined with institutional theory (North 1990; Scott 1995; Peng 2003; Dikova & 
Van Witteloostuijn 2007) and was further integrated with the concept of host 
country capability (modified from Eriksson et al. 1997; Chetty et al. 2006; Chen 
2008; Slangen & Hennart 2008; Puck et al. 2009; Vahlne & Johanson 2013) to 
understand which factors influence MNEs decision for partial, staged and full 
acquisition at the time of entry. To provide answers to RQ2 and RQ4, institutional 
theory (North 1990; Scott 1995; Peng 2003; Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn 2007; 
Arslan 2011; Arslan & Larimo 2011) will be combined with the literature on for-
eign entry motives based on OLI paradigm (Dunning 1988; 1993).  
In this study, it is assumed that a firm’s acquisition entry strategies can start 
through existing or no relationship with a target firm (Andersson et al. 1997). It 
can also occur as a result of the acquisition of host country capability acquired 
due to the firms’ market presence and ongoing business in a particular host coun-
try (Chen 2008; Jacobsen 2008). Leapfrog entries involve entries without existing 
relationship with the target firm nor previous market entry or ongoing business in 
a particular host country (Andersson et al. 1997). Gradual entries involve entries 
in which the firm has had an existing business relationship with the target firm or 
an ongoing presence in the market before the acquisition (ibid). State variables 
such as knowledge opportunities, host country capability, target-specific experi-
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ence explains the outcomes of the relationship (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). 
Change variables include the outcomes of the relationship such as acquisition 
strategies. Learning and creating trust building relationship also shows the evolu-
tion of the relationship (Johanson & Vahlne 2009).  The boundaries of the appli-
cation of the theories are illustrated in figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Boundaries of Integration Uppsala Model and Institutional Theory 
The firm’s network position is made up of its valuable network partners or exist-
ing relationship with a target firm in a host country that provides the company 
privileged access to information about the market, their relationship partners and 
their business network (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). The existing relationship be-
tween a parent MNE and a foreign target (e.g., distributor relationship, supplier-
customer relationship, partial acquisition, etc.) builds the MNE target-specific 
experience. The target-specific experience evolves into knowledge opportunities 
(Johanson & Vahlne 2009) for which an acquisition by the parent MNE is an out-
come of that relationship. Through this acquisition and accumulation of 
knowledge about doing business in the host country (Slangen & Hennart 2008) 
develops the MNE host country capability (modified from Eriksson et al. 1997; 
Chetty et al. 2006; Chen 2008; Puck et al. 2009; Vahlne & Johanson 2013) that 
enables it to initiate the next commitment decisions such as full acquisition. An 
increase (e.g. full acquisition) or decrease (e.g. market exit or divestments) in 
equity stake depends on the outcomes of learning and trust building. Increasing 
commitment decisions enables the firm to effectively exploit local market oppor-
tunities (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). Exploiting local market opportunities may 
66      Acta Wasaensia 
 
also require subsequent full acquisition and can aim at developing new competen-
cies or product market extension.  
The institutional environment (formal and informal institutional constraints) mod-
erates the relationship between the state and change variable which leads to the 
difference between realized and intended strategies (Pogrebnyakov & Maitland 
2011; Santangelo & Meyer 2011).  Institutional theory argues that institutions are 
coercive and restraints firm investment choices, the internationalization process 
model, depicts that parent MNEs interactions with other firms leads to relation-
ship development, trust building and experiences that further build up certain ca-
pabilities for the MNE. Consequently, parent MNE can respond to host country 
institutional environment at the time of entry by the acquisition of host country 
capabilities: - knowledge gained from ongoing business operations in a particular 
host country (modified from Chetty et al. 2006; Puck et al. 2009).  
Specifically on RQ1, the integration of institutional theory and internationaliza-
tion process theory argues that host country capability, target-specific experience 
and formal and informal institutional environment should influence the choice of 
acquisition strategies. Specifically on RQ3, the internationalization process theory 
provides means to capture the acquisition process, learning and knowledge oppor-
tunities that develops through MNEs interactions or relationships with the target 
firm. At market entry, the intended strategies might have been restrained due to 
the institutional environment or knowledge about the target business. Changes in 
institutional environment or the acquisition of host country capability may initiate 
a reconsideration of MNEs acquisition strategies leading to changes in equity 
stake at post-market entry.  
Specifically on RQ2, the integration of institutional theory and literature on for-
eign entry motives (Dunning 1988; 1993) depicts that while multinationals can 
aim at any motives for foreign market entry, the host country institutional envi-
ronment and MNEs host country capability makes it more suitable for certain 
entry motives and thus the choice of the acquisition strategies used by the multi-
nationals.  This assumption is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Boundaries: Institutional Theory, Host Country Capability, and FDI 
Motives 
To provide answers to RQ 4, institutional theory and literature on foreign entry 
motives based on OLI paradigm (Dunning 1988; 1993) was further integrated 
with the concept of host country capability (Eriksson et al. 1997; Chetty et al. 
2006; Chen 2008; Slangen & Hennart 2008; Puck et al. 2009; Vahlne & Johanson 
2013) to discuss the performance differentials between returns to partial and full 
acquisition. It is assumed that there are performance differentials between returns 
to partial acquirers and full acquirers (Zhou et al. 2007; Ertuna & Yamak 2011). 
By integrating internationalization process theory, institutional theory, motives of 
FDIs and host country capability it is argued that firms that take into cognizance 
the prediction of these theories should most likely achieved their intended mo-
tives than firms that do not. The integration of these theories and literature will be 
discussed in more details in Chapter 3. 
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3 ACQUISITION ENTRY STRATEGIES AND 
CHANGES IN EQUITY STAKE 
3.1 Determinants of Acquisition Entry Strategies  
This section integrates the theories discussed above to develop constructs that will 
be used in the empirical section on the determinants of acquisition entry strategies 
and changes in equity stake. These constructs are further integrated to form the 
theoretical framework of the dissertation. 
3.1.1 Formal and Informal Institutional Environment and Acquisition 
Strategies  
One of the aims of this study is the role of host country institutions and MNEs 
capabilities in influencing the choice of partial, staged and full acquisition at the 
time of entry. The focus is to understand on one hand, the role of host country 
institutions on the choice of partial, staged and full acquisition strategies. On the 
other hand, to understand MNEs internal capabilities that enable them to respond 
to the different forms of institutional pressures arising from informal institutional 
environment of host countries at the time of entry. This section specifically focus-
es on the role of host country institutions on these acquisition strategies and will 
discuss the internal capabilities MNEs develop that enable them to respond to 
host country institutions at the time of market entry. 
Host countries with regulatory restrictions on foreign acquisitions or share of eq-
uity sought by multinationals or in the form of restriction on trade influence 
MNEs choice for partial acquisition at the time of entry. It is expected that MNEs 
entering such restrictive host countries will opt for partial acquisition than staged 
and full acquisition. For example, Moskalev (2010) showed that the likelihood 
that foreign bidders establish cross-border M&A’s in which they obtain a control-
ling stake in the target is greater in the host countries with less restrictive cross-
border M&A laws. Arslan (2011) showed that formal institutions increase the 
likelihood of partial acquisition.  
Similarly, as transparency of regulatory institutions has an effect on the protection 
of minority shareholders (Moskalev 2010) and on the quality of information insti-
tutions that govern financial transparency and disclosure (Bushman, Piotroski & 
Smith 2004). It is expected that firms from transparent home countries entering 
host countries characterized by non-transparent regulatory institutions will opt for 
lower commitment entry strategies such as partial acquisition. This is because 
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non-transparency increases the difficulty and costliness of valuation process in 
acquisitions (Whittington 2000) and a reason for managers to misrepresent the 
value of target firm (Balakrishnan & Koza 1993; Whittington 2000; Zhou et al. 
2007). As a result, managers will opt for partial acquisition as foothold strategy 
and a hostage for the target firm owners if the underlying assets are a “lemon” 
(Chen & Hennart 2004).  
Restrictive formal institutions are coercive and deter entry or lead to lower com-
mitment entry strategies. In the absence of restrictive formal regulatory environ-
ment, MNEs are still faced with non-transparent regulatory institutions, corrup-
tion, and the broader political risks. However, MNEs can develop certain capa-
bilities capable of managing and responding to these institutional constraints. 
These capabilities are further discussed in Section 3.1.2. 
Formal regulatory restrictions on acquisitions come mainly in the form of gov-
ernments restricting majority foreign ownerships (Moskalev 2010). Other forms 
include regulations allowing the existence of shares without voting rights and 
existence of institutional investors as dominant blockholders who are usually re-
luctant to sell their shares (Slangen & Hennart 2007). These restrictive regulations 
are coercive, consequently, multinationals would have little choice but to conform 
to regulatory pressures because nonconforming to regulatory restrictions would 
lead to penalties such as denied entry (Doz, Bartlett & Prahalad 1981; 
Rosenzweig & Singh 1991; Francis et al 2009). MNEs entering such restrictive 
host countries are expected to opt for partial acquisition rather than staged and 
full acquisition.  
A transparent regulatory institution helps in maximizing the efficiency and ac-
countability of regulations thus eliminate inefficiencies in regulatory frameworks 
of host countries (Globerman & Shapiro 2003). Section 2.2.1 argues that non-
transparent regulatory institution would be incapable of enforcing legislation even 
though legislation does exist. Section 2.2.1 also argues that such institutions will 
be incapable of protecting foreign investment.  In a non-transparent regulatory 
institution, managers have both the incentive and the ability to misrepresent the 
value of target firm due to poor information institutions and opaque disclosure 
rules (Balakrishnan & Koza 1993; Whittington 2000; Zhou et al. 2007). This in-
creases the difficulty and costliness of valuation process in acquisitions (Whit-
tington 2000), and such institutions are more likely to be incapable of protecting 
minority shareholders (Moskalev 2010) and thus the choice of partial acquisition 
(Zhou et al. 2007; Moskalev 2010). It is argued that under such institutions firms 
can opt for both partial and staged acquisition rather than full acquisition at the 
time of market entry. Staged acquisition gives the MNEs a waiting option and an 
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exit clause to gain knowledge about the host country institutions and the actual 
value of the target firm. Staged acquisition also provides the acquiring MNE an 
option to withdraw from the market if the underlying asset is a lemon (Chen & 
Hennart 2004), or the institutions become too unfavorable. In contrarily, MNEs 
will have a preference for full acquisition when entering a host country character-
ized by transparent regulatory institutions. 
Similar to non-transparent regulatory institutions, failure in formal institutions 
should have the same influence on MNEs acquisition strategies at the time of 
market entry. Failure in formal institutions usually arises as a result of instability 
in government policies that affects business activities, changes in the political 
system, including changes of government and widespread corruption in govern-
ment (Miller 1992). Failure in formal institutions is often referred to as “political 
risks”. They are impediments to multinationals operating in such host countries 
(Howell & Chaddick 1994; Bremmer 2005). This is because they create undemo-
cratic rule, corruption, social unrest and conflicts, terrorism and wars that reduce 
FDIs in host countries (ibid). In such host countries, it is expected that MNEs will 
opt for partial and staged acquisition. This is similar to previous studies that find a 
positive relationship between high country risks or political risk market and 
choice of low control entry modes, shared equity entries and partial acquisition 
(Brouthers 1995, Smarzynska & Wei 2002; Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2004; 
Demirbag, Glaister & Tatoglu 2007; Driffield et al. 2010). 
As argued in Section 2.2.2, the aspect of informal institutions that influence ac-
quisition entry strategies is the contractual difficulties in negotiating acquisition in 
informal institutional environment.  Specifically on contractual difficulties, it was 
argued that contractual difficulties arise as a result of cultural difference between 
the acquiring firm and the management of the target firm in reaching agreement 
on the acquisition deal. MNEs will opt for partial acquisition as a result of con-
tractual difficulties in successfully closing acquisition deals with the target firm 
(Jakobsen 2008). Contractual difficulties take the form of seller’s perception that 
the deal does not protect the interests of local owners and stakeholders alike 
(ibid). This perception increases the more the differences in scripts, schemas, 
norms or values that hamper information sharing between individuals from differ-
ent cultures thus, restraining their ability to search for better alternatives (Ionascu 
et al. 2004). This perception also increases the greater the difference in informal 
institutional environment (normative and cognitive distance) because it increases 
the likelihood that cross-cultural communication will fail (Ionascu et al. 2004). 
Consequently, in an informal institutional environment, obstacles to negotiating 
with labor unions, local owners e.g. family owners of private firms and other 
stakeholders will rise inexplicably (Ionascu et al. 2004) and firms aiming to gain 
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market entry will opt for partial acquisition. However, with the provision of 
earnout payments, contractual difficulties can be circumvented. Thus, it is also 
expected that staged acquisition can be opted for in response to contractual diffi-
culties. 
3.1.2 Target-Specific Experience, Host Country Capability, Acquisition 
Strategies  
This section argues that MNEs do not remain passive when confronted with both 
formal and informal institutional pressures at the time of market entry. They re-
spond to these institutional pressures by developing certain capabilities through 
knowledge acquired during their ongoing business relationship with a target firm 
and host country experience. By combining arguments from two theoretical 
lenses, internationalization process theory (Johanson & Vahlne 2009), neo-
organizational institutionalism-institutional theory (Oliver 1997; Kostova & Za-
heer 1999) and general literature on MNE response to failed institutions (Frynas 
& Mellahi 2003), it is shown that target-specific experience provides the MNE a 
response to informal institutional constraints. It is also shown that host country 
experience through ongoing business in a particular host country develops a 
firm’s host country capability and provides the firms with adequate knowledge in 
dealing with host country formal and informal institutional constraints.  
Target-specific experience refers to experiences that accumulate into knowledge 
about a specific business partner. Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 1416) refer to this 
knowledge as relationship-specific knowledge. According to them, firms that 
have valuable network partners or existing relationship in a host country market 
or with a target firm in host country market has privileged access to information 
about the market, their relationship partners and their business network. The busi-
ness relationships constitute knowledge development within an MNE because it 
provides privileged access to information about the market (Andersson et al. 
1997; Johanson & Vahlne 1977; Johanson & Vahlne 2009). A firm's business 
networks makes up the firm network positions and provides the firm with alliance 
learning, closeness centrality and structural hole position (Lin et al. 2009). Con-
sequently, the firm enjoys insidership within its network (Johanson & Vahlne 
2009). The insidership position has been said to drive a firm’s number of acquisi-
tions in foreign markets (Lin et al. 2009). Market knowledge is attained from ex-
isting relationship or target-specific experience. It is expected that firms that have 
existing relationship with a specific target (Target-specific experience) in the 
form of customer, supplier, distributor relationship or collaborative relationship 
will most likely opt for staged and full acquisition. This is because, during such 
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collaborative relationship, they have gained knowledge about each other business, 
the nature of targets assets and network value. Lin et al. (2009) argues that such 
learning from previous relationships affects firms’ decisions towards future ac-
quisitions.  
While target-specific experience can drive acquisition commitment decisions, 
commitment decisions also depend on the outcomes of learning (Johanson & 
Vahlne 2009) and the nature of the institutional environment (Lin et al. 2009). An 
increasing and positive outcome of learning is one in which the MNE has ac-
quired market knowledge and attain a positive business relationship with the tar-
get firm. Johanson and Vahlne (2009) suggest that increasing market knowledge 
and knowledge about a partner firm business is likely to result in increasing 
commitment decisions. From the perspective of acquisitions, it is expected that 
MNEs that have existing business relationship with a specific target will most 
likely in the event of positive learning outcomes gain increased market 
knowledge about the host country market. Full acquisition is most likely an out-
come of the business relationship. 
It has been argued that ambiguity about the knowledge of the target business asset 
and network value increases the higher the informal institutional difference be-
tween the parent MNE and the target firm (Folta 1998; Chari & Chang 2009; Xu 
et al. 2010; Quimet 2013). Though, a relationship with the target firm might exist, 
contractual difficulties could still arise due to the informal institutional distance 
between the parent MNE and host country of the target firm. Also, the outcomes 
of knowledge of the partner business and host market knowledge may suggest a 
cautious investment approach. Consequently, it is expected that MNEs will opt 
for staged acquisition. The choice of staged acquisition serves as contractual 
bridges to negotiation failures through earnout arrangements linking the acquisi-
tion purchase price to future performance of the target firm. Furthermore, staged 
acquisition can also be in response to gaining sufficient time in developing 
knowledge of managing the operations of the business in foreign markets. It can 
also be in response to allow sufficient time to gain effective host country capabil-
ity in dealing with formal institutional constraints of target host country such as 
non-transparent regulatory institutions and failure in formal institutions.  
MNE’s can develop effective mechanisms and strategies to deal with non-
transparent regulatory institutions and failure in formal institutions (e.g., political 
risks).  Oliver (1991) suggests that firms can pacify, balance and bargain with the 
sources of institutional pressures that affect their business operations. Frynas and 
Mellahi (2003) suggest that firms can be active actors capable of acquiring and 
upgrading firm-specific resources and capabilities for coping with or even bene-
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fiting from institutional pressures such as political risk. Similar studies show that 
some multinationals increase investments in corrupt emerging countries because 
such corrupt government provides them incentive and opportunity to overcome 
liability of foreignness and to influence government decisions to their sole ad-
vantage (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1999; Anand, Ashforth 
& Joshi 2005; Rodriguez et al. 2005).  
Experience and institutional knowledge in dealing with inefficient regulatory in-
stitutions and political risks are pivotal in enabling firms to develop the needed 
capabilities to deal with these types of institutional pressures. They are also need-
ed in developing an effective compromise, bargaining and manipulating strategy 
in dealing with host country institutional pressures. The role of MNE’s experience 
or experiential knowledge in entry mode studies has been investigated from sev-
eral theoretical lenses. Nevertheless the findings are inconclusive as some studies 
found positive (Anderson & Svensson 1994; Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Har-
zing 2002), negative (Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Padmanabhan & Cho 1999; 
Brouthers & Brouthers 2000) and no relationship (Cho & Padmanabhan 1995; 
Meyer & Estrin 1997; Larimo 2003) between experiential knowledge and the 
choice of acquisition and greenfield investment. The reasons for this contradiction 
is because these studies explored different theoretical lenses, explored various 
categories of experiences (e.g. international experience, host country experience, 
acquisition experience and greenfield experience)(Slangen & Hennart, 2007). 
While the experience gained from several years of international business opera-
tions (international experience) might be relevant for developing effective capa-
bilities to respond to institutional pressures. It is argued that on one hand, some 
experiential knowledge is not transferable and on the other hand, host country 
capability is the context specific experience that provides firms with adequate 
knowledge in dealing with host country institutional pressures.  
Host country capability is defined as capabilities derived from knowledge MNEs 
acquire by doing business in a particular country through the ongoing business 
operations in a particular host country (modified from Chetty et al. 2006; Slangen 
& Hennart 2008a). This involves having a subsidiary in the host country or an 
established joint venture or partial acquisition in the host country. Some authors 
such as Chetty et al. (2006), Slangen and Hennart (2008a) and Chen (2008) define 
such capability as host country experience based on the number of years of doing 
business in the host country (e.g. subsidiary). In this dissertation, it is argued that 
host country experience enables the parent MNE to develop its operational capa-
bilities in the host country through learning and innovation. Unlike the assump-
tion of Chetty et al. (2006), institutional knowledge is rarely transferable especial-
ly in emerging economies. As a result, institutional knowledge should also be 
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country specific. Learning in such host country could include host country institu-
tional knowledge (Eriksson et al. 1997; Puck et al. 2009) and knowledge of an 
ongoing business in the host country (Chetty et al. 2006; Puck et al. 2009).  They 
are country specific (Mu, Gnyawali & Hatfield 2007; Mudambi, Mudambi & Na-
varra 2007; Michailova & Zhan 2014) and contributes to the overall operational 
capabilities of the firm (Vahlne & Johanson 2013). Such capabilities cannot be 
acquired via exporting operations (Marinova, Marinov & Yaprak 2004), conse-
quently, it is necessary that such host country knowledge be referred to as host 
country capabilities rather than experiences that might be duration specific (e.g. 
business partner relationships, etc.).  
The acquisition of host country capability requires an ongoing operation in a spe-
cific host country in order to gain greater familiarity of the local competitor, inti-
mate knowledge of the market (Marinova et al. 2004). The acquisition of host 
country capability ensures legitimacy aimed at averting consumer discrimination 
in favor of local providers (ibid). Host country capability develops a firm’s insti-
tutional knowledge. Institutional knowledge is the perceived knowledge of busi-
ness, currency laws, financial practices, and business culture (Chetty et al. 2006). 
It is used to understand both the formal and informal institutional differences be-
tween countries (ibid). It consists of knowledge about the laws, norms and gov-
ernance standards and structures in specific countries (Eriksson et al. 1997). 
What differentiate host country capability and other forms of experiences in pre-
vious literature (e.g., acquisition experience, international experience, host coun-
try experience) is that it is not limited to host country experience. It includes ca-
pabilities derived from an ongoing business in the form of signing a contract with 
a new distributor or agent in the host country (Chetty et al. 2006: 700). It includes 
capability needed to expand the business considerably with an existing customer 
in the host country; doing business with one or more new customers within the 
existing market and entering new country markets with existing customers (ibid). 
These experiences results into knowledge opportunities (Johanson & Vahlne 
2009). Other experiences referred in the IB literature are born in disaggregate 
measures. They are expressed in the form of internationalization experience, and 
general business experience conveyed in the number of years of doing business in 
a particular country. These are no host country capability as defined in this disser-
tation. For example, having a non-operational subsidiary in a host country or tax 
heaven subsidiary does not constitute host country capability. 
It is believed that MNEs that do possess host country capability will opt for full 
acquisition while MNEs that do not possess host country capability will opt for 
partial and staged acquisition at the time of market entry. Firms that possess host 
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country capability are acquainted with the cultural knowledge of the host country 
and how to do business in the host country. They also possess the institutional 
knowledge and have developed operational capabilities on how to effectively 
manage and create new business opportunities in the host country. Conversely, in 
the absence of host country capability, firms would opt for partial and staged ac-
quisition as both strategies provides them foothold strategy to learn and develop 
necessary competencies needed to operate and successfully do business in the 
host country. 
Conclusively, this section shows that firms do not remain passive to formal and 
informal institutional constraints during the time of entry. Firms respond to these 
institutions with host country capability and experiences gained from ongoing 
business with a particular business target (target-specific experience).  
3.1.3 Entry Motives, Institutions, and Acquisition Strategies 
This section establishes how the motives of market entry interact with host coun-
try institutional environment in predicting MNE choice for partial, staged and full 
acquisition. Thus, institutional theory and motives of FDIs (Dunning 1993; 1998) 
will be integrated into this section. 
The motives of entering a foreign market should play a fundamental role in the 
strategic entry mode choice chosen by the MNEs. Several studies have advanced 
our knowledge on the specific role of entry motives in the entry mode choice of 
MNEs in foreign market (e.g. Sanchez-Peinado et al. 2007; Chen 2008; Tahir & 
Larimo 2006; Buckley et al. 2007). However, they have assumed that institutional 
factors exert same pressures on all entry motives of MNEs in foreign markets. 
Institutional factors do not exert equal amount of pressures on all market entry 
motives. By integrating OLI paradigm and institutional theory, it is shown that 
certain forms of acquisition strategies are preferable in a particular institutional 
environment at the time of market entry.  
Dunning and Lundan (2008) provide a perspective on how to integrate OLI para-
digm with the institutional environment. However, their perspective focuses on 
certain home country advantages (Oa-Ownership-asset advantage and Oi-
Ownership-institutional advantage) MNEs develop due to how they are embedded 
in their home country. It also focuses on how national level institutions are shaped 
by the activities of both indigenous firms and foreign-owned MNEs. This is also 
similar to the argument of comparative institutionalism that MNEs innovations 
are hinged on their embeddedness in home country systems of economic coordi-
76      Acta Wasaensia 
 
nation, education systems, financial systems and market relations (Hotho & 
Pedersen 2012: 247). 
In this section, the focus is on how host country institutions impact the strategic 
motives and corresponding acquisition strategies of parent MNE in host countries. 
While comparative differences in institutions will give rise to differences in 
MNEs capabilities and responses leading to variation in entry mode choices used 
by different countries when entering foreign market (Hotho & Pedersen 2012: 
247). However, such studies will require evolutionary studies linking how organi-
zations internally generated and externally imposed incentives such as regulations 
and norms, affect all areas of managerial decision-making. Furthermore, data for 
such studies are rarely available. For this reason, macro-level institutional envi-
ronment (the institutional-based view of international business) is sought for in 
exploring the relationships between entry motives, institutional environment and 
the acquisition choice of MNEs in foreign markets.   
Section 2.2 discussed the formal and informal aspects of the institutional envi-
ronment. Section 2.1.2 discussed the motives of FDIs. This section integrates Sec-
tions 2.2 and 2.2.1. However, the impact of entry motives on the formal regulato-
ry environment will be neglected, because regulatory pressures are coercive and 
irrespective of the motives, MNEs will have to conform to the regulatory re-
strictions. Additionally, failure to comply with regulatory restriction would lead 
to denial of acquisition entry. Thus, this section will focus on how regulatory 
transparency, failure in formal institutions and informal institutional constraints 
interacts with entry motives in influencing the acquisition strategies. 
As discussed in Section 2.1.2, Dunning (1993; 1998) proposes four different mo-
tives for foreign market entry (market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, resource-
seeking, and strategic asset-seeking motives). In this section, it is argued that the 
various motives of foreign market entry respond differently to the host country 
institutional environment (i.e. regulatory transparency, failure in formal institu-
tions and informal institutional constraints).  
Acquisition aimed at market-seeking motives entails that the acquired firm is in-
volved in major value chain activities such as procurement, production, marketing 
and sales (Dunning 1993; 1998). Market-seeking motives aim at entering and 
serving the local markets, improve market position in the domestic market, ac-
quire marketing skills and marketing management expertise and gain access to 
adjacent markets (Marinova, Marinov & Yaprak 2004). Such acquired firms will 
require local responsiveness by adapting their goods to the needs and tastes of the 
local customers (Dunning 1993). To achieve local responsiveness, the acquired 
firms are required to strongly adapt within their local environment by maintaining 
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stakeholder relationships such as close ties with their customers, participate in 
local networks to obtain local market knowledge and access to distribution net-
works (Slangen & Beugelsdijk 2010). Furthermore, such acquired firms will need 
access to institutions required for firm survival and legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 
1977).  
Multinationals from developed economies entering host countries characterized 
by non-transparent regulatory institutions, political risks and institutionalized cor-
ruption are expected to need local ownership in the form of equity stake in mar-
ket-seeking acquisitions in order to survive and gain legitimacy. Allowing for 
local ownership would provide the MNEs powerful access to governmental insti-
tutions and an ability to have people within the organization to deal with regulato-
ry institutions and political risks of host countries. Local ownership also provides 
the firm with access to complex institutional networks needed for firm survival.  
Thus, firms with market-seeking motives entering host countries with non-
transparent regulatory institutions, political risks, and institutionalized corruption 
will prefer partial and staged acquisition than full acquisition. 
Resource-seeking acquisitions are aimed at gaining access to/or to acquire specif-
ic resources in the host country at relatively lower cost levels compared to their 
home countries (Dunning 1993; Filippov 2010: 314). It includes access to raw 
materials and agricultural products, access to cheap and semi-skilled labor, and 
access to technological capacity, management or marketing expertise and organi-
zational skills in more advantageous conditions (Dunning 1993).  Recently, ac-
cess to management and marketing expertise, organizational skills, and techno-
logical capacity are considered specifically as strategic asset-seeking motives and 
will be considered as such in this study. The latter are resources that are embed-
ded in the local environment and would require greater interaction with the host 
countries for MNEs to exploit these resources effectively. For example, natural 
resources are controlled by state-owned firms in most countries. Most acquisi-
tions aimed at exploiting natural resources are acquired via privatization of the 
state-owned firms.  
According to Uhlenbruck and Castro (1998: 627), host governments do not give 
up their ownership entirely in resource-seeking acquisitions; rather they want to 
retain control of these resources. Both when they give up their ownership partially 
or fully, the terms of the purchasing agreement may go far beyond the sales price. 
For example, it may come with political clauses such as protection of employ-
ment of nationals, regional development, limitation on liquidating the business, 
insisting that the management team be staffed with nationals, and limitations on 
the number of lay-offs. (ibid)  Governments also provide direct means for the 
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survival of these acquisitions through securing financing, guaranteeing govern-
ment procurement, allowing tax breaks, restricting imports and limiting new entry 
(ibid).  
Thus far, it is pertinent to argue that host country institutions interact strongly in 
resource-seeking acquisitions. On one hand, governments have a strong interest in 
resource-seeking FDIs. On the other hand, governments provide the necessary 
policy, network and protection for such acquisition to survive. Consequently, the 
government can provide the needed knowledge and assistance in dealing with 
political risks and institutionalized corruption in the host countries. MNEs enter-
ing such market will prefer partial and staged acquisition rather than full acquisi-
tion because giving host government a stake will serve as a powerful resource to 
MNEs in dealing with regulatory institutions and political risks of host countries.  
Acquisitions aimed at efficiency-seeking motives aims at increasing a firm’s effi-
ciency by exploiting the benefits of economies of scale and scope, or common 
ownership (Dunning 1993). Efficiency-seeking FDIs have been suggested to take 
place sequentially after firms have undergone market-seeking and resource-
seeking FDIs (Dunning 1993). Efficiency-seeking acquisitions are also aimed at 
diversifying activities between two countries or regions with contrasting factor 
endowment. For example, when multinationals locate information and value add-
ing activities in developed locations while labor intensive and natural resource 
operations are located in developing locations to take advantage of the difference 
in factor endowments. Efficiency-seeking acquisitions could be in the form of 
market-seeking or resource-seeking acquisition but the holistic motivation under-
lying such acquisition is to increase a firm’s efficiency by exploiting the benefits 
of economies of scale and scope, or common ownership. (ibid) Such acquisitions 
require tight integration to achieve the sole aim of the economies of scale and 
scope. The aim of tightly integrating such subsidiaries is to ensure extensive shar-
ing of all type of resources and the adoption of parent firm organizational pro-
cesses while increasing synergistic benefits (Pablo 1994). Most efficiency-
seeking FDIs take place in host countries that are open and have well-developed 
infrastructures and are located in regionally integrated markets (Dunning 1993: 
59).   
The institutional environment should have greater interactions with efficiency-
seeking acquisitions. The need to integrate such subsidiary tightly to achieve 
economies of scale and scope drives such acquisitions to take place in developed 
country institutions. Tightly integrating acquired subsidiaries is more feasible for 
fully acquired subsidiaries than partially acquired subsidiaries. Developed country 
institutions have well-developed infrastructures and stable political and transpar-
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ent institutions. In summary, efficiency-seeking acquisitions are more likely to be 
full acquisitions in countries characterize with non-failure in formal institutions 
and transparent regulatory institutions. 
Strategic asset-seeking motives are aimed at protecting or increasing a firm’s core 
competence (Dunning 2001).  Strategic asset-seeking motives is the most signifi-
cant changes in the motives of FDI’s over the last two decades (Dunning 1998) as 
firms are seeking ways to procure capabilities needed for competitive advantage. 
Examples of strategic asset-seeking acquisitions are acquisitions aimed at acquir-
ing specific technologies, marketing, and management expertise. Strategic asset-
seeking acquisitions also include acquisitions aimed at intra-firm sourcing, i.e., an 
acquisition aimed at sourcing and procuring major components and products.   
Most strategic asset-seeking FDIs take place in developed economies (Makino, 
Lau & Yeh 2002) because advanced strategic assets and sophisticated customer 
segments tend to be spatially concentrated in developed economies (Dunning 
1998). Developed economies have established transparent regulatory institutions; 
stable political environment and supporting institutions that govern the rules of 
business thus reduce the bottlenecks and need for a local stake in foreign acquisi-
tions. Developed economies also have less intervention in multinational opera-
tions compared to the level of intervention in less developed and developing 
economies (Poynter 1985). Consequently, it is likely that strategic asset-seeking 
acquisitions should have less institutional interaction with host country formal 
institutions and firms seeking for such acquisition will have a greater preference 
for a full acquisition than partial and staged acquisition.  
Based on the above discussion, the following summary can be drawn from the 
interaction of entry motives on non-transparent regulatory institutions, high polit-
ical risks and institutionalized corruption in predicting acquisition entry. Multina-
tionals from developed economies entering host countries characterize by non-
transparent regulatory institutions, high political risks, and institutionalized cor-
ruption will prefer partial acquisition and staged acquisition than full acquisition 
for market-seeking and resource-seeking motives. More so, multinationals from 
developed economies entering host countries characterize by transparent regulato-
ry institutions, stable political environment, and less corruption will have prefer-
ence for full acquisition than partial and staged acquisition for Strategic asset-
seeking and Efficiency-seeking motives.  
Contractual difficulties are one way in which informal institutional environment 
of host countries manifests themselves in decisions regarding acquisition strate-
gies at the time of entry (Jakobsen 2008; McDevitt 2006). Consumer ethnocen-
trism (Mummendey, Klink & Brown 2001; Ayub & Jehn 2006) is another form in 
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which informal institutional environment manifest especially with regards to 
market-seeking and resource-seeking motives.  
Market-seeking and resource-seeking acquisitions are independent of their parent 
MNEs and thus require less integration because they are embedded in their local 
environment (Slangen & Beugelsdijk 2010). The need to avoid consumer ethno-
centrism will prompt MNEs to retain local partner to enhance local responsive-
ness. This will lead to a preference for partial acquisition rather than staged or full 
acquisition for market-seeking acquisitions in a highly informal institutional envi-
ronment. Resource-seeking acquisitions are mostly aimed at securing raw materi-
als. Such raw materials are embedded in host countries and have interactions with 
the host country institutions. Consumers could also exercise ethnocentrism due to 
fear of foreign country resource exploitation (Moeller, Harvey, Griffith & Richey 
2013). To gain legitimacy and survival, it is expected that parent MNE will opt 
for partial acquisition in an informal institutional distance environment just to 
enable the efficient flow of raw materials to the parent MNE. Thus, firms invest-
ing in resource-seeking acquisition will more likely opt for partial acquisition 
rather than staged or full acquisition. 
Unlike market-seeking and resource-seeking acquisitions, strategic asset-seeking 
and efficiency-seeking will require tight integration to gain access to knowledge 
and competencies as well as to achieve economies of scale and scope. Most effi-
ciency-seeking investment takes place in developed countries, and such countries 
share close informal institutional environment. Also, strategic asset-seeking in-
vestment is not strongly embedded in the local institutions, firms entering with 
such motives will opt for full acquisition rather than partial or staged acquisition. 
Based on the discussion above, it can be summarized that multinationals from 
developed economies entering informal institutional distance countries would 
prefer full acquisition over partial and staged acquisition for Strategic asset-
seeking and Efficiency-seeking acquisitions. Multinationals from developed 
economies entering informal institutional distant countries would prefer partial 
acquisition over staged and full acquisition for resource-seeking and market-
seeking FDIs. 
3.2 Determinants of Equity Changes in Acquisition 
The section integrates internationalization process theory (Johanson & Vahlne 
1977; 2009) and institutional-based view of International Business (Peng 2002; 
2003; Peng & Khoury 2009; Arslan 2011; Arslan & Larimo 2011) to discuss the 
 Acta Wasaensia     81 
  
determinants of increasing and decreasing equity commitment decisions of 
MNE’s at post-acquisition entry.  
The discussion below will center on the role of partial acquisition at the time of 
market entry as a precursor to changes in equity stake when the acquiring MNE 
have (1) build trust, (2) gained market knowledge and host country capability and, 
(3) have also gained knowledge of target firm assets. Also, the discussion below 
will also discuss the role of attractive market conditions and subsequent changes 
in formal institutions as determinants of changes in equity stake. 
Drawing from internationalization process theory (Johanson and Vahlne 2009), 
mutual relationships commitment with firms and their partner firm’s network 
builds a firm knowledge and opportunities (Knowledge Opportunities). Partial 
acquisition serves as a platform (state variable) where knowledge, trust, and 
commitment can develop that leads into later commitment decision. MNEs with-
out previous relationship with a target firm may seek for partial acquisition due to 
information asymmetry faced by parent firms (Folta 1998; Tong, Alessandri, 
Reuer & Chintakananda 2008; Chari & Chang 2009; Xu et al. 2010) as a result of 
differences in financial institution that govern financial transparency and disclo-
sure (Balakrishnan & Koza 1993; Whittington 2000; Zhou et al. 2007) that makes 
assets valuation costly. Chen and Hennart (2004) argued that parent firms con-
fronted with these challenges opt for partial acquisition as a means to build reci-
procity or a “hostage” into acquisition contracts, something that the seller would 
want to avoid if the underlying assets of the firm are a “lemon”. Entering foreign 
markets via partial acquisition can serve as a foothold strategy. The outcomes of 
learning from the partial commitment will determine the next commitment deci-
sions that will be embarked upon by the acquiring firm. During the foothold strat-
egy (partial acquisition), the acquiring firm can gain valuable knowledge about 
the market (market knowledge), specifically, knowledge of formal and informal 
institutions of the host country (institutional knowledge) and knowledge of the 
acquired target assets (target-specific knowledge).  
Trust and commitment between the acquiring firm and the partially acquired tar-
get should be an antecedent to knowledge sharing and thus the performance of the 
alliance relationship (Das & Teng 1998; Yuliani & Vanessa 2007; Ali 2013). It is 
believed that increasing levels of trust or commitments to the relationship be-
tween the parent firm and partially acquired firm should enhance the tendency of 
the acquiring MNE to increase their equity commitments in the partially acquired 
targets. In contrary, the failure of both parties to develop a mutual trust and com-
mitment to their relationship may hinder knowledge sharing and knowledge op-
portunities. Empirical evidence suggests that the lack of knowledge sharing and 
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trust between strategic partners has a positive impact on the survival of alliance 
relationship (Fryxell, Dooley & Vryza 2002). Thus, in the absence of knowledge 
opportunities or trust, parent MNEs will otherwise decrease their commitment to 
the target firm.  
Furthermore, MNEs will change their equity stake in partially acquired subsidiary 
when they have gained more knowledge about the target firm business assets. 
Empirical evidence suggest that MNEs that do not possess sufficient knowledge 
of the value of the target firm assets and business are more likely to opt for partial 
acquisition at the time of market entry, especially in technology acquisitions (Fol-
ta 1998; Folta & Miller 2002; Ransbotham & Mitra 2010). These studies argue 
that MNEs opted for partial acquisition as a waiting period to enable the parent 
MNE to gain target-specific knowledge and market knowledge. During this peri-
od, the acquiring MNE becomes an insider, thereby enabling them to gather in-
formation on the target and target technology. This gives them information ad-
vantage over outsiders when subsequently buying out the target (Folta 1998; Folta 
& Miller 2002; Ransbotham & Mitra 2010). Dapena and Fidalgo (2003) argue 
that partial acquisition is a waiting option that gives the parent MNE an oppor-
tunity to learn more about the firm and to have a more accurate view of its true 
nature and value to be created. It is expected that as the acquiring MNE gain more 
knowledge about the target firm business processes, technologies and feasibility 
of such technology, they will increase their equity commitments. This enables 
them to take advantage of the business potentials and to control the application 
and economic benefits that should accrue from them. (ibid) 
In addition to learning about the target assets, partial acquisition also gives the 
parent MNE a means to acquire host country capability before making full acqui-
sition. During the partial stake, the parent MNE can gain institutional knowledge 
that provides the MNE knowledge on how to deal with challenges arising from 
restrictive M&A laws, non-transparent institutions, institutionalized corruption 
and political risks of host countries. Empirical evidence suggests that MNEs use 
subsidiary’s relations and networks for learning ownership regulations which in 
turn facilitates post-entry mode change (Ye 2012). Empirical evidence also sug-
gests that partial equity could provide a platform for host country political strate-
gy response such as developing political strategies in host countries (Boddewyn 
& Brewer 1994; Schuler 1996). It could also be a platform for shaping govern-
ment policy (Lord 2000) through financial incentive (e.g., hiring individuals with 
government experience, providing contributions to government), constituency 
building (e.g., approaching government, mobilizing grassroots), and information 
strategy (e.g., lobbying, testifying before government bodies, commissioning 
think tanks) (Hillman 2003). More so, gaining host country capability enable the 
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MNE to know how best to deal with host country institutions or even profiting 
from institutional pressures (Frynas & Mellahi 2003) and the likelihood to in-
crease their investment commitments even in corrupt emerging countries (La Por-
ta et al. 1999; Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi 2005; Rodriguez et al. 2005).   
In addition to the above discussions, the attractiveness of the host market should 
enhance MNEs option to increase their equity stake. Magnusson (2007) found 
support that the desire of MNEs to succeed in important markets drives firms to 
increases their equity stake in acquired foreign subsidiaries especially when the 
market is attractive. Song (2014) found that MNEs exit the market when the mar-
ket becomes unfavorable. When markets are attractive, there is a tendency of 
MNEs to invest and commit more resources to exploit the inherent market oppor-
tunities (Magnusson 2007; Puck et al. 2009; Song 2014). Thus, the attractiveness 
of the host country markets should more than less likely, enhance the interest of 
the MNEs to increase their equity commitments in acquired foreign subsidiary.  
Whereas, several existing institutional theory-based studies assumes that host 
country institutions remain static as firms develop strategies to cope with these 
institutions (e.g., North 1990; Porter 1990; Khanna & Palepu 1997; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 2000; Aguilera & Jackson 2003; Peng, 
Wang & Jiang 2008). It is argued that institutions do not remain static because 
they change over time (Greenwood & Hinings 1996; Hoffman 1999; Newman 
2000; Peng 2003; Thornton 2002; Kim, Kim & Hoskisson 2010). Specifically, the 
focus is on changes in formal institutions because changes in informal institutions 
take a very long time (Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn 2007).  
Several empirical studies have documented changes in institutions and the result-
ant changes in MNEs strategies. In Central and Eastern Europe, empirical studies 
have documented changes in ownership stake and equity stake as a result of 
changes in formal institutional environment (See Marinov, Cox, Hooley & Mari-
nova 1997; Larimo 2001). Changes in formal institutional environment (regulato-
ry restriction, transparency of regulatory institutions and failure in formal institu-
tions) can trigger changes in commitment decisions. Host countries can remove 
regulatory restrictions and develop better transparent regulatory institutions and 
stability in their democratic process over time. Several countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe after liberalization and accession into the European Union are key 
examples of states where improvement in these institutions lead to increased for-
eign commitments (Gelbuda, Meyer & Delious 2008). Relieving regulatory re-
strictions on foreign ownership increase the preference for acquiring MNE to in-
crease their equity stake in acquisition. Similarly, legislation allowing institution-
al owners as dominant blockholders may be relieved making it possible for parent 
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MNE to opt for increased equity in partially acquired targets. The reason why 
parent firms would want to increase their equity stake as a result of changes in 
institutional environment is because majority ownership provides the parent 
MNE‘s ability to have control over the composition of the board of directors to 
enhance decision making for the MNE. It has also been suggested that evolving 
ownership stake to majority ownership is positively associated with subsidiary 
survival and longevity (Blodgett 1992; Dhanaraj & Beamish 2004). 
In contrast to the previous discussion, it is also possible for MNEs to decrease 
their commitment or even divest their investment when host countries become 
hostile and unattractive. The host country may be aggressive to foreign investors, 
and the government may be allured by powerful local politicians to nationalize 
investments (Gao 2009). Parent MNE may be unable to negotiate successfully 
with shareholders unwilling to sell their ownership stake and over time the actual-
ization of their motives may not be achieved and thus managers may be willing to 
divest or reduce commitments. Knowledge about the host country market may 
turn out not to be attractive as initially conceived by the parent MNEs during the 
partial equity stake at the time of market entry. While in an attractive market, the 
potential for success is favorable, in an unattractive market as previously miscon-
ceived; the potential for failure is doomed (Magnusson 2007; Song 2014).  
In summary, host country capability, trust and relationship commitments, the at-
tractiveness of the market and changes in formal institutional environment should 
increase the likelihood that parent MNEs will increase their equity stake in ac-
quired foreign subsidiaries. Furthermore, increasing foreign ownership re-
strictions and the unattractiveness of the foreign market would increase the likeli-
hood that parent MNEs will decrease their equity stake in acquired subsidiaries. 
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4 DIFFERENTIAL RETURNS TO PARTIAL, 
STAGED AND FULL ACQUISITION 
 This section integrates the literature on the performance of acquisition with con-
structs from theories explored to develop constructs that will be used in the em-
pirical section on returns to partial, staged and full acquirers. This chapter con-
cludes with a section (Section 4.4) discussing the summary of discussions on de-
terminants of acquisition entry strategies, changes in equity stake and differential 
performance returns to partial, staged and full acquisition. 
4.1 The Role of Institutions: Returns to Partial and Full 
Acquisition 
This section discusses how returns to partial acquirers can be different to returns 
on full acquisition. While it does not intend to quantify the performance returns, it 
shows that with certain acquisition entry strategies firms can achieve their initial 
motivation in different institutional context. Thus, this section discusses the im-
pact of regulatory institutions, regulatory transparency and failed institutions on 
the performance of partial and full acquisitions. 
Formal institutions can influence the performance of acquisition strategies 
through regulatory pressures of host countries, transparency of regulatory institu-
tions and failure in formal institutions precipitating political risk and corruption. 
While these set of formal institutional pressures can influence firms strategic 
choice at entry, their continual existence or introduction of new forms can deter-
mine how firms reap the benefits of their investment. The literature have docu-
mented several forms of regulatory pressures that influence performance of firms. 
They include public equity market regulations (Chacar et al. 2010); corporate 
governance regulations (Reddy et al. 2010; Chacar et al. 2010); antitrust regula-
tions (Chacar et al. 2010; Brito et al. 2013); product market regulation (Chacar et 
al. 2010), industry-specific regulations (Ramanathan et al. 2010; Doran & Ryan 
2012; Feres & Reynaud 2012); labor market regulations (Chacar et al. 2010); and 
other regulatory laws making it difficult or more expensive for foreign acquirers 
to get domestic credit than domestic acquirers (Moskalev 2010).  
Regulations for public equity market and market for corporate control form part 
of regulatory jurisdictions of host country financial institutions that govern how 
corporations determine the sources of their finances and relationship between 
shareholders and management of the corporations. While corporate control regu-
lations aim at reducing principal-agency problems, the market for corporate con-
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trol serves as sources of finances for the organization through public offerings 
(Chacar et al. 2010). It also provides avenues for organizations to monitor and 
acquire well-performing firms and for shareholders to replace non-performing 
managers. It is believed that developed markets will have developed corporate 
control market that sets the “rules of game” on the principal-agency relationship 
and sources of firm’s finances. (ibid) 
Chacar et al. (2010) showed that developed corporate control market has a posi-
tive effect on firm performance persistence because it gives MNEs ability to ac-
quire well-performing firms and smaller competitive players in the industry. Red-
dy et al. (2010) showed that firms that adopted the New Zealand securities com-
mission recommendations on average, had a positive influence in firms Tobin’s 
Q, ratio of market value to book value of assets (MB) and return on asset (ROA). 
The recommendation includes establishing subcommittees for audit and remuner-
ation and having a majority of non-executive/independent directors on the board 
of seven members.  
There is empirical support that the presence of external governance provisions 
(i.e., regulations on board structure allowing more outside independent directors 
of a company) has a positive impact on firms’ performance (e.g., Gompers et al. 
2003; Lin 2011). Other studies have shown that certain reforms on corporate gov-
ernance had a positive impact on firm performance. For example, Brown and 
Caylor (2009) showed that exchange reforms allowing board guidelines in each 
proxy statement is associated with a higher Tobin’s Q. Brown and Caylor (2009) 
showed that corporate governance regulations ensuring that no former CEO 
serves on board; nonemployees do not participate in company pension plans; 
CEO serves on no more than two boards of other public companies; and auditors 
were ratified at the most recent annual meeting has an influence on firms perfor-
mance.  
Some studies have focused on industry-specific formal regulations (e.g., Rama-
nathan, Black, Nath & Muyldermans 2010; Doran & Ryan 2012; Feres & Rey-
naud 2012). Industry-specific regulations are regulations aimed at a specific in-
dustry for example regulations on emissions/pollutions. Feres and Reynaud 
(2012) showed that formal regulations regulating the environmental pollution on 
firms in the Brazilian market increased the environmental performance of firms. 
Ramanathan et al. (2010) showed that environmental regulations in the UK nega-
tively influence innovation performance in the short run. Doran and Ryan (2012) 
showed that environmental regulations explain a firm's decision to engage in eco-
innovation and eco-innovation determines a firm's performance (turnover per 
worker). 
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Chacar et al. (2010) showed that product liability laws (a product market institu-
tion) has a positive influence on firms performance persistence. They argued that 
product liability laws increase the cost of new product introduction which tends to 
be higher for new market entrants. This cost decreases the rate of new product 
introduction for new firms and thus less product competition for existing players 
leading to firm performance persistence. They also found that stronger antitrust 
regulation (a form of product market institution) decreases firm performance per-
sistence because it compels firms to compete based on product attributes. It also 
encourages freer new market entrants and thus increases competitive intensity and 
thus decrease performance persistence. (ibid) 
Thus far, regulatory institutions of host countries influence firm’s performance. 
MNEs whose home country regulatory institutions are very similar to that of the 
host country targets will incur less cost. This is because they can export home 
country knowledge about policy and regulatory institutions (McGahan & Victer 
2010). This reduces the liability of foreignness and the cost of doing business 
abroad (Eden & Miller 2004). It also reduces the liability of home and in turn 
reduces the cost of adaptation of business practices in the legal context (Steven & 
Shenkar 2012). As a consequence, MNEs that opt for the choice of full acquisi-
tion can take full benefits of this similarity (product liability laws, public equity 
market, industry specific laws, and labor market regulations) in regulatory institu-
tions to maximize their synergies related benefits and performance outcomes.  
More so, it is been argued that home country institutions define high performing 
firms within its institutional context (Volberda, Weerdt, Verwaal, Stienstra & 
Verdu 2012). As a result, MNEs whose home country institutions are similar to 
target host countries have experiential knowledge on what strategic choices with-
in an institutional context define high-performing firms. With full acquisition, 
parent MNEs can export such knowledge successfully at ease without interference 
from local owners. On the contrarily, with partial acquisition, the total transfer of 
all management knowledge and know-how from parent MNEs is highly unattain-
able and as such, parent MNEs are unable to maximize their synergistic benefits.  
Based on the aforementioned discussion, it can be summarized that firms that opt 
for full acquisition will achieve their strategic motives than those that opt for par-
tial acquisition the more similar the regulatory institutions of parent MNE home 
country and acquired target host country. In contrast, Firms that opt for partial 
acquisition will perform better than those that opt for full acquisition the larger 
the dissimilarity in regulatory institutions of the MNE home country and acquired 
target host country. 
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Similar to the argument above, a parent MNE from a more transparent home 
country entering transparent host countries will incur less agency cost or contract-
ing cost in conducting acquisitions because transactions will be governed by the 
same “rules of game” familiar with the parent MNEs. Transparent regulatory in-
stitutions will promote transparent regulatory practices such as product market 
laws, labor market laws, industry-specific regulations, corporate governance prac-
tice, disclosure and accounting practices in financial reports.  
Extant literature has shown that countries with transparent regulatory institutions 
have better protection of minority shareholders and likelihood that foreign inves-
tors tend to acquire more equity in target firms (Moskalev 2010). Foreign firms 
entering such host countries will obtain same regulatory information as domestic 
firms thus enabling a fair playing environment (Chacar et al. 2010) for companies 
to compete based on product attributes. Transparency in Regulatory institutions 
have been shown to increase the economic and financial performance of firms 
(Bijalwan & Madan 2013) because it strengthens a country ability to attract new 
business and decreases the cost of investing and transaction cost (cost of making 
ad hoc payment to acquire information from institutions). It is assumed that enter-
ing such host countries with full acquisition than partial acquisition will optimize 
the high cost of integration of assets and low transactions cost of doing business, 
in turn leading to maximization of investments and efficient use of scarce re-
sources. 
On the contrarily, non-transparent regulatory institutions have been attributed to 
performance failures because of regulatory agencies ineptitude in enforcing legis-
lation in punishing offenders and protecting minority shareholders (Mohamad 
2002). MNEs from advanced economies entering host countries with non-
transparent regulatory institutions will incur an additional cost of investment due 
to lack of knowledge of host country institutions. The ineffectiveness of such reg-
ulatory frameworks makes parent MNEs more vulnerable to institutional con-
straints of host countries than domestic firms. As domestic firms may have re-
sources and capabilities more tailored to local markets and institutions, they can 
capitalize on the liability of foreignness of parent MNE to exploit the product 
marketplace leading to parent MNE performance failure.  
Studies have shown a positive relationship between non-transparent regulatory 
institutions and the choice for partial acquisition (Folta 1998; Folta & Miller 
2002; Garner et al. 2002; McGrath & Nerkar 2004; Zhou et al. 2007; Brouthers et 
al. 2008; Xu et al. 2010). These studies argue that non-transparent regulatory in-
stitutions increases information asymmetry. Zhou et al. (2007) found support that 
stock market reacts more favorably to partial acquisition than to full acquisition 
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based on the quality of the target nation’s information institution. It is assumed 
that partial acquisition will perform better than full acquisition in non-transparent 
regulatory environment. This is because allowing for local ownership will provide 
the MNEs powerful access to governmental institutions and an ability to have 
people within the organization to deal with non-transparent regulatory institutions 
of host countries.  
As argued previously, firms would opt for low control entry modes such as partial 
acquisition in high political risks institutions (Brouthers 1995; Smarzynska & Wei 
2002; Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2004; Demirbag et al. 2007; Driffield et al. 
2010), because political risks and undemocratic rule is not a favorable business 
environment for foreign MNEs due to policy instability and governance instabil-
ity. It was further argued that such investment climate does not safeguard the in-
vested capital of MNEs (Samimi, Monfared, Moghaddasi & Azizi 2011). With 
regards to corruption, it was argued that MNEs from advanced economies that opt 
for full acquisition when entering host countries characterized by perceived high 
corruption will incur substantial cost of developing knowledge of how to work 
with corrupt governments. Due to the liability of home (Morgan 2012) in dealing 
with corrupt practices, they will perceive the bribing of politicians as unethical. 
Domestic players may engage in bribing to overcome various redundant adminis-
trative and regulatory obstacles giving them a competitive edge over the foreign 
firms in exploiting the product marketplace.  
There is documented evidence that in high corrupt society MNEs indulging in 
corrupt practices performs better than those that do not (Francis et al. 2009; 
Brockman et al. 2013). This is expecially true for MNEs from relatively similar 
corrupt countries and inevitably do not face the challenges of liability of home 
and duality of institutional pressures (Morgan 2012). Liability of home and duali-
ty of institutional pressures originates from pressures of conformity from the vari-
ety of institutional pressures of home and host countries (ibid). MNEs from less 
corrupt and political stable countries entering high corrupt countries will exhibit 
post-merger long-term performance failure compared to their peers that are politi-
cally connected to host country institutions (Steven & Shenkar 2012). It is ex-
pected that full acquisition will achieve poorly under this circumstance. In contra-
rily, entering via partial acquisition will give the MNEs local partners with local 
knowledge of host country institutions and how to respond to corrupt practices 
and institutional constraints of host countries. Mobarak and Purbasari (2006) 
found strong evidence that in joint venture schemes, MNEs are more likely to 
choose politically connected partners in Indonesia. This is because corruption, 
nepotism, and bribery are of first-order importance in Indonesia. As a result, po-
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litically connected firms can gain licenses to import raw materials than non-
politically connected firms. (ibid)  
Based on the discussion above, it can be summarized that MNEs that opt for full 
acquisition will achieve their strategic motives than those that opt for partial ac-
quisition in a host country characterized by non-failure in formal institutions (po-
litical stability and less corruption). MNEs that opt for partial acquisition will 
perform better than those that opt for full acquisition in a host country character-
ized by failure in formal institutions (political instability and perceived high cor-
ruption).  
4.2 Host Country Capability: Performance Returns to 
Partial and Full Acquisition  
MNEs that possess host country capability have effective mechanisms and strate-
gies to deal with non-transparent regulatory institutions and failed formal institu-
tions (e.g., political risks). Ability to deal with such institutions is more likely to 
enhance their acquisition performance.  
As argued previously, in the presence of non-transparent regulatory institution, it 
is expected that host countries would be incapable of enforcing legislation such as 
property rights, and copyright, patent and competition laws. It was further argued 
that MNEs entering such host countries with partial acquisition can achieve their 
strategic motives better than those that entered via full acquisition. This is be-
cause acquiring partially mitigates the risks arising from misrepresentation of the 
value of the target firm (Balakrishnan & Koza 1993; Whittington 2000; Zhou et 
al. 2007). 
MNEs can develop certain host country capability to respond to non-transparent 
regulatory institutions and failure in formal institutions. Oliver (1991) suggests 
that firms can pacify, balance and bargain with the sources of institutional pres-
sures that affect their business operations. Bruckman et al. (2013) showed that in 
countries with weak legal systems, MNEs political strategies (connected to insti-
tutions) is strongly corrected to post-merger performance because it provides the 
MNE ability to bribe politicians and regulatory institutions to overcome various 
redundant administrative and regulatory obstacles. Aklamanu (2014) found sup-
port that through the acquisition of experiential institutional knowledge, Finnish 
retailers in Russia responded to such institutional pressures by selecting the right 
environment in the host country to establish their operations, creating a new envi-
ronment and cooperating with the environment. 
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Zhu and Qian (2014) showed that increasing host country acquisition experience 
of USA multinationals in countries with weak property rights protection (PRP) 
increases acquirers likelihood to gain value through acquisitions. According to 
them, increasing host country acquisition experience in host countries with weak 
property right protection increases their likelihood to effectively exploit local 
market opportunities through the acquired targets (Zhu & Qian 2014: 4) by 
strengthening the power of the parent MNEs and changing the power and depend-
ence relationship between the parent MNE and acquired target (Zhu & Qian 2014: 
9). Host country acquisition experience is a form of host country experience, and 
a means to acquire host country capability. Consequently, it is expected that firms 
that do possess host country capabilities that opt for the choice of full acquisition 
can achieve their strategic motives. 
4.3 Towards a Motive Measure of Acquired Subsidiary 
Performance 
One of the secondary contributions of this dissertation is to bridge the gap on 
measures of acquisition performance relationship by contributing to the call for 
motive-based performance measures (Verbeke et al. 2009; Meglio & Risberg 
2010). This is because all subsidiaries are not established for financial returns and 
timing differences between setting up the subsidiary and assessing the financial 
performance may make financial measures not suitable for all studies (Anderson 
1990; Glaister & Buckley 1998; Brouthers 2013). The performance of acquisi-
tions is best captured by assessing acquiring firm achievement of initial motives 
of setting up the foreign subsidiary, herein referred to as “motive-based perfor-
mance measure”. The aim of this section is not to ignore financial measures. One 
would expect a positive relationship between the achievement of these motives 
and financial performance. However, the utmost goal is that the motive-based 
measure provides more robust evaluation of the performance of the foreign sub-
sidiaries especially when there are subsidiaries of the sample firms whose motives 
cannot be easily computed financially (e.g., R&D affiliates & other capability 
procurements affiliates). 
By motive-based performance measure, the aim is to explore the motives of ac-
quisitions of multinationals based on Dunning’s Paradigm (market-seeking, re-
source-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking motives). The aim 
of this section is to identify the initial motives of entering the foreign markets and 
access the acquisition performance based on the achievements of the initial mo-
tives of market entry. 
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Proponents of the motive-based performance measure could argue that the bound-
aries between the Dunning’s motives of market entry are not so clear. For exam-
ple, how separable are resource-seeking motives from strategic asset-seeking mo-
tives? Buckley et al. (2007) argued that strategic asset-seeking are a form of re-
source-seeking motives. While acknowledging that strategic asset-seeking is a 
form of resource-seeking, however, as Dunning, (2001: 183) put it “The location-
al requirements of strategic asset-seeking FDI are different from those of natural 
resource, market or efficiency-seeking FDI, in as much as the former is attracted 
less by the need to reduce production costs, overcome trade barriers, and exploit 
economies of scale, but more by the presence of high-quality physical and human 
infrastructure and a favorable political and commercial ethos towards M&As and 
cooperative alliances”. While it is also argued that firms can pursue a combina-
tion of motives, and the motives of FDI’s can change. In other words, separating 
these motives into its distinctive forms may question its validity. I argue that the 
additional benefit of focusing on the primary motives outweighs the existing as-
sumption that all firms combine all motives during acquisition as implied by as-
sessing both financial and non-financial motivated acquisitions with financial 
measures. Further discussions will focus on how different motives of acquisitions 
should be measured. 
Market-seeking firms are firms that seek market entry for the purpose of serving 
the market in that country. For such firms, increasing their market size, market 
share and hence financial profitability of the business will be at their foremost 
objective. Acquisitions aimed at market-seeking motives can be measured based 
on a combination of growth in market share and financial profitability. Literature 
has documented several market-seeking measures of performance. Market-
seeking measures tend to concentrate on objective and subjective measures. 
While objective measures are measures that use secondary data sources such as 
accounting data, the subjective measures uses response from respondent based on 
their perception of the performance of acquisition in terms of market share, repu-
tation, market access, marketing (Brouthers 2013) and sales growth (Datta 1991; 
Mishra 2006; Brouthers 2013)  
Resource-seeking firms are motivated to invest overseas to gain access or acquire 
specific resources. These resources include physical resources used as raw mate-
rials and supply of cheap, unskilled and semi-skilled labor in more advantageous 
conditions (Dunning 1993). Examples of physical resources include agricultural 
products, mineral fuels, industry minerals, and metals.  Most resource-seeking 
acquisitions take place in under-developed and developing economies as such 
economies are rich in natural resources and have the availability of unskilled and 
semi-skilled labor. (ibid) Resource-seeking acquisitions accounts for a moderate 
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share of acquisitions in Central and Eastern Europe (Uhlenbruck 1997), Africa 
(Gerlach & Liu 2010) and Latin America (Fones & Butt-Philip 2011). Resource-
seeking acquisitions are primarily undertaken to minimize production cost and 
secure sources of supply (Dunning 1993; 1998; Dadzie 2012). Resource-seeking 
acquisitions are primarily production-oriented and exports output to foreign par-
ent and for local market needs. To access such resources in advantageous condi-
tions, parent MNEs would need to transfer expertise knowledge and management 
capabilities to increase the productivity of the acquired firm. It is expected that 
such subsidiaries will experience an increase in productivity or productivity 
growth in post-acquisition. Sourcing performance (in terms of availability of crit-
ical raw materials, and price) and export growth should serve as a better proxy to 
access the performance of such acquisitions.  
Efficiency-seeking motives are motives aimed at rationalizing production, distri-
bution, and marketing activities through common governance of and synergy-
building among geographically dispersed operations (Dunning 1993; Gorynia et 
al. 2007). According to Dunning (1993), the aim of efficiency-seeking FDI’s is to 
take advantage of the differences in the cost of factor endowments and to achieve 
economies of scale and scope. Zhang and Yuk (1998) showed that export-oriented 
FDIs are efficiency-seeking FDIs. It is expected that post-acquisition export in-
tensity or export growth of the acquired subsidiary can serve as a proxy for meas-
uring the performance of efficiency-seeking acquisitions. Whereas, in resource-
seeking acquisitions, exports are primarily focused on export to the parent MNE, 
efficiency-seeking acquisitions will involve exports to other subsidiaries and 
markets. In addition to exports, efficiency-seeking FDIs also involve cost savings 
as it primarily aims at gaining economies of scale and scope. One would expect 
cost synergies as one measure in accessing the performance of efficiency-seeking 
acquisitions. 
Strategic asset-seeking motives are motives aimed at protecting and increasing a 
firm competitiveness or core competencies (Dunning 1993; Yang & Kang 2005). 
Strategic assets-seeking acquisitions are aimed to gain access to technology and 
specialized competencies that improve the competitive advantage of the firm 
(ibid). There are existing literature on technology acquisitions. These studies have 
accessed the performance of strategic seeking acquisitions (e.g technological ac-
quisitions) based on; the number of new product development or product qualifi-
cation aftermath of the acquisition (Ahuja & Katila 2001; Reus 2004; Puranam & 
Srikanth 2007); the number of patents granted to the acquiring firm aftermath of 
the acquisition (Hagedoorn & Duysters 2002; Cloodt et al. 2006); and R&D per-
formance (Hitt et al. 1991; Cassiman, Colombo, Garrone & Veuglers 2005).  
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Table 3 below shows the performance measures according to the acquisition mo-
tives. It depicts why the different motive of acquisitions requires a distinctive way 
to capture the performance of acquisitions. These measures are further strength-
ened and validated in the empirical section. 
Table 3. Motive Base Performance Measure 
Motives of Acquisitions Performance Measure 
Market-Seeking Motives • Market Share 
• Market Reputation 
• Market access  
• Sales growth  
Efficiency-Seeking motives • Export Growth 
• Cost Synergies 
Resource-Seeking Motives • Export Growth 
• Sourcing Savings (availability of 
critical raw materials & price sav-
ings 
Strategic Asset-Seeking motives • R&D Performance 
• Number of Patents 
• Number of New Product Lunch 
• Product Qualification to Market 
4.4 Summary of Acquisition Strategies, Post Entry 
Changes, and Performance  
Institutional theory and internationalization process theory are the two theories 
utilized in this dissertation. From the extended model of institutional-based view 
of international business, regulatory restrictions, transparency of regulatory insti-
tutions, failure in formal institutions, contractual difficulties were the construct 
developed for this study. Figure 12 depicts the conceptual framework of the stu-
dy. 
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Figure 12. Conceptual framework for the study 
From institutional theory, it was shown that institutions influence the investment 
decisions of firms (Xu & Shenkar 2002; Peng 2002; 2003; Dikova & Van Wit-
teloostuijn 2007; Estrin et al. 2009; Peng & Khoury 2009; Arslan 2011; Arslan & 
Larimo 2011; Santangelo & Meyer 2011).  
It was further argued that institutions do not exert an equal amount of pressures 
on all entry motives. By exploring the motives of foreign market entry based on 
OLI paradigm (Dunning 1993; 1998) that is, market-seeking, resource-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking, it was shown that the institutional 
impact on entry strategies varies depending on the motives of foreign market en-
try.  
Furthermore, it was shown that institutional environments do not remain static but 
vary over time. As a result, equity or ownership stake in acquisition is a continu-
um and managers do exercise an option to increase their equity stake. Internation-
alization process theory (Johanson & Vahlne 1977; 2009) and institutional theory 
(Peng 2002; 2003; Peng & Khoury 2009; Arslan 2011; Arslan & Larimo 2011) 
was integrated to discuss the determinants of  increasing and decreasing equity 
commitment decisions of MNE’s in acquisitions at post-market entry. 
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Finally, it was shown that institutions influence the performance of acquired firms 
(Markides & Ittner 1994; Dhanaraj & Beamish 2004; Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-
Canal 2007; Pattnaik & Choe 2007; Aybar & Ficici 2009; Brouthers 2013). It was 
argued that institutions should have an influence on returns to partial, staged and 
full acquisition. It was also shown that host country institutional environment and 
host country capability should confer differential performance returns on partial 
and full acquisition. Table 4 shows the summaries of predictions drawn from the 
literature. 
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Table 4. Summary of Literature: Acquisition Entry Strategies and Perfor-
mance 
1. Host country regulatory restrictions increase the likelihood of partial acquisition. 
2. Non-transparent regulatory institutions and political risks increase the likelihood 
of partial and staged acquisition rather than full acquisition.  
3. Firms that have target-specific experience will opt for staged and full acquisition 
and firms that have host country capability will opt for full acquisition. In contra-
rily, firms that are deficient in partner specific experience or host country experi-
ence will opt for partial and staged acquisition as means to gain market and host 
country institutional knowledge. 
4. Multinationals from developed economies entering host countries characterize by 
non-transparent regulatory institutions, high political risks and institutionalized 
corruption will prefer partial acquisition and staged acquisition rather than full ac-
quisition for market-seeking and resource-seeking acquisition. 
5. Multinationals from developed economies entering host countries characterize by 
transparent regulatory institutions, stable political environment and less corruption 
will have preference for full acquisition rather than partial and staged acquisition 
for strategic asset-seeking and efficiency-seeking acquisition. 
6. Multinationals from developed economies entering informal institutional distant 
countries are likely to opt for full acquisition over partial or staged acquisition for 
strategic and efficiency-seeking acquisition.  
7. Multinationals from developed economies entering informal institutional distant 
countries are likely to opt for partial acquisition over staged or full acquisition for 
resource-seeking and market-seeking acquisition. 
8. The gaining of host country capability, trust and relationship commitments will 
lead to increasing equity commitment in foreign market. 
9. Market attractiveness will lead to increasingly equity commitment in foreign 
market. 
10. Changes in formal institutional environments in terms of relieving foreign own-
ership restrictions, changes to transparent regulatory institutions and non-failure 
in formal institutions would increase the likelihood that parent MNES will in-
crease their equity stake in acquired foreign subsidiaries.  
11. Increasing foreign ownership restrictions and the unattractiveness of the foreign 
market would increase the likelihood that parent MNEs will decrease their equity 
stake in acquired subsidiaries. 
12. Full acquisition performs better in transparent regulatory institutions, non-
regulatory restrictive institutions and non-failure in formal institutions. 
13. Partial acquisition performs better in non-transparent regulatory institutions, reg-
ulatory restrictive institutions and failure in formal institutions. 
14. The acquisition of host country capability increases the likelihood that full acquir-
ers are able to achieve their strategic motives in institutional distance host coun-
tries. 
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5 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS 
This section discusses the research strategy, and method used. First, the philo-
sophical assumption used when conducting the research is discussed. Second, this 
section discuss case study as a research strategy and how multiple case studies 
will be used in theory building for the dissertation. Finally, the data collection 
method, data analysis method and the interview process is discussed. 
5.1 Philosophical Justification: Critical Realism  
There are several philosophical stances to a research. Table 5 below shows five 
philosophical stance to research (combined from Guba & Lincoln 1994; Healy & 
Perry 2000; Torraco 2002; Stiles 2003; Easton 2010). From the description of the 
various philosophical stances and for the purposes of exploratory research into 
acquisition entry strategies and performance outcomes, realism stance was chosen 
for this dissertation project. The realism stance of this dissertation is specifically 
transcendental realist ontology referred by Easton (2010) as critical realism, here-
in referred to as realism.  
Realist approach aims to explain and examine the underlying mechanism of a 
particular phenomenon (Easton 2010; Stiles 2003). Realist believes that people’s 
subjective interpretation of the social world (phenomenology stance) and theoret-
ical frameworks/extant research findings can be combined in order to determine 
the underlying mechanism that influences people’s actions (Easton 2010). The 
reason for these combination is because the realist believes that there is a “real'' 
world to discover even though it is only imperfectly understood (Guba & Lincoln 
1994; Healy & Perry 2000; Easton 2010). Thus, in order to discover this real 
world, realist believes that people’s subjective perception of the world provides a 
window on to a reality beyond those perceptions, through which a picture of reali-
ty can be triangulated with other perceptions (Healy & Perry 2000). This is dis-
tinct from the idealist/constructivist where people’s subjective perception of the 
world represents the true world (Healy & Perry 2000).   
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Critical realist view reality as one that consist of empirical, actual and the real 
world (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009). The empirical world includes those things 
we can observe. The actual world refers to those things that happen independently 
of the researcher. The real world includes those mechanisms that are productive 
of different events. Thus, the task of the researcher is to explore the real world 
and how it relates to the empirical and actual. While realist shares some similarity 
with positivist in the objective world (I.e., patterns & generalization and in find-
ing causalities), it also differs from positivist. Realist focuses on the unobservable 
mechanisms disregarded by the positivist that explains the observable events posi-
tivist seek to explain (ibid). More so, the focus of causalities in critical realism 
differs from that of positivism. While critical realist view causality in terms of 
contextual and emergent, positivist view causality in terms of universally predict-
able pattern (ibid: 42). 
Critical realism is an emergent philosophical stance, and it is still gaining recogni-
tion in the academic literature. However, researchers are often challenged on how 
to proceed with applying critical realism in their research methodology. The fol-
lowing section discusses several research methodologies on how to conduct a 
realist research.  
The type of methodology does not significantly inform the philosophical stance of 
a researcher but how the methodology was used provides the distinction between 
paradigms that operates within the qualitative research.  
In an attempt for generalization, realist can use structural equation modeling to 
model structures with complex independencies and multi-item scales (Healy & 
Perry 2000). This suggests that realism does span the use of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods in analyzing research data. Healy and Perry (2000) argues 
that because of the interest in extrinsic reality, realist can approach their method-
ology via in-depth interviews and focus groups methodologies (e.g. case study 
methodology) with well-articulated interview procedure. Realist researcher can 
also approach their methodology via instrumental case study research (Healy & 
Perry 2000). Instrumental case study research is a type of case study research 
where the case itself is secondary, and the focus of the study is likely to be known 
in advance and constructed around established theory or methods. The interest of 
the researcher, in this case, is to extend theory or identify patterns and themes and 
compare these with other cases (Grandy 2010).  
The important aspect of applying critical realism in research is not the chosen 
methodology but the philosophical underpinning on how the methodology was 
applied. The methodologies discussed above are well-grounded methodologies 
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already in existence before the emergence of critical realism. However, how the 
researcher can use the chosen methodology defines his critical realist stance. Re-
alists go beyond the mere scope of extending theory or identify patterns and 
themes when using instrumental case study research. They go beyond the focus of 
analytical generalization as with Eisenhardt (1989) case study methodology. Real-
ist focuses on ontological depth of reality, and they discard research approaches 
that focus on the surface (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 43). Realist focuses on the 
unobservable mechanisms (constructs) (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009: 43) and 
context (contextualized explanation) (Welch et al. 2011) that explains the observ-
able phenomenon. 
The current study approaches the critical realist stance using case study method-
ology. Critical realism has been argued to be suitable for case study methodology 
because it justifies the study of any situation (Easton 2010). Case study research 
method is also suitable for M&A research because of the complex causal, and the 
contextual and contemporary nature of acquisitions (Bengtsson and Larsson 
2012). Case study research is chosen for this study to answer the “how and why” 
questions in a contemporary phenomenon such as M&A. Case study research 
provides a possibility to explain inductively other such factors that may explain 
acquisition strategies that are not captured by existing theories. Case study re-
search approach supports the combination of predetermined outside reality for 
further investigation (Easton 2010) for which critical realism advocates.  
One fundamental challenge is how to apply case study methodology in critical 
realism. Applying case study methodology in critical realism must ensure that the 
focus is on extricating entities and the mechanisms that connect and combine 
them to cause events to occur (Easton 2010). In other words, the focus is on struc-
tured mechanisms that cause particular events to occur. These mechanisms can 
produce different events. The same events may also have different mechanisms. 
(ibid) With regards to the present study, the same mechanism can cause partial, 
staged and full acquisitions to occur. Similarly, partial, staged and full acquisition 
can also be caused by different mechanisms. 
As with the debate over how many cases fulfill a proper case study methodology 
(Eisenhardt’s 1989; Dyer & Wilkins 1991; Ragin 1997; Dooley 2002; Yin 2003), 
there is also no absolute measure of how many cases should a critical realism re-
search be limited to (Easton 2010: 119). Critical realism can be applied regardless 
of the numbers of cases involved, as long as the process of the case study meth-
odology involves a thoughtful, in-depth research or ontological depth of reality 
with the objective of understanding why things are the way they are (Easton 
2010: 119). Achieving ontological depth of reality does not entail interviewing 
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people in depth (Bhaskar 1998: 199) or limiting data collection to interview re-
sponse, but ensuring comparative analysis of different cases (Danermark, 
Ekstrom, Jakobsen & Karlson, 2002) and ensuring contextualized explanation 
(Welch et al. 2011). Because observations are imperfect, critical realist believes 
that they are unlikely to reveal the complete truth or complete understanding of 
the truth. As a result, critical realist researcher collects further data to distinguish 
among alternative explanations of the truth. 
In the current study, critical realism stance has been applied in the case study 
methodology as follows. First, multiple case studies were selected for the disser-
tation. Second, rather than focusing on the case studies as the unit of analysis (See 
clarifications and definitions in 5.2 below), the focus is on the acquisition deci-
sions (i.e. the cases). This implies that each acquisition decision is treated as a 
case while the case company is treated as the case study. By this way, the critical 
realist can focus in depth on the uniqueness and context of each acquisition deci-
sion as each acquisition decision is context specific (Meyer 2001). This is also 
similar to embedded case selection design (Yin 1989). The data collection was 
not limited to interview data but also data collected from company websites, 
company documents given to the researcher from the case companies as well as 
previous researches and theories on entry mode choice. Comparative analysis was 
ensured through with-in and cross-case analysis.  
Critical realist stance is applied in this dissertation project because of its ontologi-
cal appropriateness. First, although studies on entry mode choice have been re-
searched widely in the extant literature and various theoretical lenses have been 
explored. However, there have been limited studies on the strategic context where 
companies utilized partial, staged and full acquisition as entry strategies. More so, 
some studies that have studied partial acquisition have utilized the same institu-
tional framework used to differentiate the choice of acquisition vs. greenfields to 
study the choice of partial acquisition vs. full acquisition (e.g. Arslan 2011; 
Arslan & Larimo 2011). They ignored that social phenomena such as actions and 
institutions are concept dependent (Easton 2010: 120). 
Thus far, there is a “real'' world about partial, staged and full acquisition to dis-
cover even though it is only imperfectly understood. While existing theo-
ries/literature serves as data sources in realism, the participants’ interviews are 
only a representation of the summaries and not a word-for-word account of reality 
(Layder 1998). Consequently, the only way to understand, describe and evaluate 
reality or the social world is to go beyond what is articulated by individuals and 
explore prior theoretical ideas, concepts, models or propositions that can be help-
ful in explaining external/objective reality (ibid). 
 Acta Wasaensia     103 
  
Second, studies on entry mode choice tend to ignore dynamic nature of these en-
try strategies at post-entry (decreasing and increasing equity stake in acquisitions) 
and studies on performance of partial, staged and full acquisition are limited or 
have basically assumed that all subsidiaries are designed to generate financial 
profits. These studies have ignored the dynamic nature of these strategies and 
overlooked other objectives of foreign subsidiaries beyond those elements of the 
social environment that are compliant to quantification because of their positivist 
philosophical stance in an attempt to measure rational decision making in terms of 
cause and effects (Bitektine 2008). This has led to a situation where theories have 
been tested so far only on those elements of the social environment that are ame-
nable to quantification thus limiting the generalizability of these theories in ex-
plaining the elements of the social environment that are not amenable to quantifi-
cation (ibid).  
Third, while acknowledging the deficiency in previous studies, it is however ar-
gued that the findings of this extant literature on entry mode choice and perfor-
mance and the well-established theoretical lenses can help inform and guide fu-
ture research that attempts to close this gap. The benefits of incorporating addi-
tional insights from extant literature outweigh the potential benefits of starting 
from scratch and upholding only the phenomenology/idealist stance (i.e. without 
the possibility of inculcating prior studies or theoretical frameworks).  
Finally, idealist/phenomenology stance has been criticized for the degree in which 
researcher subjective interpretation of the data has a greater influence on the re-
search findings (Stiles 2003). Critical realism stance gives an alternative to this 
criticism because it provides a means to avoid this limitation through generaliza-
tion, contextualization, triangulation and other quantitative approaches to measur-
ing extrinsic reality (ibid). 
5.2 Case Study Research Approach 
Case study research approach is the chosen research approach for this study. Case 
study is a research strategy/approach and not a methodological choice. There 
seems to be ambiguity in the literature that a case study is a methodological op-
tion for qualitative research. It is pertinent to emphasize that a case study is a re-
search strategy and not a methodological option (Piekkari, Welch & Paavilainen 
2009). Thus, case study research can be approached utilizing any or multiples of 
the methodological approaches vis-à-vis quantitative, qualitative, mixed methods. 
It can employ various data collection processes such as participant observation, 
document analysis, surveys, questionnaires, interviews, and Delphi processes 
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(Dooley 2002; Piekkari et al. 2009).  Before proceeding further as to how case 
study research approach will be applied in the current study, it is relevant to em-
phasize some fundamental differences between a case study research, a case, and 
a case study. 
Dooley (2002) defines a case as an account of an activity, event, or problem or an 
account of an activity that describes a series of events that reflect the activity or 
problem. A case is a descriptive research document, which is often presented in 
narrative form, based on a real-life situation or event (Merseth 1994). While a 
case represents an account of an activity, event or problem, case studies empha-
size the study and the contextual analysis of a limited number of events or condi-
tions and their relationships (Dooley 2002). According to Yin (1994), a case study 
research is a “scholarly inquiry” that aims at investigating contemporary phenom-
enon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are 
used”. Piekkari et al. (2009) defines case study research as an analysis that exam-
ines, through the use of variety of sources, a phenomenon in its naturalistic con-
text, with the purpose of “confronting” theory with the empirical word. In sum-
mary, a case represents any activity or event, a case study represents the study of 
the activity or event and case study research is the research strategy used to un-
dertake the case study (Dooley 2002). For the current study, the company is the 
case study, but the acquisitions are the cases, and case study research is the re-
search strategy undertaken for the case study. The next section discusses how 
case study is used for theory building for the dissertation. 
5.3 Case Study Research and Theory Building 
The current study is focused on theory building as it aims to understand the con-
text of Finnish firm’s acquisition strategy decisions. MNEs may have several ac-
quisitions in the same host country or several acquisitions in different host coun-
tries, and each of these acquisition decisions is made case by case or are inde-
pendent decisions. Consequently, the focus is on the individual acquisition deci-
sions or cases to understand the context leading to their acquisition strategies. 
This study develops constructs via existing theories, integrate deductive and in-
ductive theoretical approaches to develop alternative theoretical framework that 
explains how and why Finnish MNEs opt for partial, staged and full acquisition at 
the time of market entry. It also develops constructs that explain why they change 
their equity stake at post-market entry and how these acquisition strategies influ-
ence the performance of the acquired subsidiary.  
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Yin and Eisenhardt’s suggest that case study can be used for theory building and 
theory testing, but did not account for how a theory building case study is differ-
ent from a theory testing case study research. Dooley (2002) suggests several 
ways to use case study for theory building through the fulfillment of specific 
phases of the general method of theory building vis-à-vis conceptualize, opera-
tionalize, confirm, apply and refine.  First, case or cases should be applied to al-
ready conceptualized and operationalized theory using standard case study re-
search and series of quasi-experimental studies. Second, case(s) should be used 
for confirmation or disconfirmation of an already conceptualized and operational-
ized theory using standard case study research and series of quasi-experimental 
studies. Third, case(s) should be used for the purpose of creating or advancing 
conceptualizing and operationalizing of a theory using grounded theory research 
and meta-analysis research. (ibid) Similar to Eisenhardt’ s and Yin view on the 
use of multiple case studies for theory building, Dooley (2002) also advocated 
that multiple case studies should be used for continuous refinement and develop-
ment of a fully developed theory.  
Furthermore, Dooley (2002) outlines six steps in which these four roles can be 
utilized to account for methodological rigor, validity, and reliability. First, the 
researcher should determine and define the research questions. Second, the re-
searcher should select the cases and determine data-gathering and analysis tech-
niques. Third, the researcher should prepare to collect data; fourth, the researcher 
should collect data in the field. Fifth, the researcher, should evaluate and analyze 
the data and finally, the researcher should prepare the report.  Figure 13 summa-
rizes seven steps how case study research is utilized in this study for theory build-
ing. 
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Figure 13. Theory Building Process for Current Study 
Figure 13 is compiled from Eisenhardt’s (1989); Yin (2003); Dooley (2002) and 
Sinkovics, Penz & Ghauri (2008). Details of Steps 1 to 5 of the theory building 
process are discussed below.  Detailed discussions on analyzing the data (step 6) 
as well as reporting findings (step 7) are discussed in Section 5.4. Also, the quali-
ty criteria (data evaluation) utilized for realism theory building process is dis-
cussed in Section 5.5.  
Defining the research questions: The dissertation drew insight from Yin and Ei-
senhardt’s view on qualitative case study research. According to them, the re-
searcher requires a clear and well-defined research questions. The research ques-
tion should ask the why and how questions. Determining the research questions 
also requires a literature review that adds face validity to the research project 
(Dooley 2002). The research questions for this dissertation ask the “how” and 
“why” questions. The literature review and synthesis was conducted during this 
phase. In selecting cases suitable for the research, I opted for multiple case studies 
rather than a single case study. Multiple cases were selected to enable comparison 
across organizational context (Welch et al. 2011), to increase the strength of the 
findings, and to enable analytical generalization (Eisenhardt 1989). Thus, the 
multiple case studies is applied to already conceptualized and operationalized 
theory to confirm or disconfirm already constructs derived from existing theories 
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and to develop new theories in the form of constructs for later theory testing or 
advance the conceptualization and operationalization of constructs (ibid).  
Case Selection: Theoretical sampling process was used in selecting the multiple 
cases utilized for this dissertation (Eisenhardt 1989). For the present study, the 
process shown in Table 6 (modified from Yin 1989: 54; Curtis, Gesler, Smith & 
Washburn 2000: 1002; Suri 2011: 70) was undertaken to ensure theoretical sam-
pling.  
Table 6. Theoretical Sampling Process for Current Study 
Activities Description 
1.Definition of key 
constructs 
(a) Partial Acquisition: (See Table 1) 
(b) Staged Acquisition: (See Table 1)                                        
(c) Full Acquisition:  (See Table 1) 
(d) Increased Equity Stake: (See Table 1) 
(e) Decreased Equity Stake: (See Table 1) 
(f) Firm Domicile: The MNEs must be domiciled in Finland 
or Finland is the home country of the firm, and its head-
quarters located in Finland. 
(g) Institutional Distance:  The acquisitions was made in 
institutional similar or institutional distance environ-
ment (IMF classification based on advanced economies, 
emerging and developing economies aided this selec-
tion) 
2. Suitable Database  Thompson Database & FDI Internal databank of the market-
ing department of the University of Vaasa was used as a ref-
erence database to find appropriate Finnish firms (Case stud-
ies) 
3. Selection Process (a)    Cases should be acquisitions made within 2000-2013 
(b)  Choose a case that is conceptually driven by the theoreti-
cal framework that underpins the research question 
from the outset; and/or, 
(c)  Choose a case to replicate previous case(s) to test the 
emerging theory; or, 
(d)  Choose a case that is a polar opposite/that provides vari-
ation in the contextual factors to extend the emerging 
theory. 
(e) Theoretical saturation 
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Theoretical sampling or theory-based sampling involves the selecting of cases 
that represent vital theoretical construct about the phenomenon under study (Suri 
2011: 70). The aim of theoretical sampling is to select cases that are relevant to 
the research questions to enable the replication or to extend the emergent theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Theoretical sampling requires the setting out operational defi-
nitions of dependent variables/key constructs under study (Suri 2011: 70). Theo-
retical sampling was applied in the following ways. 
First, key constructs already defined in Table 1 enabled the selection of appropri-
ate case study. Second, a suitable source for the appropriate case study was identi-
fied. The FDI Internal databank of the marketing department of the University of 
Vaasa and Thompson database was selected as suitable sources of case studies for 
the dissertation. The key constructs already identified was used to find case stud-
ies from the database. That is the focus was on case studies that have partial, 
staged and full acquisitions and or have increased and decreased equity stake in 
their foreign acquired subsidiary. It is worth nothing that the database does not 
have any classification for staged acquisition as defined in this study. For this 
reason, equity changes in the form of increasing equity stake served as a proxy for 
staged acquisition (the actual classification of the acquisition cases as staged or if 
it was a mere increasing ownership stake was verified during the interview). 
For the selection process, the first criterion was the year when the acquisition was 
made. For the current study, the acquisitions made between the years 2000 to 
2013 were selected. This is because it is more feasible to find managers that will 
have adequate knowledge of the acquisition decisions within this range of period. 
Thus, case studies that have only acquisitions (cases) made outside these range of 
period were excluded from the list of suitable case studies.  
The second criteria utilized was to select suitable cases based on: (a) Choose a 
case that is conceptually driven by the theoretical framework that underpins the 
research question from the outset; and/or, (b) Choose a case to replicate previous 
case(s) to test the emerging theory; or, (c) Choose a case that is a polar oppo-
site/that provides variation in the contextual factors to extend the emerging theo-
ry.  
To fulfill this trio sub- criteria's, the type of acquisition strategies was one dimen-
sion in selecting the suitable case studies. Only case companies that have at least 
more than one acquisition strategies (partial and full acquisition or partial and 
increasing ownership stake, full acquisition and increasing ownership stake, par-
tial acquisition and decreasing ownership stake, full  acquisition and decreasing 
ownership stake) within this period were selected. Thus, case studies that do not 
meet these criteria were dropped out of the sample. By applying this logic, the 
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final sample consisted of cases studies that have more than two acquisition strate-
gies (filling theoretical categories); similar acquisition strategies (replication); 
different acquisition strategies (polar opposite).  
After suitable case studies have been selected, suitable acquisition cases were 
selected. Theoretical saturation was used to select suitable cases within the case 
studies. Most of the MNEs selected undergo several acquisitions within this peri-
od selected. When same acquisition strategies and several acquisition strategies 
have been made in same host countries, a maximum of two acquisitions was se-
lected. The institutional context played a significant role in the final selection of 
suitable cases. Cases were preferably selected when the institutional contexts pro-
vide an entirely new context in the study. For example, KONE & 
KONECRANES acquisitions in African context were preferable selected because 
of the unique context of Africa and limited studies in this institutional context.  
The original result of case selection after the above selection criteria resulted in 
fourteen Finnish MNEs (UPM-KYMMENE AHLSTRÖM, KONE, 
KONECRANES, CARGOTEC; FAZER; ATRIA; COMPONENTA; KEMIRA; 
HK RUOKATALO; FINFOREST; METSO; LAHDEN POLTTIMO; SNELL-
MAN). The last five firms (HK RUOKATALO; FINFOREST; METSO; 
LAHDEN POLTTIMO; SNELLMAN) were dropped out of the case studies ex-
plored in this study. This was because the current acquisition manager informed 
that they are unaware of decisions regarding the acquisitions, and no one is avail-
able in the company that has sufficient knowledge of key decisions regarding the 
mentioned acquisitions. Furthermore, after conducting the interviews, CARGO-
TEC was dropped out because the response from the manager was not adequate 
for this study. This was because the interviewing manager did not want to com-
ment on specific acquisition decisions (cases). As noted earlier, acquisitions are 
case by case. Using such general responses does not provide the context and does 
not fulfill the embedded design case study methodology used in this study. The 
final case studies (companies) were eight and the number of cases selected is 
shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Case Studies acquisition strategies and geographic locations 
S/NO Names of 
Finnish 
Compa-
nies 
N
o 
of
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d 
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N
o 
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l  
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N
o.
 F
ul
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Ch
an
ge
s 
Location of Investment 
A UPM-
KYMMENE 
 1 2 1 South Africa, Germany; Rus-
sia 
B AHLSTRÖM  1 1  USA; Sweden  
C ATRIA 2 1  1 Estonia, Sweden, Russia 
D KONECRAN
ES 
1  1  Morocco, South Africa 
E KEMIRA 2  2  USA, Russia, Netherlands 
F KONE 1 2 3 1 Egypt, Kenya, Israel, Bulga-
ria,  Europe, Saudi Arabia 
G COMPONE
NTA 
1  1  Turkey & Sweden 
H FAZER 2  2  Denmark, Norway (2), Swe-
den 
TOTAL  9 5 12 3  
Table 7 shows the case studies, the number of partial acquisition, full acquisition 
and changes in equity stake. The final sample consisted of eight Finnish multina-
tionals that made international acquisitions in the form of partial acquisition, 
staged acquisition and full acquisition or have in some cases increased or de-
creased their equity stake in their acquired foreign subsidiaries.  
As already discussed, the staged acquisitions were confirmed during the interview 
based on the conceptual meaning of staged acquisition in this study. Cases involv-
ing changes in equity stake were not regarded as separate cases because they were 
previously partial acquisition and have been considered as a case (i.e. a partial 
acquisition case where equity has changed). There was a total of twenty-six ac-
quisition cases in total selected from these eight case studies/firms for this study. 
Originally from the selection criteria, there were twenty-three acquisition cases 
suitable. During the interview, three cases (case 1, case 15 and case 20) emerged 
as the responding managers referred to the cases and wanted to comment on the 
acquisition decision.  Rather than eliminating these three cases out of the final 
cases, it was decided to include them for two reasons. First, the year of these ac-
quisitions (case 1 and case 15) falls outside the scope of the period selected, sec-
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ond, the ability to find responding managers which was the justification for the 
period selected for the cases have been solved. Third, case 20 specifically referred 
to several acquisitions with same motives within the same institutional context 
(EU). It was believed that the addition of these cases would add to theory devel-
opment for the current study and thus they were added to the final set of suitable 
cases for the study. 
After the final selection of case studies and cases, email was sent to the respective 
acquisition managers if they can participate in the interview process. The email 
specifically sought the acquisition managers responsible for key decisions during 
the acquisition of the cases selected for the case study. The contact of all case 
companies was added to Excel spreadsheets to keep a diary of correspondence 
between the interviewee organization and the author. The dairy of correspondence 
includes names, address, company name, telephone number, e-mail address and 
other contacts within the organization contacted if applicable. The managers were 
contacted by email and after two weeks if no response is received they were fur-
ther called through phone numbers and reminded about the email. If these did not 
prove successful, they were further contacted through someone in the company 
the author have a close rapport or someone internal to the organization to remind 
the interviewee. This proved to be successful in cases where consent from the 
interviewer was difficult. The acquisition managers were also informed during the 
email that they should give consent to the interview by confirming any suitable 
data and time. The confirmed acceptable date of the interview was also added to 
dairy of correspondence. A copy of Informed Consent Form is shown in Ap-
pendix A.  
Data-gathering Techniques: With regards to data gathering techniques, the dis-
sertation primarily utilized qualitative data gathering method. The qualitative data 
includes interview data and archival data from company websites and power point 
presentations during the interview. The author made a request for soft copies of 
all power point presentations to be sent via email. In cases where there is confi-
dential information, they were either removed before sending to the author or the 
case study managers informed not to publish the official versions in the disserta-
tion. These documents were read and also added to the transcribed data in suitable 
sentences while maintaining confidentiality. The list of all data collected for each 
case is shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Data Matrix from the Case Companies 
S/NO Case Studies 
Year of  
Data 
Collection Other documents 
A UPM-
KYMMENE 
2014 • Consolidated financial statements and annual report for 
the year of acquisition and year after the acquisition. 
• Company web pages and press release on the specific 
acquisition case under study (Strömberg 2000) 
• Face-to-face interview (Transcripts) 
B AHLSTRÖM 2014 • PowerPoint presentation of Acquisition process 
• Consolidated financial statements and annual report for 
the year of acquisition and year after the acquisition. 
• Company web pages and press release on the specific 
acquisition case under study (Ahlstrom Corporation 
STOCK EXCHANGE RELEASE 2014).  
• Face-to-face interview (Transcripts) 
C ATRIA 2014 • Consolidated financial statements and annual report for 
the year of acquisition and year after the acquisition. 
• Company web pages and press release on the specific 
acquisition case under study 
• Face-to-face interview (Transcripts) 
• Legal consultancy press releases on case acquisition 
D KONECRANES 2014 • Consolidated financial statements and annual report for 
the year of acquisition and year after the acquisition. 
• Company web pages and press release on the specific 
acquisition case under study 
• Face-to-face interview (Transcripts) 
E KEMIRA 2014 • Consolidated financial statements and annual report for 
the year of acquisition and year after the acquisition. 
• Company web pages and press release on the specific 
acquisition case under study (Tikurilla Group News 2009; 
Rosendal  2014)  
• Face-to-face interview (Transcripts) 
• Industry press releases on case acquisition 
F KONE 2012 & 
2014 
• Consolidated financial statements and annual report for 
the year of acquisition and year after the acquisition. 
• Company web pages and press release on the specific 
acquisition case under study (Liautaud 2013; 2014; KONE 
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Corporation 2014) 
• Face-to-face interview (Transcripts) 
• Acquisition policy document 
G COMPONENT
A 
2014 • Consolidated financial statements and annual report for 
the year of acquisition and year after the acquisition. 
• Company web pages and press release on the specific 
acquisition case under study (Componenta 2012). 
• Face-to-face interview (Transcripts) 
H FAZER 2014 • Consolidated financial statements and annual report for 
the year of acquisition and year after the acquisition. 
• Company web pages and press release on the specific 
acquisition case under study (Slotte 2011; HDR Partners, 
Vitzthum 2013) 
• Face-to-face interview (Transcripts) 
Preparation for data collection:  Qualitative database was organized before the 
actual collection of data to ensure a proper data collection. It helped in planning 
proactively how to store the data and what data to be stored. The qualitative data-
base comprised of Microsoft 2010 word document, the university computer hard-
drive, and a backup 3.75GB memory stick that were both used to store the record-
ed interview data from the digital voice recorder. Each recorded interview data 
stored on the hard drive, memory stick, and the transcribed data is given a file 
name after the company name (e.g. KONE_Interview.wma for audio record and 
KONE_Interview.doc for the transcribed data). In addition to organizing a quali-
tative database, a pilot study was conducted for one case company (KONE) in 
2012 using the same data gathering techniques that will be used in this study. The 
pilot study was used to avoid problematic areas that may emerge if all the data 
collection is done at the same time. The pilot study enhanced the perfection of the 
interview questions and the sequencing of the interview questions to ensure that 
the resultant data can be coded (Dooley 2002).  
Data Collection: Data collection was done via face-to-face interview using digi-
tal voice recorders to record and store the data. This ensured dependability and 
repeatability (Sinkovics et al. 2008). Semi-structured interview was the qualita-
tive data gathering method primarily used for this dissertation. The interview was 
semi-structured because it is the most effective and appropriate means of collect-
ing information (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). This is especially true when the in-
terest of the researcher is to understand the interviewee perception of the social 
world or the ways in which managers make sense of and create meanings about 
their actions (Qu & Dumay 2011). It also provides flexibility for the researcher 
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and to modify the style, pace and ordering of questions to evoke the fullest re-
sponses from the interviewee (Qu & Dummay 2011: 247).  
For example, the interviewer will be able to follow up a response from the inter-
viewee with a standard question, such as “please tell me more about that [. . .]” 
when the interviewee suddenly discloses an area of great interest (Qu & Dumay 
2011: 247). This is also referred to as laddering interview technique (Sinkovics 
et al. 2008). Semi-structured interview gives the participants (interviewer and 
interviewee) freedom to combine a range of dialog that is of interest to both even 
when the researcher probes a specific question. Recommendation by Qu and 
Dumay (2011) was adopted as guides when conducting the semi-structured inter-
view. The recommendations are summarized as follows: 
• Establishing understanding and maintaining the flow of interviews story 
by not interrupting  
• Avoid questioning with one-word answers, questions that contains jargons  
• Knowing when to interrupt and learn how to focus and pace the interview.   
• Avoid interview bias and adopt a non-judgmental attitude. 
During the interview, questions were probed in depth in comparison with conflict-
ing and similar literature to sharpen generalizability and internal validity respec-
tively. Also, depth of the probing was done until the point of theoretical saturation 
i.e. until the point where probing more will only yield marginal improvement. 
The interview lasted for an average of 60mins. There was one responding manag-
er for each case company except for KONE where the responding manager left 
the company after the pilot interview. As a result, when the second interview was 
conducted it was conducted with the new manager responsible for acquisitions. 
Also for KEMIRA acquisitions, an additional 30mins interview was conducted 
via phone with another manager that was responsible for the completion of their 
staged acquisition in Russia (Tikkurila Paint, a spinoff from KEMIRA responsi-
ble for the parent firm paint business) 
5.4 Analyzing the Data 
Evaluating and analyzing qualitative data requires a process of organizing, de-
composing, synthesizing data, searching for patterns and implication of the data 
and deciding how it should be conveyed to others (Bogdan & Biklen 1982). The 
method of analyzing data is dependent on the philosophical paradigms of the 
study (Myers 1997). For example, in grounded theory paradigm the researcher 
does not come to the field with a well-defined set of constructs and instruments 
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with which to measure social reality. Consequently, the researcher is only able to 
derive the categories from the field through in-depth examination and exposure to 
the phenomenon under study (Sobh & Perry 2006: 1204). Unlike other qualitative 
paradigms, realism researchers enter the field with prior theories because it is be-
lieved that there is an external reality that other people may have usually re-
searched or experienced aspects of that reality beforehand (Sobh & Perry 2006: 
1204). Consequently, their perceptions are some of the many “windows” on to 
that reality deserving some consideration before realism data collection starts 
(Perry, Riege & Brown 1999: 18).  
Qualitative data analysis process follows a formal process of data reduction (Sobh 
& Perry 2006: 1204) through the interpretation and examination of textual data 
from different perspective (Sinkovics et al. 2008: 704). This requires three forms 
of coding process such as open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Miles 
& Huberman 1984; Sinkovics et al. 2008: 704). Open coding refers to the process 
through which concepts and their properties are identified in the textual data 
(Sinkovics et al. 2008). It involves the naming and categorization of phenomena 
throughout the examination of the data. Axial coding refers to the process of es-
tablishing relationships between categories and their sub-categories and identify-
ing the intersection of related categories. It is also the process where codes from 
the conceptual framework are allocated to chunks of text. Selective coding refers 
to the process of refining and integrating categories to build a theory. (ibid) Selec-
tive coding is the state where the concepts are established, and their underlying 
statements are used to explain the phenomena under study. It also involves the 
process of comparison and interpretations (Sobh & Perry 2006: 1204).  
Data reduction process suitable for realism requires that the first phase of data 
reduction (i.e., open coding) be omitted. This is because only those perceptions 
relevant to the external reality are worth investigating (Sobh & Perry 2006: 1204). 
Consequently, the codes used to reduce data in realism research should be gener-
ated from the conceptual framework rather than the data. In contrast, other para-
digms, for example, constructivism research argues for open coding as the first 
phase because every detail of the respondent’s perceptions should be the reality 
under investigation. Thus, realism research requires the use of the prior estab-
lished constructs as the codes followed by axial coding and selective coding. 
(ibid) 
The potential challenge of this process is that other emerging themes that might 
not be in the conceptual framework might be omitted. Sobh and Perry (2006: 
1204) suggested that this problem can be solved by the constant interaction of the 
conceptual model and the interview data. This implies a constant interaction be-
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tween the conceptual model and data analysis. For this study, this challenge is 
solved by undergoing open coding, axial coding and selective coding for the rest 
of the chunk data that did not constitute a part of the prior constructs. A model of 
the data reduction process for this study is shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. Data Reduction Process for the Case Study 
There are established software for qualitative data analysis (e.g. Nvivo software, 
Coding Analysis Toolkit and HyperRESEARCH). However, the data analysis for 
this dissertation was done manually because the aim of realism research is not to 
track and match every phase of every perception in the textual data subjectively 
rather to track only those perception about an external objective reality (Sobh & 
Perry 2006: 1206). Using qualitative software for data reduction is more relevant 
to subjective research that focuses on textual-based-theory (e.g., grounded theo-
ry). Such software cannot analyze, interpret data nor make deductions and gener-
alizations from the data. (ibid) 
The first step for the case analysis was axial coding. This was done by reading 
through the textual data and marking a sentence or group of sentences according 
to their implied meaning from the conceptual framework. That means inserting a 
comment in the Microsoft Word document and naming the comment after the 
conceptual constructs they imply. The second step was selective coding. This was 
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done by using the established constructs in the first step and its interpretations in 
explaining their relationship to the choice of acquisition strategies, changes in 
equity and acquisition performance. The third step followed a process of checking 
the remaining chunk of data, identifying emerging constructs, naming and catego-
rizing the constructs. If the outcome of the third step yields any emerging theme, 
this theme is then subjected to axial coding in search of related sentences and 
their implied meaning. Finally, selective coding is done until coding saturation. 
All the coding process is done within-case analysis (i.e. within each case) (Patton 
1990: 388; Yin 1994; Sobh & Perry 2006: 1203). The within-case analysis was 
examined using embedded design (Yin 1989). This requires analyzing the within-
case analysis at each acquisition case. After the within case analysis, cross-case 
analysis was done.  To ensure cross-case analysis, the summary of key findings in 
each case acquisitions was further tabulated into a single table often referred to as 
meta-matrix (cf. Miles & Huberman 1994; Nummela, Saarenketo, Jokela & 
Loane 2014). Meta-matrix is shown in Table 20. The meta-matrix facilitates case 
comparison, contextualization, and generalizability. 
The aim of the cross-case analysis is to enhance generalizability, deepen under-
standing and explanation of the phenomenon under study by examining the simi-
larities and differences between the within-case analysis (Miles & Huberman 
1994: 173). The cross-case analysis followed a process of searching for common-
alities and contextualized explanation as suggested by realism stance (Easton 
2010; Welch et al. 2011). This entails searching for commonalities of causal 
mechanisms and the contextual conditions under which they work (Welch et al. 
2011: 745). For this study, the commonalities and context were done by classify-
ing the acquisitions according to acquisition strategies utilized at the time of entry 
(i.e. partial, staged and full acquisition). Also, the acquisitions were classified in 
terms of the year of market entry and host country formal institutional classifica-
tion at the year of entry. The host country formal institutional classification was 
based on International Monetary Fund classification (i.e. advanced, emerging and 
developing economies). Similar classifications or data from IMF (used in its orig-
inal form or in combination with other economic institutional reports) are used in 
IB studies as measures of formal institutional environment (e.g. Arslan 2011; 
Arslan & Larimo 2011). The classification of host country institutions based on 
advanced, developing and emerging is to aid our understanding of how and why 
these strategies were utilized in these contexts. Contextualization was also 
achieved by classifying the acquisition based on the motives of the acquisition. 
The impact of informal institutions was solely based on the interview data and 
linked to the construct developed in the theoretical section (contractual complexi-
ties). 
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Reporting Findings: Reporting findings refers to the process of presenting the 
data to the reader. Analytical reporting style and reflective reporting styles are 
two ways of reporting the findings of a qualitative research (Dooley 2002). Ana-
lytical reporting style follows the sequence- literature review, methodology, re-
sults, and discussions. It represents an objective writing style where the research-
er’s presence is passive. (ibid) The second form of reporting qualitative research 
is the reflective reporting style. Unlike analytical reporting style, reflective report-
ing requires the researcher’s presence to very noticeable in the report. Analytical 
reporting style is utilized in this study. In addition to ensuring that researcher’s 
presence is minimally present in the report, certain realism report guidelines are 
applied to ensure that the focus of the explanation in the reporting is on contin-
gencies, structures and mechanisms through which the external reality is con-
strued. In doing so, a conscious process of reflection was undertaken to under-
stand what these findings mean, what alternative explanations of such findings 
existed, what disconfirming evidence are there for these explanations and how 
many of these findings relates to outcomes of previous research cycles (Cepeda & 
Martin 2005: 861). The following guidelines in accordance to Sobh & Perry 
(2006: 1206) were applied to this study: 
• Showing numerical frequencies of empirical experiences to enable readers 
follow the line of thought.  
• Reporting findings should avoid numbers and should concentrate on inter-
pretations.  
• Every observation should have an explanation of why the observation oc-
curred.  
• There should be illustrative quotations in support of explanations and 
should frequently occur in the text with links to the respondent who said 
it, to provide in depth understanding that realism researcher seeks. 
Reporting qualitative research follows the deductive vs. inductive dichotomy, i.e. 
reporting with reference to theory and reporting without reference to theory (Ali 
& Birley 1999, Thomas 2006). In this study, both deductive and inductive ap-
proaches are combined when reporting the phenomenon under study (Ali & 
Birley 1999, Thomas 2006).  Thus, inductively, all specific data incidents that are 
not present in the prior conceptual constructs are reported as emerging theories 
and their underlying context are discussed. Deductively, the existing constructs 
are subjected to confirmation. Using the integrated approach enhances theory 
building in realism. 
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5.5 Data Evaluation 
Establishing quality criteria when conducting qualitative research is very crucial 
in achieving the validity and reliability of a qualitative study (Yin 1994). Healy 
and Perry (2000) established six criteria for evaluating the quality of qualitative 
research utilizing realism stance. These criteria are: 
• Ontological appropriateness 
• Contingent validity 
• Multiple perceptions of individuals and or researchers 
• Methodological trustworthiness 
• Analytic generalization 
• Construct validity. 
Ontological Appropriateness refers to ensuring that the research problem deals 
with complex social science phenomenon that can be discovered through the re-
flective perception of multiple participants even though it is only imperfectly un-
derstood (Healy & Perry 2000). This requires selection of research problem that 
answers the how and why questions. As previously discussed, the research ques-
tions answers the how and why firms opt for varying acquisition strategies at the 
time of market entry and changes in equity stake and post entry. More so, the con-
text focus of the study and the process nature of acquisitions enhance the philo-
sophical assumption of the study. 
Contingent validity refers to validity about generative mechanisms and the con-
texts that make them contingent (Healy & Perry 2000: 125). Thus, it implies the 
validity of the uncertainty about reality that may be contingently actualized. Hea-
ly and Perry (2000: 125) suggest that contingent validity can be accomplished 
through theoretical sampling vis-à-vis literal replication and theoretical replica-
tion. The aim of theoretical and literal replication is for confirmation of theory, 
extension of theory and improvement of the theoretical framework. Theoretical 
replication entails selecting cases that have different settings and are expected to 
accomplish different results (Yin 1994). Literal replication entails choosing cases 
that have similar settings and are expected to accomplish similar results (Yin 
1994).  In this study, this was accomplished via theoretical and literal replication. 
As shown in Table 6 step 3, each additional cases was cautiously selected based 
on the theoretical framework (step 3b) and to replicate previous case(s) (step 3c). 
Also, a case was selected that is polar opposite to produce opposing results but for 
predictable reasons (step 3d). 
Furthermore, contingent validity was achieved by ensuring in depth questions 
were asked until the point of theoretical saturation. The context of each case was 
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described in terms of the appropriateness of the sources of the information, the 
size of the firms, industry, dates of the interviews and the managerial positions of 
the interviewee. Contingent validity was also achieved by ensuring that the re-
sponding managers are the appropriate interviewee for the study. This was 
achieved by ensuring that only managers responsible for the acquisition decisions 
were interviewed. One could argue that why not interview the M&A team rather 
than just the acquisition managers? It is often that acquisition decisions involve 
M&A team who make target search and screening, due diligence, negotiation and 
the final decisions to acquire the targets. Nevertheless, the manager has the over-
all picture of the strategic decision-making process. Thus, the managers provide 
strategic aspects that are nonetheless the focus of the current study.  
Multiple perceptions of participants refer that in realism research, researchers 
should triangulate several data sources and several peer researchers’ interpreta-
tions of those triangulations (Healy & Perry 2000).  Thus, the aim of multiple 
perceptions in realism research is similar to internal validity which aim at ensur-
ing that researcher arrives at converging lines of inquiry by data triangulation 
(Yin 2009: 115; Dooley 2002: 340). For the current study, this was achieved in 
four ways. First, through method triangulation, I ensured that the combination of 
interview data and secondary data sources generated consistency (Patton 2002). 
For example, the acquisition strategies informed by the managers during the in-
terview correspond to the strategies published on the company web pages and 
annual reports. Second, through triangulation of sources (several researchers’ in-
terpretations of data triangulations); the interview data was given to a fellow re-
searcher to ensure that the voice recorded version is same as the transcribed ver-
sion of the interview (Patton 2002).  Third, through analyst triangulation, the tran-
scribed interviews were sent to the interviewee for verification (Patton 2002). 
Fourth, the data was interpreted using multiple theories, referred to as theory tri-
angulation (Patton 2002).  Furthermore, as a way to provide the benefit of the 
research to the managers, it was promised that a summary of the findings and im-
plication for managers will be sent to the managers. It is believed that the triangu-
lation of data formats (audio and text) by managers and peer researchers provide a 
logical source of evidence (Yin 2009) and thus improves corroboration. 
Healy and Perry (2000: 123) define methodological trustworthiness “as the extent 
to which the research can be audited by developing a case study database and by 
the use of quotations and matrices that summarizes key findings in the written 
report”. For the current study, methodological trustworthiness was achieved by 
the establishment of case study database. This is similar to the concept of reliabil-
ity in positivist paradigm where methodological trustworthiness is established 
through ensuring that random error does not exist in a measurement. (ibid) The 
 Acta Wasaensia     121 
  
reasoning behind the establishment of case study database is to ensure that the 
study can be audited. The case study database ensured the methodological trust-
worthiness of this study. The case study database consists of three sections. Sec-
tion (A) (Data Collection Procedure) Consist of informed consent form (Appen-
dix A) and interview guide questions (Appendix B) (Healy & Perry 2000: 122). 
Section (B) (Data matrices-Table 8) consists of a summary of the data collected 
from each case study. Section (C) shows the interviewee anonymity and confiden-
tiality confirmation (Appendix C). 
Analytic generalization is one quality criteria in conducting a realism research. It 
ensures theory building rather than statistical generalization that is aimed at theo-
ry testing (Healy & Perry 2000). A realism research should aim at initially theory 
building (i.e., conceptual development, operationalization, application), then con-
firm or disconfirm the theory through the research data and then present a final 
theory or model or modified theoretical framework at the end of the report for 
future empirical testing or testing the generalizability of the final theory. In this 
study, research questions were identified in prior. This is followed by a literature 
review that leads to conceptual development (Section 4.4), application and opera-
tionalization (Section 5). In chapter 6, the data collected was analyzed to confirm 
or disconfirm the theory. Chapter 7 follows a detailed discussion of the findings 
of the study as well as areas of future research. 
Construct validity refers to how well constructs in the theory explored in the re-
search are measured in the study under investigation (Healy & Perry 2000: 124). 
Construct validity was ensured by using prior theory. The study under investiga-
tion integrated two theories (institutional theory and internationalization process 
theory) that provided the constructs for this study. By utilizing these constructs, 
construct validity was ensured. The combination of case study database as de-
scribed above and data triangulation discussed above enhances the construct va-
lidity used for this study.  
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6 EMPIRICAL DATA AND RESULTS 
This section discusses the empirical data and analysis as well as the results of the 
study. First, the empirical data or case study selected for this study is discussed. 
Second, the background of case studies/firms is elaborated. Third, within cases 
analysis of the case study is presented. Fourth, cross-case analysis of the cases is 
done which presents the results of the study.  
6.1 Background of Cases 
The case studies are Finnish MNEs in the manufacturing sector. Their business 
sectors include elevator, cranes, paper, energy, purification process, casting solu-
tions, food and processing, life sciences and diagnostic applications. Table 9 
shows the case studies/companies and their business sectors.  
Table 9. Case Companies and Business Sector 
S/NO Names of 
Case Studies  
Business Sectors 
A UPM-KYMMENE Manufacturing: Paper, forestry, biocomposites, energy, 
timber & biochemical, biofuels, labels,  pulp & plywood 
B AHLSTRÖM Manufacturing: filters, medical gowns and drapes, diag-
nostics & life science applications, wallcoverings, flooring 
and food packaging 
C ATRIA Manufacturing: meat business, meat product business,  
poultry business, convenience food business 
D KONECRANES Manufacturing & Services: cranes for shipbuilding, ports, 
automotive, waste to energy & steel equipment 
E KEMIRA Manufacturing & Services: pulp & paper, oil & gas, mining 
and water treatment 
F KONE  Manufacturing & Services: elevators, escalator & automat-
ic building doors 
G COMPONENTA Manufacturing:  design & engineering & casting solutions 
H FAZER Manufacturing & Services: Food Services, contract cater-
ing & food products 
Table 10 shows the motives of these investments and host countries of the in-
vestments and the equity sought at the time of market entry. The case studies are 
all multinationals and their market capitalization ranges between 79M€ (COM-
PONENTA) to 20B€ (KONE) (Bloomberg 2015).  Market capitalization for 
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Fazer was not available from Bloomberg. Out of twenty-eight cases or case ac-
quisitions under study, fifteen were made in advanced economies why thirteen 
were made in emerging markets and developing countries. 
Table 10. Cases Characteristics and Acquisition Strategies 
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A Russia  EMDC 60 % Partial Acquisition 1988 Market-Seeking 
A South Africa EMDC 100 % Full Acquisition 2000 Efficiency-Seeking 
A Germany AE 100 % Full Acquisition 2011 Efficiency-Seeking 
B USA AE 45 % Partial Acquisition 2011 Strategic Asset-seeking 
B Sweden AE 100 % Full Acquisition 2012 
Market-Seeking + Effi-
ciency +  Strategic 
Asset-Seeking 
C Russia EMDC 49,50 % Partial Acquisition 2010 Resource-Seeking 
C Sweden AE 57.1 -100% Staged Acquisition 2007 Market-Seeking 
C Estonia AE 76%-100% Staged Acquisition 2004 Market-Seeking 
D South Africa EMDC 19%-100% Staged Acquisition 2007 Market-Seeking 
D Morocco EMDC 100 % Full Acquisition 2010 Market-Seeking  
E Russia EMDC 70 % Partial Acquisition 2006 Market-Seeking  
E X AE   Full Acquisition   Strategic Asset-Seeking 
E USA AE 15%-100% Staged Acquisition 2000 Market-Seeking 
E Netherlands  AE 100 % Full Acquisition 2014 Market-Seeking 
F Egypt EMDC 49,50 % Partial Acquisition 1992 Market-Seeking 
F Saudi Arabia EMDC 40 % Partial Acquisition 2007 Market-Seeking 
F Bulgaria EMDC 60%-100% Staged Acquisition 2011 Market-Seeking 
F Kenya EMDC 100 % Full Acquisition 2013 Market-Seeking 
F Israel AE 100 % Full Acquisition 2013 Market-Seeking 
F US, Italy, etc. AE 100 % Full Acquisition Yearly Efficiency-Seeking 
G Turkey EMDC 55%-93,6% Staged Acquisition 2006 Market-Seeking 
G Sweden AE 100 % Full Acquisition 2012 Market-Seeking + Effi-ciency-Seeking 
H Norway AE -100% Staged Acquisition 2003 Market-seeking 
H Denmark AE 59%-100 Staged Acquisition 2001 Market-seeking 
H Norway AE 100% Full Acquisition 2013 Market-Seeking 
H Sweden AE 100 % Full Acquisition 2011 Efficiency-Seeking + Market-Seeking 
EMDC = Emerging Markets and Developing Countries  
AE = Advanced Economies 
From the table, twenty case acquisitions had market-seeking motives. Out of 
these twenty market-seeking motives, three had mixed motives i.e. in addition to 
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market-seeking motives they also had efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-
seeking motives. There were six efficiency-seeking motives. Two cases out of the 
six efficiency-seeking motives also had mixed motives i.e. included market-
seeking motives and strategic asset-seeking motives. Two cases had strategic as-
set-seeking motives. One case acquisition had resource-seeking motives.  
Table 11 shows the measures of acquisition performance informed by the case 
managers with respect to the motives of these acquisitions. It also shows the actu-
alization of the initial motives of the acquisition at the time of market entry. Fur-
ther analysis and findings are discussed in the next section. 
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Table 11. Case Acquisitions, Motives and Achievement of Motives of 
Market Entry 
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1 EMDC PA MS Achieved  targets Market Share + financial measures 
2 EMDC FA ES Achieved targets Cost Synergies + financial measures 
3 AE FA ES Achieved targets Cost Synergies + financial measures 
4 AE PA SA Failed Acquisition New Product Qualification 
5 AE FA ME+ES 
+SA 
Achieved targets Market Share+ financial measures (net sales) 
6 EMDC PA RS Failed Acquisition Availability of raw materials and price of meat 
7 AE SA MS Achieved targets Market Share+ profitability 
8 AE SA MS Achieved targets Market Share+ profitability 
9 EMDC SA MS Achieved targets Sales, profitability - merely on EBIT- and Return 
on Capital 
10 EMDC FA MS Achieved targets Sales, profitability - merely on EBIT- and Return 
on Capital 
11 EMDC SA MS Achieved targets Market Share+ financial measures 
12 AE FA SA Achieved targets   
13 AE SA MS Achieved targets Market Consolidation 
14 AE FA MS  Market Position + profitability improvement 
through synergies 
15 EMDC PA MS Achieved targets No of installed equipment in service + financial 
measures 
16 EMDC PA MS Achieved targets No of installed equipment in service + financial 
measures 
17 EMDC SA MS Achieved targets No of installed equipment in service + financial 
measures 
18 EMDC FA MS Achieved targets No of installed equipment in service + financial 
measures 
19 AE FA MS Achieved targets No of installed equipment in service + financial 
measures 
20 AE FA MS Achieved targets Cost Synergies + no of equipment in Service 
21 EMDC SA MS Achieved targets production capacity + financial number 
22 AE FA MS+ES Achieved targets financial measure + cost synergies 
23 AE SA MS+ES Achieved targets Customer retention+ financial measure 
24 AE SA MS Achieved targets Customer retention + financial measure 
25 AE FA MS+SA Achieved targets Customer retention + financial measure 
26 AE FA MS+ES  Achieved targets Customer retention+ skills & competences + 
financial measure 
FA= Full Acquisition. SA= Staged Acquisition, PA = Partial Acquisition, MS =Market-Seeking, 
ES =Efficiency-Seeking, SA =Strategic asset-seeking, RS=Resource-Seeking. 
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6.2 Within Case Analysis 
Case Study A: UPM had three case acquisitions explored in the interview. The 
acquisitions were made in Russia, South Africa, and Germany in the year 1988, 
2000 and 2011 respectively. The company does not have any acquisition policy 
requiring them to acquire either full or partial acquisition. Rather, every acquisi-
tion is a separate case. The company does have an acquisition department/unit 
responsible for M&A strategy. The responding manager’s responsibilities span 
across executing M&A as part of corporate strategy. The responding manager has 
been involved in small acquisition transactions and large acquisition transactions 
in the case company. According to him, they’ve had few big acquisition transac-
tions in Latin America and Europe. They have also had quite a good number of 
smaller transactions in Europe and elsewhere and small transactions have been a 
tool for business development in their various businesses. Table 12 shows the 
summary of the characteristics of the case company acquisitions. 
Table 12. Summary of Characteristics of UPM Acquisitions 
Case Study A Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Acquisition Policy No No  No 
Host country of 
Acquisition 
Russia South Africa Germany 
Formal Institutions EMDC EMDC AE 
Motive of Acquisi-
tion 
Market-Seeking Efficiency-Seeking Efficiency-Seeking 
Acquisition Strate-
gy time of entry 
Partial Acquisition Full Acquisition Full Acquisition 
Equity 60-100% 100% 100% 
Year of Entry 1988 2000 2011 
Post-Acquisition 
Strategy 
Full Acquisition   
Performance 
measures 
Market Share+ finan-
cial measures 
Cost synergies+ finan-
cial measures 
Cost Synergies´+ fi-
nancial measures 
Performance out-
come 
Achieved targets Achieved targets Achieved targets 
EDMC=Emerging Market and Developing Countries. AE= Advanced Economies 
The case company had one partial acquisition in Russia (case 1) which was ac-
quired in 1988. The interviewee was not in the current position when this acquisi-
tion decision was made but was able to provide information about the acquisition 
decisions. The interviewee stressed that their primary motivation for the acquisi-
tion in Russia was for market-seeking motive due to their need to have a local 
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presence in the Russian market and need to have a local business partner for mu-
tual beneficial reasons. The case study/firm acquired a local plywood manufactur-
ing facility business in which they had a minority owner that was the earlier own-
er of the firm. At the time of the acquisition, the case company did not have any 
plywood manufacturing operations in Russia.  
Full acquisition was the acquisition strategy utilized when entering into the South 
African (case 2) market in the year 2000.  The purpose of the acquisition was be-
cause they were seeking to develop and grow a portfolio of their manufacturing 
business that was already international. 
INTERVIEWER: Describe the motive of the acquisition made in South Afri-
ca?  
INTERVIEWEE: “UPM raflatac business portfolio operates globally in most 
places, Latin America, Africa, North America, Middle East, Asia, and Europe. 
Growing in this business in places like in South Africa is in accordance with what 
we want to do with the business, to grow and develop.  In many places, there are 
smaller local competitors for this business and acquisitions are often looked for 
to expand and increase this business portfolio exposure geographically or certain 
niche market around the world. South Africa has been part of UPM raflatac geo-
graphically exposure for quite a long time. If we look at the African continent, 
South Africa is a bigger country and it makes sense for our business to be present 
in the market”. 
Full acquisition was also the acquisition strategy utilized for UPM investment in 
the German market (Case 3). The purpose of the acquisitions was primarily effi-
ciency-seeking motives i.e. to gain economies of scale and efficiencies. Case 3 
also involved a subsidiary in the United States. They were primarily motivated by 
the acquisition because the market for the demand for paper business portfolio has 
been declining. The interview stressed that mature markets it is important to seek 
for economies of scale and efficiency so that they can remain competitive and 
operate efficiently even in a market that is declining. The acquired target was a 
large competitor within the graphic papers business in Europe where the case 
study/company was already a large player before the acquisition.  
The acquisition of this case study/company was made in a developed country 
market (Germany) and developing/emerging market countries of South Africa 
and Russia. There are formal institutional differences between Finland and the 
two emerging economies of Russia and South Africa such that one can argue that 
South Africa and Russian institutions are less developed compared to Finnish 
Institutions. Finland is part of EU nation states as well as Germany; as a result 
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there is no expected difference between formal institutional environment between 
Finland and Germany. 
From the interview, there is support for the role of host country capability in in-
fluencing their choice for full acquisition in South Africa. The country has a weak 
formal institution compared to the Finnish institutions especially at the time the 
acquisition was made. The acquisition was made during the post-apartheid regime 
which constituted a period of national reconciliation, black empowerment and a 
period often spark with a violent protest for equality. UPM has been doing busi-
ness in South Africa before the acquisition. The expansion of existing business 
not limited to the case firms previous years of doing business in South Africa in-
fluenced the company’s choice for full acquisition. 
UPM was primarily motivated for efficiency-seeking FDI in South Africa. Most 
likely the acquisition of host country capability made it irrelevant for the compa-
ny to opt for partial acquisition in South Africa and need to have a local partner. 
For case 3, the case study was primarily motivated by efficiency-seeking motives. 
The institutional development in Germany makes institutional factors insignifi-
cance for this case. However, the interviewee stressed the importance of the in-
dustry maturity and the need for efficiency maximization through economies of 
scale and scope and tightly integrating the acquired subsidiary. It can be summa-
rized that full acquisition in South African (case 2) was primarily influenced by 
the acquisition of host country capability. Additionally, the full acquisition in 
Germany (case 3) was influenced by their efficiency- seeking motives of cost 
synergies and economies of scale which can only be achieved by tightly integrat-
ing the acquired firm. The nature of the industry in terms of the maturity of the 
industry influenced their choice for full acquisition in Germany. These were all 
expressed when the following question was posed to the interviewee.  
INTERVIEWER: Discuss if and how acquisition motive influenced the deci-
sion for full acquisition? 
INTERVIEWEE: The acquisition motive had an impact on our choice of full 
acquisition. For example, in the case of acquisition in Germany we acquired the 
large firm to increase our economies of scale and integrate it tightly into our sys-
tem and existing business. Having a minority owner will make no sense if we want 
to absorb and integrate the acquired business very tightly into our existing system 
to enable us gain economies of scale and efficiency. In South Africa, it is easier to 
think there could be a possibility for partial acquisition. But depends on the case, 
for example where the case has been that our company would not have been pre-
sent in South Africa before the acquisition, and then there might have been bene-
fits for retaining the local partner. If it were an expansion of existing business in 
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South Africa, then the benefit of retaining the local partner would have been 
small. We have been in South Africa for a long time. 
With regards to the Russian market, the case company had not been present in 
Russia and did not have any plywood manufacturing operations in Russia. As a 
result, they opted for partial acquisition as their entry strategies into the Russian 
market. Considering the institutional environment of Russia and the differences 
between Russian Market and the Finnish market, it was important to probe in-
depth to uncover more reasons that led to the choice of partial acquisition. During 
the probing to uncover more regulatory factors that could have influenced their 
decision for partial acquisition, the interviewee stressed that their benefit of hav-
ing a local partner superseded any regulatory requirement restricting ownership 
stake because they needed a local partner to achieve their primary motivation for 
searching for new markets. When stressed further if there were any, he reiterated 
that it did not matter. This was expressed in the following way.  
INTERVIEWER: Where there any regulatory, institutional factors or re-
quirements that influenced the decision for partial acquisition?  
INTERVIEWEE: “Everything starts with what you want to do in your business 
strategy. If you enter a new place or seek to expand your existing business into 
that geographical place or location then basically that is what you seek for.  If 
you have a specific requirement locally, for example, you need to have local part-
ner in place or local minority shareholder and if there is a requirement for a lo-
cal majority partner then easily, it makes no sense for you to actually enter into 
such an area if your motive is to expand your business there. The regulatory 
framework can block the entry strategies in this case. If the regulatory require-
ments would be that you require a local minority owner, it is not an issue because 
you needed a local minority owner from the start. In this case, it becomes a tech-
nicality that you just fulfill the purpose of the regulations but it does not effective-
ly change anything. Thus, you just oblige to the letter of the law, and it does not 
change much in the real operations. In summary, if you have the benefit of having 
a local partner, then the regulatory requirement makes no impact. They do not 
change what you want to do.” 
There was one example of increasing equity commitment for the case company. 
The interviewee informed that the partial acquired subsidiary in the Russian mar-
ket (case 1) has now been acquired fully. The full acquisition was made in 2005. 
According to the interviewee, the primary reason for the equity changes to full 
acquisition was because during this period of the partial stake, the parent firm had 
gained host country capability and the seller’s willingness to give up their equity 
stake made the requirements of having the local partner to have outlived its pur-
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pose. It is believed this is possible only the presence of trust. This was expressed 
in the following comments.   
INTERVIEWER: What were the reasons for changing equity to full acquisi-
tion?  
INTERVIEWEE: We had the partnership for a very long time. The business has 
been well integrated into our other business in Finland and Western Europe. Al-
so, we have established a way of operating locally in that environment with other 
stakeholders around the business. In this case, the purpose of having the local 
partner has outlived its purpose. Also, the minority owners or partners also did 
not see it as important to retain the minority ownership of a manufacturing facili-
ty within a larger business in the case company. Thus, the benefits from both par-
ties of having the partnership in place had outlived the original motives. Thus, it 
became easy for both parties to decide and acquire the remaining equity stake. 
Furthermore, financial measures and motive based measure were the dominant 
measures of acquisition performance. Efficiency motives were measured based on 
cost-synergies that should positively impact their operating cost and operating 
profit. Market-seeking motives were measured based on market share and turno-
ver. Though the motive-based measure has a relationship to financial measures, it 
is pertinent to understand that not meeting financial performance is because of the 
non-actualization of strategic motives. The interviewee also pointed out that the 
most viable measures were the financial measure. From the literature review, it 
was expected that cost synergies and financial measures should be the measure of 
efficiency- seeking motives and market share and financial measures for market-
seeking motives. This was expressed in the following comment.  
INTERVIEWER: How does your organization measure the performance of 
acquired subsidiaries?  
INTERVIEWEE: “We do financial follow-up all our acquisitions. At the time of 
the decision, we have an estimate of what we are expecting from the acquisition. 
We follow it up to see if we are performing as we planned. We also do project 
follow-up, for example in acquisition integration or other activities you plan to 
have post-acquisition.”  
INTERVIEWER: Does your acquisition motive have an impact on the acqui-
sition performance?  
INTERVIEWEE: Our initial motives have an impact on acquisition perfor-
mance.  What we want to do is our motive. This is laid out in the business plan or 
an action plan for the target. The original business plan or motive is been fol-
lowed-up. Depending on the business plan, the things we follow differ because it 
is not only about financial performance we expect to have. For example, if we are 
 Acta Wasaensia     131 
  
doing things like integration or changes in the production or further investments 
in the assets.  However, we always measure all our acquisitions based on finan-
cial measures. They are the most normal acquisition performance measure. If we 
do not buy a business, let’s says we buy technology or patent know-how, it is dif-
ficult to follow the financial performance measure. However, if we buy technolo-
gy we want to utilize the technology for other operations. At the end of the day, 
everything is done for financial gain. Irrespective of what we buy, we still aim at 
seeing the impact on financial outcomes.  
INTERVIEWER: Could you give examples of how you measured the motives 
of these acquisition discussed above?  
INTERVIEWEE: The full acquisition in Germany that was motivated by effi-
ciency-seeking motives was measured based on cost synergy. The acquisition in 
South Africa and Russian market was measured based on our presence in the 
South African and Russian market respectively and the ability to expand our 
business in these countries (market share).  
INTERVIEWER: How can you describe the performance of these acquisi-
tions in terms of meeting their strategic motives? 
INTERVIEWEE: Acquisition in Germany achieved the targets set in terms of 
cost synergy. Acquisition in South Africa was a small acquisition to expand our 
presence in the South African market and obviously achieved through the acquisi-
tion. Plywood acquisition in Russia originally acquired to expand our business 
and to provide a competitive manufacturing platform for the business. This was 
achieved and the operation has been well performing and important part of the 
business since.  
Case Study B: Two cases was the focus of the interview. The acquisitions were 
made in USA and Sweden in the year 2011 and 2012 respectively. The company 
does not have acquisition policy requiring them to acquire either full or partially. 
Rather every acquisition is a separate case. The company does have an acquisition 
department/unit responsible for M&A strategy. The responding manager respon-
sibilities span across executing M&A for the organization. The responding man-
ager has been involved in full and partial acquisition. Table 13 shows the sum-
mary of characteristics of the case acquisitions. 
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Table 13. Summary of Characteristics of AHLSTRÖM Acquisitions 
Case Study B Case 4 Case 5 
Acquisition Policy No  No 
Host country of Acquisition USA Sweden 
Formal Institutions Advanced Economies Advanced Economies 
Motive of Acquisition Strategic Asset-Seeking Market-Seeking  & 
Strategic asset-
seeking 
Acquisition Strategy time of 
entry 
Partial Acquisition Full Acquisition 
Equity Stake 49,5% 100% 
Year of Entry 2011 2012 
Post-Acquisition Strategy Stopped funding the acquisi-
tion 
 
Performance measures New product qualification Market Share+ fi-
nancial measures 
(net sales) 
Performance outcome Failed acquisition Achieved targets 
Partial acquisition was the acquisition strategy utilized when entering the USA 
market (case 4) in the year 2011. The motive of this acquisition was for strategic 
asset-seeking. The company wanted to acquire a key strategic competence of a 
firm seeking to get a product still undergoing R&D (nonwoven battery separator 
solution) to get qualified to the market. The qualification of the technology is 
needed to aid the development of the new product to market. The interviewee 
expressed this: 
“In our building energy business portfolio, they identified a promising product 
developed by a target company that is a membrane product. The membrane mar-
ket is a market we are interested in. Although, we have produced some nonwoven 
material, and we have owned some patents and know-how, but it was long time 
ago, and it was in the wrong type of battery market, not the one that is growing 
fast. Lithium-ion battery market is the material market that is growing fast as you 
know; there is lithium-ion in these computers and electric vehicles as well. So, we 
wanted to be part of lithium-ion technology growth expectations were and still the 
market is growing fast. So you just have to get your product qualified, and it is 
enough to grow with the market, you do not need to win the market but to grow 
with the market.” 
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The case study also had one full acquisition in Sweden (case 5) that was acquired 
in 2012. The motive of the acquisition was market-seeking. The market-seeking 
motive was aimed at growing in the new market (within their existing business), 
and to establish a presence in leading competitive markets.  According to the Ex-
ecutive Vice President, Filtration, “When we combine Munktell's strong position 
in the European advanced filtration market with our solid presence in North 
America, we will gain access to new markets geographically” (Björnman 2012). 
The acquisition also had strategic asset-seeking (in terms of acquisition of compe-
tence, immobile strategic assets such as brands and distribution networks and oth-
er capabilities such as human and intellectual capital). It also had efficiency-
seeking motives as it gave them a platform to be forward integrated enabling 
them to cut cost and reap cost synergies from the acquisition. 
“We identify that the life science and laboratory businesses are the most attrac-
tive ones from all growth perspectives. Moreover, megatrends support the acqui-
sition of case 5 and our business, so there is good strategic fit. From the geo-
graphical point of view, we were strong in The USA but we are weak in Europe. 
So, this is also perfect transaction from that point of view that we can enter the 
European market. This is life science laboratory, the customers are not price sen-
sitive at all, but they want to get a product across every single time. The lab test 
cannot give a wrong result and the same was for life science, so the customers do 
not want to switch to other suppliers. The acquisition was by far the best way to 
re-enter the European market. Munktell Inc. had experience from membrane 
product. Case 5 was also more forward integrated than we are. That is, they had 
taken some steps in the value chain we were just considering to do, and now we 
could get the platform for it, know-how for it and we knew that it worked. It is 
always a little bit risky to move forward in the value chain because you may be 
competing with your customers. Munktell had done it already, and it seems to 
work fine, so it was safe for us to do it. Other reasons for the acquisition was get-
ting the brand and creating value within business and possibilities to use the as-
sets for different types of products. The head operation of the acquisition was in 
Sweden, but they sold all over in Europe. They are strong in Germany and had a 
subsidiary in Germany. They had a partially owned company in France, and we 
bought out the other owners of the company. Now we are the only owners in 
France. Case 5 is a global business in a way; they sold basically to all European 
countries. 
The two acquisition strategies discussed above were made in developed country 
markets (Sweden and USA). With this regard, it is expected that there are no for-
mal institutional differences between Finland and the two develop economies of 
Sweden and USA. Finland is part of EU nation states as well as Sweden; as a re-
134      Acta Wasaensia 
 
sult there is no expected difference between formal institutional environment be-
tween Finland and Sweden. The interviewee also pointed out that host country 
institutions did not have any significant impact on their choice of full acquisition. 
There is also little, or no informal institutional difference between Finland and 
Sweden as both are part of Scandinavian countries and share similar business cul-
tures. The interviewee response expressed this:  
“As you know Swedish and Finnish cultures are quite close to each other, so we 
did not have any major problem. I mean, target case 5 was led by one single indi-
vidual, the owner of the company. He has built the company over the past 15 
years or so. So, of course, we needed to bring in our AHLSTROM way of work-
ing, and AHLSTROM structures, AHLSTROM HR policies, many different kind of 
structures that may seem little stiff or if you are used to making up your mind. So 
we brought much structure to the business. I will say that I have not seen anything 
major and of course it must have been a little bit tough for the employees with 
different HR policies, take  care of this and that’s and building all kind of stuffs, it 
must have been a little bit different for employees but nothing has been men-
tioned” 
INTERVIEWER: Actually when you discuss the various process of your ac-
quisitions process, I was wondering if there was nothing about cultural fit. Is 
it because you believed that the cultural fit was there?  
INTERVIEWEE: It was there; it was behind it but was not an issue. Sweden 
and Finland are close. Swedish talk a lot more than they make decision, but still 
one single individual has made all the decisions, so in a way he was working in a 
Finnish way. Moreover, operations were in those countries where we have opera-
tions. For example, we had a market presence in Germany. We also had a market 
presence in France. So it was not a topic to discuss. I think we wanted to make 
sure that our head of this business area, an Italian, fits in well. However, it is one 
on one relationship, how well we can cooperate. However, it was clear all along 
that the owner of the business wanted to step-out. We even want to keep him to 
get his knowledge, but it was clear that he does not want to make any decision. 
We saw that it was going in the right way without any issues we did not have to 
consider the cultural issues. 
INTERVIEWER: In the USA market did you think about cultural fit as a 
key part of the acquisition?  
INTERVIEWEE: We are strong in the USA market and three persons we nomi-
nated for the board, one of them is American, one is Finnish but he has lived in 
the USA and still lived in the USA for a long time and he knows the USA culture. 
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The last person has also worked in America for 40 years also. So, it was not an 
issue. 
The case study has been present in the USA market before the acquisition of the 
USA target. The USA market is the biggest market for the case study, and they 
get 25% of their net sales from the USA market. However, the acquisition of the 
USA target was in a new technology. The acquired target in the USA market was 
a customer to the case company before the acquisition. The case company has 
been developing lightweight nonwoven materials for lithium-ion membrane sepa-
rators since 2008 and the acquired firm has been incorporating a product of the 
parent firm (nonwoven) into its engineered separator product over the last few 
years.  The interviewee stressed that they were developing their product together, 
such that they will be selling them nonwoven materials to the battery separators 
market. They would handle the membrane part, and the parent firm would bring 
in the nonwoven part, but we did not sell any volumes to them because they did 
not have a product. They were still developing the product. The idea was to de-
velop together in this very promising market. However, our business area knew 
them very well. 
INTERVIEWER: For the acquisition in Sweden, did you have any business 
relationship with them before the acquisition?  
INTERVIEWEE: No, not really. They were our competitor.  
INTERVIEWER: Since you didn’t have previous relationship with them, 
what were the key more or less strategic issues and more or less processes 
internally that gave you that sort of competence to really make this full ac-
quisition?  
INTERVIEWEE: We knew the business because we have the same businesses in 
the USA; so, we knew what the acquired target was doing. Moreover, life science 
laboratory business is quite transparent because we have catalogs, where you 
describe what kind of product you sell. So anybody can see what they are doing, 
what they are selling, and we knew the business fully well since we have same 
kind of business in The USA. I would say that it was a transparent transaction 
from that point of view. 
INTERVIEWER: Why did you acquire the case company in the USA par-
tially?  
INTERVIEWEE Response: Because we wanted to make sure that the previous 
management i.e. the management would stay in the company, and they would 
have strong incentives to develop the business. Because when you acquire a de-
velopment company, if you lose the key employees you lose everything.  
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INTERVIEWER: But you could also do it the same way by acquiring it fully 
and still keep them on the job?  
INTERVIEWEE Response: Yes, then we had high incentives to, we wanted to 
be in the same boat. We wanted to have a structure where if it works they become 
millionaires, and then they would have much money. That was our idea; they 
would push it as far as they can. 
From the interview, there is an emerging theme “Incentive Alignment” that inter-
acts with the motives of the acquisition in the USA market and their choice for 
partial acquisition. The moderator variable “Incentive alignment” seems to have 
an enhancing interaction with the motives of acquisition “strategic asset-seeking” 
on the choice of partial acquisition such that they both have a stronger effect in 
predicting the choice of partial acquisition in the USA market. The Incentive 
alignment was aimed at retention of key employees and to make them have the 
incentive to continue the new product development. This is also similar to the 
Incentive alignment argument of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that more equity 
ownership by the manager may increase corporate performance because it means 
better alignment of the monetary incentives between the manager and other equity 
owners. Even though the parent firm had host country capability, they still decid-
ed to acquire partially due to their aim of retaining key employees and incentives 
to get them committed to the new product development.  
For the Swedish acquisition (case 5), the case study already had a similar invest-
ment in the USA market. Expanding into related business led to the choice of full 
acquisition. They knew the business, and how it works, the absence of regulatory 
restriction, institutional transparency and non-failure in formal institutions as well 
similar informal institutional environment between Sweden and Finland led to the 
choice of full acquisition. Unlike other studies that found a relationship between 
technology acquisitions and the choice of lower equity commitments (e.g. Folta 
1998; Folta & Miller 2002; Ransbotham & Mitra 2010), this case shows that the 
stage of the development of the strategic asset-seeking enhanced the choice for 
partial acquisition. The stage of development of the strategic asset is further de-
scribed as explorative strategic asset-seeking-motives as it involves strategic asset 
(technology) which is still under development. Similarly, the responding manager 
also pointed out that in cases where the technology is already qualified into the 
market, they would probably opt for full acquisition.  
From the case company, financial measures, and motive-based measure were the 
dominant measures of acquisition performance. Strategic asset-seeking motives 
were measured based on qualification of new product development which if ful-
filled could have an impact on their net sales and profitability. For the acquisition 
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in Sweden, which was primarily motivated by market-seeking motives, net sales 
were one measure of their KPIs. The interviewee also pointed out that everything 
boils down to financial numbers. 
INTERVIEWER: Do you consider the motive of the investment when meas-
uring the performance of acquisition? 
INTERVIEWEE: Absolutely. We follow what kind of development we have 
gained. For example for the USA acquisition the KPI’s was just to get the product 
qualified so that the customers buy it. So that was what it was all along, and they 
could not do it. It was a wrong choice, and we failed. However, we knew the risks 
all along. We have withdrawn from the acquisition by not making further invest-
ments in the acquired firm. For the Swedish acquisition, it boils down to numbers 
in terms of if we have been able to increase the net sales, etc. So far sales have 
been fine, and the acquisition has been a successful one. 
Case Study (C): Three case acquisitions was the focus of the interview. The ac-
quisitions were made in Sweden (case 7), Russia (case 6) and Estonia (case 8) in 
the year 2007, 2010 and 2004 respectively. There is no acquisition policy requir-
ing the case study to acquire fully or partially. Rather every acquisition is a sepa-
rate case. The company does have an acquisition department/unit responsible for 
M&A Strategy. The responding manager responsibilities span across all M&A 
activities of the organization. The responding manager has been involved in full 
and partial acquisition.  
The motive of acquisition in Russia was primarily resource-seeking motive. The 
resources sought for was pork meat that is used as raw materials in their produc-
tion to serve the local market. The case firm also had two cases of staged acquisi-
tion in Sweden and Estonia. However, the strategic process of acquiring to full 
acquisition differed. Table 14 shows the summary of the characteristics of the 
case acquisitions. 
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Table 14. Summary of Characteristics of ATRIA Acquisitions 
Case Study C Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 
Acquisition Policy No  No No 
Host country of 
Acquisition 
Russia Sweden Estonia 
Formal Institutions EMDC Advanced Economies Advanced Economies 
Motive of Acquisi-
tion 
Resource-Seeking  Market-Seeking  Market-Seeking 
Acquisition Strate-
gy time of entry 
Partial Acquisition Staged Acquisition Staged Acquisition 
Equity Stake 49,5% 57.1% -100% 76%-100% 
Year of Entry 2010 2007 2004 
Post-Acquisition 
Strategy 
Divested   
Performance 
measures 
Availability of Raw 
Materials 
Market Share+ profit-
ability 
Market Share+ prof-
itability 
Performance out-
come 
Failed acquisition Achieved targets Achieved targets 
The Swedish staged acquisition was via stock trade. The case company knew all 
along they wanted to have a full ownership from the beginning, and the stock ap-
proach was just the only way to enter the market. The case company acquired 
from the stock market the majority of the shares which gives them the ability to 
give full buyout offer to the rest of the shareholder. The primary motivation for 
the staged acquisition was market-seeking (seeking for growth in a niche market 
and to serve the local market). The interviewee response expressed this: 
 “We do have quite big slaughter house businesses in Finland so since we are 
exporting meat anyway so we are looking for processing industrial companies. 
So, it is raw material flow that we have to export anyway, so why don’t we use 
that own processing capacity in Sweden the? So that is the reason behind it. Also, 
seeking for growth was another reason. We are operating in a stagnating market 
or low growth market, so the only way to have growth is to acquire new business-
es into our company.” 
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They already had a subsidiary in Sweden before the acquisition of case 7. Thus, 
they had host country capability before the acquisition of case 7. The acquisition 
provided the case study (ATRIA) a wider product range, ability to respond to 
price competition in the meat industry set by the integration of the European mar-
ket and growth in achieving their goal to become one of the leading food-industry 
companies in the Baltic Sea region. Similar motive was behind the staged acquisi-
tion in Sweden (case 7) and Estonia (case 8). The staged acquisition in Estonia 
was not a stock listed approach. It was stepwise approach using earnout arrange-
ments. The case company knew all the time that they would acquire 100% of the 
company.  According to the interviewee “it was only sort of time issue.” 
Partial acquisition was the acquisition strategy utilized when entering the emerg-
ing market of Russian in the year 2010. The case company had been present in the 
Russian market before the acquisition, but they never had any relation-
ship/cooperation with the acquired firm before the acquisition.  Thus, the compa-
ny had host country capability and did not have target-specific experience before 
the acquisition. However, it was not a primary reason for the choice of partial 
acquisition. Also, it is expected that there are formal and informal institutional 
differences between Finland and Russia. As a result, there was need to probe 
more in-depth if there were any institutional factors that could have influenced 
their choice for partial acquisition.  During the probing, it became obvious that 
political risks avoidance was a primary reason for the acquisition but not the pri-
mary motivation for their choice for partial acquisition. The partial acquisition 
was a way to guarantee the source of their resources (meat was the raw material) 
because the Russian Federation imposed import restrictions on meat importation. 
Importation would require a lot of political processes and connection to secure 
licenses that could involve non-transparent transactions that the case study would 
most likely prefer to avoid. 
With regards to culture, the interviewee expressed that they have been operating 
in Russia before case 6. “We had acquired a company there in 2005 located 
where we currently have the meat processing company” Thus, the case study 
knew already the ways of working in Russia. The acquisition was because of the 
raw material needs (meat) and the regulatory restrictions that would influence the 
sourcing and price of meat from outside Russia. In Sweden and Estonia (case 7 
and case 8), they sought for staged acquisition. Their motives were primarily 
market-seeking motives. However, the nature of the industry, in terms of the ma-
turity of the industry played a significant role in their acquisition decisions. The 
interviewee stressed the stagnating market or low growth market and acquisition 
as the only way to achieve the required growth. 
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Case 6 was later divested due to market uncertainty in an unfavorable market 
conditions that resulted in an unprofitable business.  
INTERVIEWER: Could you discuss why you divested your Russian ac-
quired subsidiary?  
INTERVIEWEE: Well actually, first of all, we made some changes in our indus-
trial structure, and then we pulled out from one part of the business “the consum-
er packed meat” that was not profitable. As a result, we did not need that much 
meat as raw material. Moreover, then there was and still is “African swine flu 
disease” that made the government block those affected regions in Russia so that 
meat cannot be transferred from that region to the other. So actually we could not 
utilize any more meat from these farms. So, it did not make any sense for us to be 
involved anymore. 
Financial measures and motive-based measure were the dominant measures of 
acquisition performance. Market-seeking motives were measured based on mar-
ket growth and profitability, and the resource-seeking was measured in terms of 
availability of raw materials for production and sourcing savings. 
Case Study (D): Two cases was the focus of the interview. The acquisitions were 
made in South Africa (case 9) and Morocco (case 10) in the year 2007 and 2010 
respectively. The case company has no acquisition policy for acquiring fully or 
partially. Every acquisition is a separate case. The case study does have an acqui-
sition department/unit responsible for M&A Strategy. The responding manager’s 
responsibilities span across all M&A activities of the organization. The respond-
ing manager has been involved in full and staged acquisition. Table 15 shows the 
characteristics of the case acquisition for the case company under study. 
Table 15. Summary of Characteristics of KONECRANES Acquisition 
Company D Case 9 Case 10 
Acquisition Policy No No 
Host country of Acquisition South Africa Morocco 
Formal Institutions EMDC EMDC 
Motive of Acquisition Market-Seeking  Market-Seeking 
Acquisition Strategy time of entry Staged Acquisition Full Acquisition 
Equity Stake 19% -100% 100% 
Year of Entry 2007 2010 
Post-Acquisition Strategy Full Acquisition  
Performance measures Sales+ profitability Sales+ profitability 
Performance outcome Achieved targets Achieved targets 
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The acquisition strategies for this case company were made in an emerging mar-
ket and developing countries of South Africa and Morocco in the year 2007 and 
2010 respectively. Staged acquisition was the acquisition strategy utilized when 
entering the South African market. Full acquisition was the acquisition strategy 
utilized when entering into the Moroccan market. According to the case company, 
staged acquisition is a type of acquisition strategy aimed at a step towards control 
and total ownership of the target firm. It is used in cases that the company knows 
to certain extent the market playing ground and may have had a business partner, 
for instance, a licence agreement, thus some understanding of the environment 
and playground of the business. The stepwise approach gives them the opportuni-
ty to see that they are comfortable with the market and the environment. The ac-
quisition deal is structured such that there is a clause to acquire fully after several 
years. Market-seeking motives motivated both acquisitions (case 9 and case 10). 
They were driven primarily to gain a footprint expansion into these market and 
springboard on sales entries to other African countries. The South African market 
was used as a springboard on sales entries to other territories in the South of Afri-
ca. Morocco hub was used for penetrating Sub-Saharan region from the North of 
Africa. 
The staged acquisition in South Africa started with 19.5% equity stake, and the 
remaining equity stake was acquired in 2009. The case company had a business 
relationship with the acquired firm before the acquisition. The business relation-
ship is stated to have lasted since the 1990’s and right before the acquisition; the 
acquired target was the representative of the case company in South African mar-
ket.  
The case company pointed out that post-apartheid regulation in South Africa in-
fluenced their decision for staged acquisition at the time of market entry. The 
mandatory regulation was the legislative measure “a strategy for broad-based 
black economic empowerment” (B-BBEE) enacted by the successive government 
of ANC 1999, 2004 and 2009 aimed at overcoming the economic legacy of apart-
heid and empowering “Blacks minorities to participate in economic activities 
through mandatory quotas” (Kruger 2011). The interviewee pointed out they de-
cided to take a partial stake to wait and see if the implementation of the B-BBEE 
will affect the productivity of the acquired firm or the way businesses are done. 
This was expressed in the following comments. 
INTERVIEWER: During the decision for staged acquisition in South Africa, 
where there any institutional factors such as regulations, transparency is-
sues, political risks, corruption and cultural issues that influenced your 
choice?  
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INTERVIEWEE: Yes. Regulatory issues did. At the time we went to South Afri-
ca we did have an earlier business relationship. We knew about the business envi-
ronment. We knew about the Black empowerment regulation. We purposely took 
the staged approach to see if the regulation or liberation type of issues will con-
tinue and how they may impact on how business is done. The staged approach 
was to take some time to wait and see if how the regulations unfold over time and 
when the time is right then we can take the full control of the company. The 19% 
equity stake enabled us to have business dealings and we get access to the com-
pany itself and we were able to see for instance if the black empowerment still 
sustain because is also a little bit of evolving issues in South Africa. 
For the Moroccan acquisition, the case study acquired the target fully, and their 
motive for market entry was also for market-seeking motive. Before the acquisi-
tion, the acquired firm was a distributor of the case study, and the case study has 
been operating in the Moroccan market before the acquisition. The case study 
target-specific experience had influenced their choice for full acquisition at the 
time of market entry. When probed in depth on institutional issues and their effect 
on Moroccan acquisition, the interview responded:  
 “Morocco has been open. That was very easy because they had a kind of French 
business culture. They are close to Spain, but they have some political issues time 
to time, but French culture is something we are quite very much familiar with. 
That was a kind, easy issue to go straight forward” In essence irrespective of the 
target-specific experience, the absence of regulatory restrictions and the open-
ness of Moroccan business culture influenced their decision for full acquisition.  
From the case company, financial measures, and motive-based measure were the 
dominant measures of acquisition performance. Market-seeking motives were 
measured based on Sales and profitability (EBIT & Return on Capital). Both ac-
quisitions achieved their motives.  
Case Study (E):  There were four acquisition cases for Case Study E. These were 
made in Russia (case 11), Italy (case 12), USA (case 13) and Netherlands (case 
14) in the year 2006, 2000 and 2014 respectively. The company does not have 
any acquisition policy requiring them to acquire either full or partially. Rather 
every acquisition is a separate case. The company does have an acquisition com-
mittee at corporate level responsible for M&A strategy. The responding manag-
er’s responsibilities span across executing M&A and divestments as part of cor-
porate strategy. The responding manager has been involved in both partial and 
full acquisition. Table 16 shows the summary of the characteristics of the case 
acquisitions 
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Table 16. Summary of Characteristics of KEMIRA Acquisitions 
Case Study E Case 11 Case 12 Case 13 Case 14 
Acquisition Policy No No No No 
Host country of Ac-
quisition 
Russia Italy USA Netherlands 
Formal Institutions EMDC AE AE AE 
Motive of Acquisi-
tion 
Market-Seeking Strategic Asset-
Seeking 
Market-Seeking Market-Seeking 
Acquisition Strategy 
time of entry 
Staged Acquisi-
tion 
Full Acquisition Staged Acquisition Full Acquisition 
Equity Stake 70-100% 100% 15-100% 100% 
Year of Entry 2006 2013 2000 2014 
Post-Acquisition 
Strategy 
Full Acquisition  Full Acquisition  
Performance 
measures 
Market Share+ 
financial 
measures 
 Market Consolidation Market position + 
profitability im-
provement 
through synergies 
Performance out-
come 
Achieved tar-
gets 
 Achieved targets Achieved targets 
Staged acquisition strategies were utilized when entering the USA and the Rus-
sian market. Full acquisition was the acquisition strategy utilized when entering 
into the Netherlands and Italy. Market-seeking motives were the motives for three 
acquisitions in USA, Netherlands and Russia. The fourth acquisition was motivat-
ed by strategic asset-seeking motives. Three of the four acquisitions were made in 
advanced economies of Italy (case 12), USA (case 13) and Netherlands (case 14). 
The fourth acquisition was made in the emerging and developing country of Rus-
sia (Case 11). The Netherlands case acquisition has its geographical spreads in 
Asia Pacific, Europe & Americas. The purpose of the acquisition was to strength-
en the case company presence in Europe and Asia Pacific region and enhance 
their position, especially in the packaging and board industry. The acquisition in 
Russia was aimed at strengthening industrial coatings business line in the Russian 
Federation. The USA acquisition (case 13) was aimed at entering the USA water 
treatment chemicals market that was the largest market for water treatment chem-
icals in the world. The USA acquisition (case 13) was also aimed at growing big 
enough through consolidating the market so that the case company can be strong-
er and big enough to compete in the global market for water treatments solutions. 
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The case company had been exporting to the Russian Federation before the acqui-
sition. The case company also had a previous acquisition in Russia before the case 
acquisition. Thus, they had host country capability before the acquisition of case 
11. The case company did not have any relationship with the target firm before 
the acquisition. The USA acquisition was a privately owned firm. The acquisition 
was in staged because the case study knew already that they wanted to acquire the 
target firm fully, and the acquisition contract was structured giving the acquirer 
option to acquire the remaining stake after several years. The acquired target did 
not have any business relationship with the target before the case acquisition. Be-
fore the acquisition, the case company had been operating in the USA market. 
The acquisition deal was structured using earnout provisions where the full pur-
chase price is paid based on the pre-determined performance metrics on a particu-
lar future years (Handler & Hirsch 2014). This was made by an arrangement that 
required the CEO to be part of the business within the limited period to ensure 
good business performance and the completion of acquisition payment.  There 
were no institutional reasons for the staged acquisition.  
Case 14 was a competitor and customer of the case company before the acquisi-
tion. The target firm had some product portfolio that the parent firm was selling to 
its customer and vice versa. Thus, the parent firm and target firm have had coop-
eration’s and ongoing business relationships before the acquisition. The parent 
firm was already present in the market segment of the business portfolio they ac-
quired from the competitor. The acquisition was aimed at strengthening their 
presence in the Asia Pacific Region and thus increases their market share and 
growth. The presence of host country capability influenced their decision to make 
full acquisition. Also, the relatedness of the acquisition to the parent firm increas-
es their likelihood of full acquisition. 
The interviewee also stated that partial acquisition is often utilized if the target 
business is still under development. This is with regards to the new technology 
acquisitions R&D acquisitions (strategic asset-seeking) were the technology is 
still under development. After partial stake, they wait and see if the technology 
gets to the market before making full acquisition. However, if the technology is 
already proven and they do not have it, in-house, they opt for the choice of full 
acquisition. This was expressed in the following comments:  
However, in new technology, I mean the technology that is under development; 
the “so-called start-up companies”. If there are some preliminary studies of some 
new technology but it is not proven in the market yet and we see the high potential 
there, that kind of case I would say most probably we would like to establish some 
partial ownership where we then later acquire it fully if the expectation are ful-
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filled. Perhaps we will buy fully if it gives some new technology that we do not 
have currently in-house but is already established and qualified in the market.  
Thus, explorative strategic asset-seeking increases the likelihood of partial acqui-
sition while exploitative strategic asset-seeking increases the likelihood of full 
acquisition. Exploitative strategic asset-seeking motives were their motivation for 
the acquisition in Italy (case 12). 
The staged acquisitions have all been completed and are all fully owned acquired 
subsidiaries.  The performance of the USA acquisition was measured in terms of 
motives of the acquisition and financial ratios. The motive measure was in terms 
of the achievement of the consolidation of the market. For the Netherlands acqui-
sition, strengthening the market position and profitability improvement through 
synergies were the key strategic measures of the achievement of the motives of 
their acquisition. Not surprisingly, the Netherlands acquisition also had profitabil-
ity improvement through synergies because of the geographical spread of the ac-
quisition which would require some cost-synergies. 
Case Study (F):  Five cases was the focus of the interview. The acquisitions were 
made in Egypt (case 15), Bulgaria (case 17), Kenya (case 18), Israel (case 19) and 
Saudi Arabia (case 16) in the year 1992, 2011, 2013, 2013 and 2007 respectively. 
There was also series of about 20 small acquisition transactions done yearly in 
developed economies that are aimed at efficiency-seeking motives. All these ac-
quisitions were lumped together in this study as one case because they have the 
same motives and acquisition strategies. Also, the acquisition decisions are guid-
ed based on the case study acquisition policy. The case study does have an acqui-
sition policy requiring them to aim at full acquisition. However, the decision of 
how much equity is sought is done case by case. Also, they do have an acquisition 
department/unit responsible for acquisitions.  
The subsidiaries of the case study handle 5M€ worth of acquisitions within their 
territory and are responsible for managing the entire acquisition process. The 
M&A department review all subsidiary acquisition proposals before the final ap-
proval by the Area Director especially when it is not worth more than 5M€.  
Above this threshold and less than 15M€, it requires approval from the chairman 
of the board. Above 15M€ threshold, it requires the approval of the Board of Di-
rectors. Two responding managers were involved in this case study interview. A 
pilot interview was conducted using the case study in 2012. A second interview 
was scheduled after changes were made to the interview questions. During this 
time, the previous manager was no longer working for the company. The respon-
sibility of the managers spans across executing and overseeing all acquisitions for 
the case study. The first responding manager has been involved in small acquisi-
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tion transactions and large acquisition transactions and staged acquisition. The 
replacing manager has worked in the same department before taking on the new 
role. Table 17 shows the characteristics of the cases. 
Table 17. Summary of Characteristics of KONE Acquisitions 
Case Study F Case 15  Case 16 Case 17 Case 18 Case 19 
Acquisition 
Policy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Host country 
of acquisition 
Egypt  Saudi Arabia Bulgaria Kenya Israel 
Formal Insti-
tutions 
EMDC EMDC AE EMDC AE 
Motive of Ac-
quisition 
Market-
Seeking 
Market-
Seeking 
Market-
Seeking 
Market-
Seeking 
Market-
Seeking 
Acquisition 
Strategy  
Partial Ac-
quisition 
Partial Acqui-
sition 
Staged Acqui-
sition 
Full Acquisi-
tion 
Full Acquisi-
tion 
Equity Stake 49% 40%-50% 60%-100% 100% 100% 
Year of Entry 1992 2007 2011 2013 2013 
Post-
Acquisition 
Strategy 
Still Partial 
acquisition 
10% increase 
Saudi Arabia 
   
Performance 
measures 
Installed 
base + fi-
nancial 
measures 
Installed base 
+ financial 
measures 
installed base 
+ financial 
measures 
installed base  
+ financial 
measures 
installed 
base + fi-
nancial 
measures 
Performance 
outcome 
Achieved 
targets 
Achieved 
targets 
Achieved 
targets 
Achieved 
targets 
Achieved 
targets 
The case study categorized their acquisitions into two categories. The first in-
volves acquisitions aimed at expansion into new markets where they had no pres-
ence before market entry. The second involves expansion into markets that they 
already had a presence. The latter is usually small portfolio acquisitions aimed at 
improving their operational synergies. They are efficiency-seeking acquisitions 
that aim at achieving economies of scale and scope in the maintenance service 
operations by using their existing service networks to serve the combined service 
networks. Thus, it cost them less to have more equipment service while utilizing 
their existing service network. This is the case of the 20 case acquisitions de-
scribed above that is lumped in as one case (case 20) in this study. 
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Market-seeking motives were the motives of the cases (case 15 to case 19). Case 
18 and case 19 (Kenya and Israel) were both full acquisition while case 15 and 16 
(Egypt and Saudi Arabia) were both partial acquisition. Staged acquisition strate-
gy was utilized for case 17 (Bulgaria). In Saudi Arabia (case 16) they entered via 
partial acquisition because of regulatory restriction on ownership stake. In Egypt 
(case 15) contractual difficulties in successfully closing the acquisition deals re-
sulted in their partial acquisition until today. The case company has negotiated 
several times to purchase the remaining stake from the majority owner, but the 
target has not come to an agreement on the terms of the evaluation. Though re-
porting standards have been developed according to the wish of the parent MNE, 
but the evaluation expected by the target is ridiculous that the parent MNEs does 
not want to settle at that price.  
As earlier pointed out, the efficiency-seeking acquisitions are usually made in 
host countries where they already have been present in the local market. In such 
market, the responding manager inferred that they know how the markets work, 
the challenges of working in the local market including cultural challenges. Con-
sequently, it makes sense for them to opt for full acquisition. According to the 
interviewing manager, the efficiency-seeking acquisitions i.e. the small transac-
tions discussed above (case 20) have mostly been done in advanced economies 
within the European Union and the US.  
It was also obvious that the nature of the target firm business is a key reason for 
their choice for staged acquisition in new markets.  This is especially the case in 
the less mature market and/or cases where the business still needs development in 
terms of reporting and management processes.  The interviewee stressed that alt-
hough they undergo due diligence, however, when such firms have very bad ac-
counting, it is difficult to know by facts how much the targets makes money from 
services and how much they make from general equipment installations. This 
makes them want to limit their risks by buying just a smaller equity stake and 
then paying more in the future when they have established a better financial re-
porting and knowledge of the business processes.  By doing so, they retain the old 
management in place. Keeping the old management in place is to enable the pre-
vious owners to join them in developing the business properly. They tie together 
the final acquisition purchase price based on the performance of the firm in 3 to 5 
years. By doing so, they provide incentives for the previous owners to continue to 
work for the acquired firm.  
 “If you grow the company making it more profitable, I will give you more money, 
I keep you more motivated throughout the business.” 
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They accomplish this by leaving the operational control of the company to the 
previous owner while they mostly have the management control. They also pro-
vide financing and equipment. The target owners in this situation are “kind of 
man on the ground to explain to us what is required to operate in the market.” 
Thus, one can infer that incentive alignment is interacting with the nature of the 
target firm business (developed business and/or the maturity of the local market) 
to influence the choice of stage acquisitions. This is unlike in previous case stud-
ies where incentive alignment interacts with the motive of the foreign market en-
try. Furthermore, the acquiring targets are usually the distributors of the case 
company before the acquisitions. Thus, they have a relationship with the target 
firm but they do not have host country capability. Host country capability is need-
ed to manage market-seeking FDIs successfully because such firms will have to 
deal with the local supply chain, local laws, customers, etc. 
The absence of host country capability influenced their decision for staged acqui-
sition for the case of Belgium. This was obvious from the interview response: 
“And especially if we enter a new country and we want the owner to continue and 
be motivated to work part time in the company. Then it makes sense for us to buy 
40% of the company and leave 60% to the owner of the company because then he 
would have the motivation to do his best with the company. Then, we have the 
option to buy the rest company let say in 3, 4, to 5 years. It might be for multiple 
reasons. For example, if there is a small frontline in a less mature market or still 
needs developing in terms of better reporting and following our processes, then 
we go for staged acquisition and have the option to acquire the rest of the com-
pany within  3 to 5 years” 
The case company often acquires fully in cases where they have relationship with 
the target firm before the acquisition and the market is mature, the business is 
well established and profitable and has good management systems, reporting, and 
processes. This was the reason for their full acquisition in Israel and Kenya. They 
opted for full acquisition when entering into Israel due to the maturity of the mar-
ket and the well-developed nature of the business in terms of reporting, manage-
ment systems, and profitability. Also for Kenya’s acquisition, the maturity of the 
market and the developed nature of the business influenced their choice for full 
acquisition as expressed by the interviewee.  
 “We never considered making a partial acquisition in Kenya but 100% acquisi-
tion. Even though it is a new market for us, we acquired the distributor that we 
already know. The former MD agreed to stay with us for two years and so is 
providing consultancy on how the operation are done. For the Kenyan acquisi-
tion, we never considered a partial acquisition. I think Kenya operations were 
 Acta Wasaensia     149 
  
more developed. It was already at a point that the distributorship structure was 
not working because of the large volumes. They have very high number of units 
they sold per year and their installed equipment’s with maintenance contracts 
was growing. They had limited internal resources to meet the growth, and that 
would have started to hamper the growth. The seller was willing to sell and then 
it makes sense to acquire them fully.” 
There are no regulatory restrictions in Kenya at the time of market entry. There 
are political risks and other forms of corruption issues in Kenya as expressed by 
the interviewee. Thus, there was the presence of failure of formal institutions in 
Kenya at the time of market entry. However, the case company opted for full ac-
quisition. They structure their evaluations based on anticipated volumes with their 
operating standards. It allows them to mitigate all other performance of the target 
firm that cannot be accounted for. Thus, political risks and corruption is struc-
tured in the acquisition price. 
To probe deep into the role of mature markets and their acquisition choice, it be-
came obvious that less maturity of the market, as opposed to market maturity, led 
to their choice for staged acquisition as with the case of Bulgarian acquisition. 
Less mature market means a fragmented market with domestic players and rela-
tive small market shares owned by global players.  
“In certain markets like in East Europe, Africa, and certain Asian countries, the 
size of the market is small and still developing. Even though the market is signifi-
cant, they are not impressible from our company point of view because of the 
presence of fragmented local players who often manufacture cheap, bad quality 
equipment. However, as soon as the market develops and portions of such market 
swings and the global players start getting market shares, it becomes one devel-
opment that makes us take this type of staged approach”. 
There was one case of increasing equity stake in the acquisition of the case study 
in 2014. This was the partial acquisition in Saudi-Arabia. The increasing equity 
stake was because of the relieving of ownership restriction by the Saudi govern-
ment from 40% ownership restriction to 50% ownership restriction. The case 
company entered into an agreement with the acquired target to gain control in the 
company and consolidate it as a subsidiary of the parent firm financial reporting. 
A common measure of the case study acquisition is the number of installed 
equipment’s base of the target and the number of maintenance contracts. This is 
in line with their market-seeking motive that is aimed at acquiring and maintain-
ing the installed equipment base. For the efficiency-seeking acquisitions, the 
number of installed base and maintenance contracts and the cost synergies are the 
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most common measure of their acquisition performance. The acquisitions 
achieved their primary motives. 
Case Study (G): COMPONENTA had two cases explored in the interview. The 
acquisitions were made in Turkey (case 21) and Sweden (case 22) in the year 
2006 and 2012 respectively. The case company has no acquisition policy on full 
or partial acquisition. The company does not have an acquisition department/unit 
responsible for M&A strategy because of its relative size and few acquisitions 
deals it does. The responding manager’s responsibilities span across executing 
M&A, divestment, and joint ventures. Table 18 shows the summary of the charac-
teristics of the case company acquisitions.  
Table 18. Summary of Characteristics of COMPONENTA Acquisitions 
Case Study G Case 21 Case 22 
Host country of 
Acquisition 
Turkey Sweden 
Formal Institutions EMDC AE 
Motive of Acquisition Market-Seeking Market-Seeking & Efficiency-
Seeking 
Acquisition Strategy  Staged Acquisition Full Acquisition 
Equity 55%-93,6% 100% 
Year of Entry 2006 2012 
Post-Acquisition 
Strategy 
Almost full acquisition  
Performance measures Production capacity & financial 
measures 
Financial measures, customer 
retention, cost synergies 
Performance outcome Achieved targets Achieved targets 
Market-seeking motives were the motives of the case acquisitions (case 21 and 
case 22). Case 22 in addition to market-seeking motives also had efficiency-
seeking motives. Staged acquisition strategy was utilized for case 21 (Turkey), 
and full acquisition was utilized for case 22 (Sweden).  The staged acquisition in 
Turkey was via a stock trade. They acquired 55% in 2006 from the majority own-
ers, and the remaining 45% was listed on the stock exchange as free float. Ac-
cording to the Turkish law, they have to launch a tender offer for the remaining 
shares. They have launched the tender offer twice but have still been unable to get 
all the shares in the two tenders. Both tenders were in 2007. Their equity stake 
rose to 72% at the first tender and in second tender it raised to 92.6%. They have 
now acquired additional 1 % (93.6%).  The case company did not have any target-
specific experience before undertaking both acquisitions. 
The case study describes their motive for staged acquisition as one arising primar-
ily from risks sharing. “if you go to an unknown or such market area where you 
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have no access, and you want to enter the new market, basically it carries a big 
risk. In such market you may want to share the risk for example with the local 
firm in form of shared ownership and then make a contract that after 3 or 5 years 
there are some option arrangement in which you can buy the remaining stake out 
from the acquisition” 
Secondary, the aim of staged acquisition is to “gain from the local partner in 
term of permits that are needed, market knowledge and access to the local cus-
tomer. When we have gained enough information and experience from the market 
and target then basically we can form the final view either to exit by selling it to 
the other party or acquire the remaining stake from the other party” 
The staged acquisition provides a platform for gaining more knowledge about the 
target firm, market knowledge, and host country institutions.  
Furthermore, the case study also pointed out that staged acquisition is also an im-
portant acquisition strategy when the companies are limited in resources because 
of their firm size because it provides them additional time to seek for resources. 
“Especially, if you are small company or medium size company, you have always 
only a limited amount of resources in use and therefore it is very often not just for 
us but for other companies that they want to enter the market in this way” 
The acquisition in Sweden (case 22) was made in 2012.  The case study already 
had an existing subsidiary in Sweden since 2004 before undertaking this acquisi-
tion. Thus, they had host country capability before undertaking case 22.  The case 
manager informed that their primary decision to acquire the company was be-
cause it was their competitor, and they were afraid that if they do not acquire the 
target, other bigger competitors will do so. The acquisition provided the case 
study an additional efficiency and cost synergies in their operations in Sweden. 
The output of the acquired subsidiary is sold in part in Sweden and the rest of 
Europe. The case manager implied the reasons for the acquisition with the state-
ment below. 
 “The target firm was our competitor and we were scared that it could be taken 
over by someone else, who could then consolidate the market and put our opera-
tions in Sweden in danger. That was the primary motivation. Also, the acquisition 
was extremely cheap. By acquiring the target firm, and combining it with other 
operations in Sweden, we were able to close down one of our smallest units. We 
then transferred production from the smallest unit to the remaining bigger unit. 
We got capacity utilization to a significant higher level, cost synergies, and, to 
some extent, some cross-selling synergies.” 
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Also, the case manager informed that acquisitions are made case by case and the 
motivations are usually, an opportunity (e.g. case 21), competitor preemption 
(case 22), some other cases, customers that wants to grow (following customers to 
overseas market) and some other cases just a growth opportunity because of de-
clining markets.  
“Acquisition decision is case by case. In some cases, it is an opportunity, and it 
just pops up. Sometimes it looks like a threat that someone would be coming to 
your market and take the market share and sometimes it is demand from a cus-
tomer that would like to grow in a new geographical environment. Sometimes it is 
just purely because there is no more growth opportunity in certain area, and you 
want to grow. Also, sometimes, you become the number one in your market, and 
you need to get the growth from the other market that you have not been operat-
ing earlier” (COMPONENTA). 
Institutions did not play any major impact on the acquisition strategies for case 21 
and case 22. There were no regulatory restrictions in Turkey and Sweden at the 
time of market entry. Although the case study did not possess target-specific ex-
perience before case 21 acquisition, however, they pointed out the role of new 
opportunity development in the Turkish market that led to their choice of staged 
acquisition. Turkey opened up a completely new business opportunity that was a 
big risk for the case study. However, by taking staged approach, it has so far been 
in good market condition. Sweden is institutionally close to Finland. In addition 
to been institutionally close to Finland, the case study already possesses host 
country capability before undertaking the acquisition in Sweden. 
The performance of the Turkish acquisition (case 21) was captured based on fi-
nancial KPIs and production capacity improvements while the performance of the 
acquisition in Sweden (case 22) was primarily captured based on cost synergies 
and financial KPIs. Specifically on case acquisition 21, it was reported in their 
company web pages that they have moved more production to their Turkish facto-
ry (low-cost country) because of increasingly cost of manufacturing in Finland 
(Componenta 2014). That informs why one of the KPIs for the market-seeking 
motives of case acquisition 21 is based on production capacity improvements. 
The case company also stressed the performance differentials between returns to 
partial and full acquisition and why it is of importance for companies to optimize 
the right acquisition strategy at the time of market entry. According to the inter-
viewing manager, not opting for the right acquisition strategy at the time of mar-
ket entry, could incur additional management cost and loss of scarce management 
resources. These are discussed in more details in Section 6.6.1. 
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Case Study (H): FAZER had four case acquisitions explored in the interview. 
Two acquisitions were made in Norway (case 23 and 26) in the year 2002 and 
2013. The remaining two acquisitions were made in Denmark (case 24) and Swe-
den (case 25) in the years 2001 and 2011 respectively. The case study does have 
an acquisition policy to opt for full acquisition. Their goal is always to aim at full 
acquisition, but they have also used staged acquisition in special cases. The case 
study does not have an acquisition department responsible for M&A strategy. 
However, the M&A manager follow-up competitors and markets that are interest-
ing to the company in close collaboration with the business units and business 
market intelligence. The responding manager’s responsibility spans across exe-
cuting M&A and asset management for the case study.  
Market-seeking motive was the motives of the case acquisitions (case 23, 24, 25 
and case 26). Case 25 in addition to market-seeking motives also had efficiency-
seeking and strategic asset-seeking motives. Staged acquisition strategy was uti-
lized for case 23 (Norway) and Denmark (case 24). Full acquisition were utilized 
for case 25 (Sweden) and case 26 (Norway).  For the staged acquisition in Nor-
way (case 23), they acquired a majority stake (controlling stake) at the first phase 
of the earnout arrangement, and the remaining stake was acquired in 2 years. For 
the staged acquisition in Denmark (case 24), the management of the target owned 
only small stake while the rest was owned by the heirs of the founder. They ac-
quired first 59% from heirs at fixed price (with customary reps & warranties).  
Using call options they acquired the remaining stake after three years of the origi-
nal deal from the remaining owners. The case study still employs the management 
of the acquired firm.  Table 19 shows the summary of the characteristics of the 
case company acquisitions.  
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Table 19. Summary Characteristics of FAZER Acquisitions 
Case Study H Case 23 Case 24 Case 25 Case 26 
Acquisition Poli-
cy 
No No No No 
Host country 
of Acquisition 
Norway Denmark Sweden Norway 
Formal Institu-
tions 
AE AE AE AE 
Motive of 
Acquisition 
Market-Seeking Market-Seeking Market-Seeking, 
Efficiency-seeking 
& Strategic asset-
seeking 
Market-Seeking  
& Efficiency-
seeking 
Acquisition Strat-
egy  
Staged 
Acquisition 
Staged 
Acquisition 
Full Acquisition Full Acquisition 
Equity Majority-100% 59%-100% 100% 100% 
Year of Entry 2002 2001 2011 2013 
Post-Acquisition 
Strategy 
Full acquisition Full Acquisition   
Performance 
measures 
Customer retention 
& financial  
Customer reten-
tion & financial 
measures 
cost synergies + 
financial measure 
+competence & 
skills 
Customer reten-
tion & financial 
measures 
Performance 
outcome 
Achieved targets Achieved targets Achieved targets Achieved targets 
The case company was deficient in host country capability and target-specific 
experience before undertaking case acquisition 23. The main motivation for using 
staged acquisition was because they wanted to have a local partner, with whom 
they can share risks, build trust and who can manage the operations of the busi-
ness locally. “Our reason for staged acquisition in Norway (case 23) was be-
cause we were entering a new market area where we wanted to have some local 
partners, with whom we could trust and who can take care of the local business. 
Also, it is a partial risk sharing option.” 
Similar reasons motivated their staged acquisition into Denmark (case 24). Also, 
the interviewing manager pointed to the fact that prior to this acquisition they had 
no contract catering business in Denmark but had other subsidiaries within Con-
fectionery business since the 80's. They decided to opt for staged acquisition 
(59% at entry) to enable them secure the management continues there and contin-
uous to the success of the company. In this type of business customer retention 
matters a lot that is also why retaining local managers is of importance to the 
business. The case study possessed host country capability. However, their choice 
for staged acquisition was because they were entering into unrelated business, and 
they need to retain local managers that have the market knowledge to ensure the 
success of the acquisition. The case company did not have target-specific experi-
ence prior to this acquisition. 
 Acta Wasaensia     155 
  
Furthermore, the interviewing manager stated that quite often in negotiations the 
seller and buyer have a different opinion on the valuation. Staged acquisition is a 
good way to bridge the valuation differences. “If you say that our company value 
that much but then the seller have an alternative opinion. So quite often we have 
to compromise that we pay some down payment, and the sellers keep minority and 
then based on the performance in 2 or 3 years, we acquire the rest at predeter-
mined amount”. 
Host country capability necessitated their full acquisition in case 25 and 26. They 
had existing subsidiaries in these host countries before the acquisitions. For case 
25, the acquired target had specific skills in handmade fresh-baked artisan bread 
and the demand for this product had been increasing. The case study acquired the 
target firm to gain these competencies, increase the capacity to meet increasing 
demand for handmade fresh-baked artisan bread and to offer the product to com-
pletely new markets. For case 26, the case study acquired the target firm to be-
come the leading contract caterers in the Norwegian market. This was made pos-
sible because they possessed host country capability, and the acquisition was in 
related business (case 23 and case 26 were both in contract catering). 
The interviewing manager informed that financial KPIs were the key KPIs in ac-
quisitions. However, they also measure retention of key customers in market-
seeking acquisitions (case 25), competence and skills in strategic asset-seeking 
acquisitions (case 25) and cost synergies in efficiency-seeking acquisitions (case 
26). Furthermore, the interviewing manager informed that differences in regula-
tions did affect the returns on acquisitions. He cited that in 2005, they acquired a 
contract catering business in Saint Petersburg, Russia. They kept to their policy 
and code of conduct by playing according to the rules. They realized that the local 
competitors are not playing according to the rules.  They exited from there in 
2011 because they were not competitive against the competitors. The competitors 
were not obeying taxes and social security like they did. As a result, the market 
price was set by the competitors whose cost track was wider than theirs. This case 
is not specifically a case that was explored in this study.   
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6.3 Determinants of Acquisition Strategies at the time 
of Market Entry 
Table 20 above shows the meta-matrix that depicts the findings from the within 
case analysis. These findings are utilized for the cross case analysis and findings 
discussed in this section. Section 6.3.1 to 6.3.2 discusses the determinants of par-
tial, staged and full acquisition at the time of market entry. Through this discus-
sion the answer to research question one is provided.  
6.3.1 Why do Firms Opt for Partial Acquisition Strategy? 
This section discusses major findings relating to the choice of partial acquisition. 
Table 21 shows the summary of case companies, acquisition cases, target host 
country institutions, motives of the investments and major findings relating to 
their choice of partial acquisition at the time of market entry. 
Table 21. Findings on the Choice of Partial Acquisition 
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Major Findings 
1 A Wood Product 
Manufacturing 
Russia EMDC 60% 1988 Market-
Seeking 
• Deficiency of target-
specific Experience 
• Deficiency of host Coun-
try Experience 
• Year of the Acquisition 
4 B Nonwoven 
battery separa-
tor  
USA AE 45% 2011 Strategic 
Asset-
seeking 
• Motives interacting with 
incentive alignment 
6 C Meats Russia EMDC 49,5% 2010 Resource-
Seeking 
• Secure source of raw 
materials 
• Political risks avoidance 
15 F(KONE) Lift Manufactur-
ing & Services 
Egypt EMDC 49,5% 1991 Market-
Seeking 
• Negotiation complexi-
ties 
• Year of the Acquisition 
16 F(KONE) Lift Manufactur-
ing & Services 
Saudi 
Arabia 
EMDC 40% 2007 Market-
Seeking 
• Regulatory Restrictions 
EMDC= Emerging Market and Developing Countries, AE = Advanced Economies 
Regulatory Restrictions: Table 21 shows five case companies and five cases of 
partial acquisition including the business sector of the acquisition, target host 
country. The table also shows the classification of the host country institutions 
according to IMF classification at the year of market entry.  
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Four out of the five partial acquisitions were made in emerging and developing 
countries of Russia (2), Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. One was made in the United 
States. From this five, one was acquired in the year 1988 when Russia was under 
transition from centrally administered system to one based on market principles 
(IMF 1988). From the classification in Table 21, one could conclude that there is 
a strong relationship between restrictive host countries in developing and emerg-
ing countries and the likelihood of partial acquisition. However, the interview 
points to a narrow finding relating to the role of ownership restriction. From the 
interview data, only KONE referred to regulatory restriction as the reason for the 
partial acquisition in Saudi Arabia. They entered Saudi Arabia with an ownership 
stake of 40% in 2007. Saudi Arabia restricts foreign ownership to 40% Al-Khouri 
(2012). KONE has an acquisition policy to aim for full ownership and control, yet 
the restrictive ownership laws in the host country gave them no other alternative 
than to opt for partial acquisition. 
Year of Acquisition Entry: From the interview data, parent MNEs that did not 
have host country capability with or without target-specific experience opted for 
partial acquisition at the time of market entry. This was the case with (KONE) 
acquisitions in Egypt in Year 1992 (case 15) and (UPM) acquisition in Russia 
(case 1) in 1988. Furthermore, parent MNEs that did not have host country capa-
bility with or without target-specific experience also opted for staged acquisition 
at the time of market entry. What distinguishes the choice of partial and staged 
acquisition for these cases is the time (year) of market entry. 
While UPM did not have target-specific experience before the acquisition, their 
choice of partial acquisition was because “We acquired local plywood manufac-
turing facility business. At that time, we did not have any plywood manufacturing 
operations or partner in Russia. We decided to acquire it partially and retained 
the local owner who remained the minority owner of the firm. It was a mutual 
benefit for us and beneficial for the old owner to remain.”  
For KONE, the acquired target was their distributor before the acquisition in the 
year1992 but they did not include earnout arrangements in the acquisition con-
tract to bridge contractual failures resulting in their choice for partial acquisition. 
Although as expressed by the acquisition manager, having such target-specific 
experience should facilitate successful deal closure, the case decision was made 
long before he came to the company. According to him, information from compa-
ny records suggests that unsuccessful deal closure was the reason behind the par-
tial acquisition. During his time in office, they have as well renegotiated but have 
been unable to close the deal. 
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What makes the choice of partial acquisition in these cases different to other cases 
of staged acquisition is the year of the acquisition. Earnout arrangement has not 
been used in practice during the 1980’s and early 90’s compared to the last two 
decades. The interviewing managers (Case Study A and Case Study F) informed 
that they did not know why the acquisition managers at that time did not utilize 
earnout arrangements but currently, it is a tool in the organizational M&A process 
to bride contractual complexities. Thus, the acquiring managers had no alterna-
tives to bridge negotiation failures other than settling for a partial stake. While the 
partial acquisition of UPM was further renegotiated in the year 2004 that resulted 
in full acquisition, KONE until date have been unable to successfully renegotiate 
the acquisition of the remaining stake in the company.  The reason for this unsuc-
cessful renegotiation is attributed to negotiation complexities rooted in the cultur-
al difference between the case company and target firm. This is further discussed 
in the subsequent section on the role of informal institutional distance in influenc-
ing the choice of partial acquisition.   
Informal Institutions: Informal institutional environment is explored based on 
the manifestation of cultural differences in acquisition issues. Thus, cultural is-
sues discussed by the interviewees are prescribed and perceived as the manifesta-
tion of culture in acquisition issues.  Specifically, the interest is on how cultural 
issues or differences influence their choice of acquisition strategies. This is fur-
ther supported by Hofstede cultural scores of individualism and collectivism of 
both the acquiring firm home country and target host country.  The main reason 
for strengthening the interview data with the individualistic vs. collectivist aspects 
of the culture is because its captures the dimension of cultural distance that influ-
ences the outcomes of negotiations a pre-requisite for closing acquisition deals. 
Other aspects of cultural distance measure such as power distance may more nec-
essarily predict post entry strategies e.g. integration planning and HR strategies. 
Similarly, uncertainty avoidance may more necessarily predict where to enter 
rather than the entry strategies chosen to enter a foreign market.  
The interview data suggest that the acquisition of host country capability by 
MNEs makes cultural differences insignificant in acquisition strategy choices 
(case 4 and case 5). For example, with regards to the partial acquisition of AHL-
STRÖM in the USA, the interviewee said they had host country experience that 
made cultural issues irrelevant to the acquisition decision.  
 “We are strong in the USA market, and the people we nominated, three members 
typically one of them is American, one of them is Finnish, but he has lived in the 
USA and still lived in the USA for a long time and he knows the USA culture and 
we have one free person who has also worked in America for 40 years also. So, it 
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was not an issue” Similarly, ATRIA said, “Because we are already operating in 
Russia, we had acquired company there in 2005; it is now where we have the 
meat processing company. So we knew already the ways of working in Russia, so 
this new one was just because of the raw material, and then import restriction 
that might affect the sourcing of the meat and the price on the sourcing”  
Similarly, case studies A and D were already operating in the local market before 
the acquisition suggesting that they had host country capability before the partial 
acquisition. This suggests that cultural distance insignificantly explain the choice 
of partial acquisition when parent firm has acquired host country capability.  
Furthermore, the literature review suggests that culture manifest itself in acquisi-
tion decisions by making acquisition negotiation more complex in reaching deci-
sions (Graham 1985; McDevitt 2006; Jakobsen 2008; Dikova et al. 2010).  Jakob-
sen (2008) suggest that partial acquisition is as a result of contractual difficulties 
in successfully closing acquisition deals with the target firm. This is because con-
tractual difficulties are rooted in cultural differences (Drew 1997; Dina 2010). In 
culturally different countries, sellers may perceive that the deal does not protect 
the interests of local owners and stakeholders alike (Jakobsen 2008).  
Individualistic vs. collectivist cultures is the aspect of cultural distance responsi-
ble for failure in contracts negotiation (McDevitt 2006). It has been shown that 
collectivist cultures are concerned with self-face and are more likely to opt for 
win-lose negotiations while individualistic culture will opt for integrative or win-
win negotiations (ibid). Out of the six acquisition cases, only one case acquisition 
from KONE cited negotiation complexities in successfully closing the acquisition 
deal in Egypt. To further validate that the negotiation complexities resulting into 
contractual failure is rooted in cultural distance, I explored Hofstede individualis-
tic vs. collectivist cultural dimension to confirm if the findings of McDevitt 
(2006) can be applied to this case.  Figure 15 shows the comparison of individual-
istic dimension of Finland and Egypt from Hofstede (adapted from http://geert-
Hofstede.com/finland.html) 
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Figure 15. Hofstede Individualistic cultural comparison Finland vs. Egypt 
From the numbers, Finland scored 63 as an individualistic society. Egypt scored 
25 considered as a collectivistic society. It is expected that while the parent Finn-
ish MNE will be seeking for a more integrative i.e. win-win negotiation, the 
Egyptian counterpart will be seeking a more win-lose outcome i.e. distributive 
outcome thus leading to the contractual failure. Without the negotiation complexi-
ties, Case Study F (KONE) would opt for full acquisition because they have an 
acquisition policy to opt for full acquisition. The interviewee had this comment 
regarding negotiation failures with the Egyptian partner.  
 “We have the minority stake in the company we cannot go to 100%. We have 
negotiated several times so we could buy the majority, but the evaluation they 
expect is ridiculous.  They are not performing the way we should perform; they 
are reporting the way we wish them to report. However, you cannot force some-
one to sell when they do not want to sell, or they want to sell but the evaluation is 
ridiculous.” 
Although three other partial acquisition were made in collectivist cultures of Rus-
sia (case 1 and case 6) and Saudi Arabia (case 16), however, the interviewed 
managers did not cite negotiation complexities or cultural issues as the reasons for 
their partial acquisition. KONE had target-specific experience with the Egyptian 
target and the Saudi Arabian target before the acquisition. In the case of Saudi 
Arabia, host country regulatory restrictions resulted in their choice of partial ac-
quisition. Thus; the role of culture cannot be explored as the ownership restriction 
already made it irrelevant. Case Study C (ATRIA) and Case Study B (AHL-
STROM) had host country capability in Russia and USA respectively before the 
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acquisition and thus cannot ascribe their partial acquisition to cultural issues. Case 
Study F (KONE) did not have host country capability in Egypt before the partial 
acquisition in Egypt. Based on these commonalities, it can be concluded that ne-
gotiation complexities rooted in the cultural difference between Finland and 
Egypt resulted in the unsuccessful closure of the acquisition deals and thus the 
choice of partial acquisition.   
Strategic Asset-Seeking Motives: Effect of Incentive Alignment and Nature 
of Target Strategic Assets: From the cross case study, it emerged that there are 
two types of strategic asset-seeking motives in terms of the nature of the target 
firm strategic asset. The first one involves a target firm whose strategic assets is 
still under development or undergoing research & development referred to as ex-
plorative strategic asset-seeking motives, the later refers to exploitative strategic 
asset-seeking motives in which the target firm strategic asset is completely quali-
fied on the market and the motive of parent firm is to exploit and leverage the 
capabilities of the target firm. There is a joint effect between explorative strategic 
asset-seeking motives and incentive alignment in influencing the choice of partial 
acquisition. The need to align incentive of the inventors “Incentive alignment” 
influence the choice of partial acquisition strategy for explorative strategic asset-
seeking motives. This was related to two partial acquisitions of Case Study B 
(AHLSTRÖM) and Case Study E (KEMIRA). No specific case acquisition was 
referred to by the interviewing manager for KEMIRA, but he inferred this when 
providing evidence for alternative reasons resulting in their choice of full acquisi-
tion in Italy (case 12). 
Case Study B referred to explorative asset-seeking as “Development Company”.  
The case study went further to explain their choice of partial acquisition not lim-
ited to the “development company” but also to align incentives. Case Study E 
referred explorative asset-seeking venture as new technology company that is 
“under-development”, the so-called “start-up companies.” The case study further 
explains that  
 “if there are some preliminary studies of some new technology but it is not prov-
en in the market yet and we see the high potential there, those kind of case I 
would say most probably we would like to establish some partial ownership were 
we then later own, if the expectation are fulfilled we would then be willing to ac-
quire the whole share.”  
Case Study B expressed the need to align incentives as a way to give the previous 
management of the company an incentive to remain and develop the product to-
gether. The case company loosely integrated the acquired target in part because 
they were acquired partially and secondly to keep the motivation of employees in 
166      Acta Wasaensia 
 
developing the technology. The interviewee stressed “we wanted to make sure 
that the previous management i.e. the management would stay in the company, 
and they would have strong incentives to develop the business. We wanted them to 
be in the same boat. We wanted to have a structure where if it works they become 
millionaires, and then they would have much money. That was our idea; they 
would push it as far as they can. We did not integrate them because we wanted 
them to be free; because if we have brought in our HR policies, these and that,… 
it could have been too much. So, we wanted them to be separate; Off course we 
wanted to control; we did it through our shareholders agreements and our board 
members in the acquired firm. That was our way of controlling it. The acquired 
target was better off without all our systems.  
In such strategic asset-seeking acquisition, retaining key employees is vital to the 
success of gaining the needed competencies and enabling the acquired firm in 
developing the product technologies. Previous studies have argued that motivat-
ing such employees through structural autonomy and incentive alignments is very 
vital for achieving the innovative capabilities that made the acquired firm attrac-
tive in the first place (Puranam et al. 2009).  This finding is also similar to previ-
ous studies on technology acquisitions and the choice of partial ownership (Folta 
1998; Folta & Miller 2002; Ransbotham & Mitra 2010). However, reason ex-
pressed for partial equity differs from the valuation difficulties in technology ac-
quisitions cited in previous studies. With regards to this case, the valuation of the 
technology is known; however, the technology is still under exploration and thus 
the reason for the waiting approach. The incentive alignment in strategic asset-
seeking investments is different from the earnout provisions clauses in staged 
acquisition. Whereas the aim of incentive alignment in strategic asset investment 
is to retain key employees who are usually the owners or part of the owners of the 
target firm, the incentive alignment in staged acquisition is an incentive to miti-
gate risks in the valuation of the target firm. 
Resource-Seeking Motives and Non-Transparent Regulatory Institutions: 
Resource-seeking acquisitions are aimed at gaining access to factors of produc-
tion and acquire specific resources (Dunning 1993; Filippov 2010: 314). It in-
cludes access to raw materials and agricultural products, access to cheap and 
semi-skilled labor in more advantageous conditions (Dunning 1993).  Non-
transparent regulatory institutions are those institutions that cannot ensure open-
ness and better organization of the legal system and accountability of regulatory 
institutions (OECD 2011). 
From the cross case study, only Case Study C (ATRIA) had resource-seeking 
motives for an acquisition made in Russia in 2010. The resources sought for was 
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meat. It was used as raw materials in their production to serve the local market. 
The host government of Russia had imposed import ban/restriction on meat im-
portation into Russia. Case Study C opted for partial acquisition as a result of 
“political risks avoidance” in the sense that they prefer to acquire a local meat 
company to secure the sources of their raw materials than undergoing the political 
and non-transparent process of securing import license from the Russian govern-
ment. The partial acquisition was a way to guarantee their resources (meat was 
the raw material) from the target firm. As predicted in the literature review host 
country institutions have greater influence in resource-seeking acquisitions be-
cause of their interest in protecting the local industry and local players from glob-
al competition (Uhlenbruck & Castro 1998:  627).   
 
The non-transparent regulatory formal institutions that manifested due to the im-
port restriction of meat into Russia resulted in the MNEs choice for seeking alter-
native means of securing the raw materials needed for production. It can be con-
cluded that in the context of non-regulatory formal institutions of host countries, 
firms seeking resource-seeking motives would likely opt for the choice of partial 
acquisition. The reason for the partial acquisition of the case company is to avoid 
transparency issues with dealing the regulative agencies in Russia and at the same 
time secure the sources of their raw materials. This finding is consistent with pre-
vious studies that found that firms opt for partial acquisition or shared ownership 
in natural resource industries because such industries are often politically sensi-
tive, and a local partner is needed to provide acquiring MNE with securing per-
mits. (Gomes-Casseres 1989; Hennart & Larimo 1998; Demirbag, Glaister & 
Tatoglu 2007) 
6.3.2 Why do Firms Opt for Staged Acquisition Strategy? 
This section discusses major findings relating to the choice of staged acquisition. 
Table 22 shows the summary of case companies, acquisition cases, target host 
country institutions, motives of the investments and major findings relating to 
their choice of staged acquisition at the time of market entry.   
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Table 22. Staged Acquisition Strategies: Characteristics of Cases and Ma-
jor Findings 
Ca
se
s 
Ca
se
 S
tu
dy
 
Business 
Sector 
Host 
Country 
Formal  
Institutions 
Equity 
Stake  Y
ea
r 
En
tr
y 
Motives  Major Findings 
7 C Meats Sweden Advanced 
Economies 
57.1% -
100% 
2007 Market-
Seeking 
• Market power consol-
idation 
• Stock trade 
8 C Meats Estonia Advanced 
Economies 
76%-
100% 
2004 Market-
Seeking 
• Deficiency of host 
country capability 
• Market power consol-
idation 
• Deficiency of target-
specific experience 
9 D Cranes 
manufacturing & 
services 
South 
Africa 
EMDC 19%-
100% 
2007 Market-
Seeking  
• Target-specific expe-
rience 
• Deficiency of host 
country experience 
• Mild regulatory 
framework 
13 E Water treatment 
chemicals 
USA Advanced 
Economies 
15%-
100% 
2000 Market-
Seeking 
• Deficiency of target-
specific experience 
• Deficiency of host 
country capability 
11 E Paint & Coating 
Business 
Russia EMDC  70%-
100% 
2006 Market -
Seeking  
• Deficiency of target-
specific experience 
• Host country capabil-
ity 
17 F Lift Manufactur-
ing & Services 
Bulgaria Advanced 
Economies 
60%-
100% 
2011 Market-
Seeking 
• Deficiency of host 
country capability 
• Target-specific expe-
rience 
• Nature of  target 
business 
21 G Metallurgy Turkey EMDC 55%-
93,6% 
2006 Market-
Seeking 
• Deficiency of host 
country capability 
• Deficiency of target-
specific experience 
• Stock Trade 
• Market Power Consol-
idation 
23 H Contract Catering Norway Advanced 
Economies 
Majority-
100% 
2002 Market-
Seeking 
• Deficiency of host 
country capability 
• Deficiency of target-
specific Experience 
• Market Power Consol-
idation 
24 H Contract Catering Denmark Advanced 
Economies 
59%-
100% 
2001 Market-
Seeking 
• Deficiency of target-
specific Experience 
• Host country capabil-
ity 
• First contract catering 
in Denmark 
• Stock Trade 
EMDC= Emerging Market and Developing Countries 
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Acquisitions involving Stock Trade:  Two forms of staged acquisition were 
utilized by the cases en route to full ownership. The first involves acquisition con-
tracts containing earnout provisions and the second pertains to call options in-
volving the purchase of remaining shares of acquired target from stock exchange 
market.  The latter are typically privately owned firms that are not traded in stock 
exchange market where the acquiring firm structure the acquisition deal with 
earnout provisions. In such earnout schemes, the owner(s) of the target firm re-
ceives down payment and the total purchase value is linked to certain criteria’s 
such as positive revenue trend, number of new customers, etc. and after meeting 
those criteria’s after a period of certain years the acquiring firm pays the addition-
al sums to sellers (Weber 2010; Handler & Hirsch 2014). The other “The call op-
tion staged acquisition” involves a stock trade. Using stock trade as market entry 
strategies is the only option available especially when the company is traded on 
stock exchange market with the availability of free float. 
Several Case studies expressed that their choice of staged acquisition was because 
it was the only options available to acquire the target firm. They acquired the ma-
jority from the majority shareholders, providing them sort of legality to offer a 
full buyout to other shareholder or free float.  Case Study C (ATRIA) expressed 
their staged acquisition choice as  
 “It was not sort of a partial entry in that way that we want to have it partially. It 
was the only way to go on board. The main aim was for us to have a place where 
we could offer to the rest of the stock market that we have much ownership now 
we want to get the other stakes. That was the case; it was not in that sense partial 
entry; but just a method of entering the market”. 
For Case Study H (FAZER), the acquisition in Denmark (case 24) also involved a 
call option. The Management in Denmark owned only small stake while the rest 
was owned by the heirs of the founder.  They bought first 59% from the heirs at 
fixed price (with customary representatives & warranties).  The sale and purchase 
agreement included put & call options. The case study decided to utilize their call 
option at first window two years after the original deal (fixed EBITDA) multiple.  
Management (who still is employed by the case company) sold their stake three 
years after original purchase. 
Staged acquisition is thus aimed at full acquisition after few years as indicated in 
the theoretical section and confirmed from the case data. Staged acquisition is in 
some ways similar to partial acquisition because they require only partial equity 
initially. They are also similar to full acquisition as they are acquired fully after 
few several years. The difference between staged acquisition and partial acquisi-
tion is that staged acquisition usually do have contractual clauses enabling the 
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acquirer to acquire fully over several years or intent to acquire fully through a 
defined legal procedure without restrictions e.g., legal procedure requiring majori-
ty owners to offer call options to acquire the remaining equity stake or shares. 
Deficiency of Host Country Capability and Deficiency of Target-Specific Ex-
perience: Host Country Capability is the accumulation of knowledge about doing 
business in a certain host country from an ongoing business and knowledge about 
the host country institutional framework such as rules, norms and values (Modi-
fied from Eriksson et al. 1997; Chetty et al. 2006; Chen 2008; Slangen & Hennart 
2008; Johanson & Vahlne 2009). MNEs acquire host country capability through 
establishing a subsidiary and ongoing business operations in a host country. Un-
like host country capability which deals with knowledge on how host country 
institutions influences firms’ business activities, knowledge about the market and 
how the market works, Target-specific experience deals with the knowledge 
about the internal processes, structures, assets and systems of the target firms. It 
provides relationship-specific experience and knowledge about the MNEs busi-
ness partner for which knowledge opportunities is an outcome of the relationship 
(Johanson & Vahlne 2009). 
The internationalization process theory cites the importance of host country expe-
rience and target-specific experience in developing host country capability and 
knowledge opportunities. It was argued that firms that do not have target-specific 
experience (i.e. deficiency of target-specific experience) will opt for partial acqui-
sition. Partial acquisition serves as a means to get to know the target firm busi-
nesses and processes, gain privileged access to information about the market, 
their relationship partners and their business network (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). 
It also serves as a means to develop mutual trust and knowledge opportunities 
(ibid). Target-specific experience is very vital in enhancing firm's acquisition 
strategy in foreign market. Target-specific experience and host country capability 
provide firms the capability needed to operate successfully, manage, integrate and 
transfer knowledge to the acquired subsidiaries.  
Similarly, some IB scholars utilizing transaction cost economies have interpreted 
such deficiency of Target-Specific Experience in terms of valuation difficulty of 
parent firm assets and as an option to build reciprocity which the target firm will 
accept except if their asset is not a “lemon” (Chen & Hennart 2004). However, 
this finding goes beyond complexities in asset valuation to include among others, 
building trust, deficiency of knowledge of managing the operations of the target 
firm in the local market, knowledge of the target firm culture and how best to 
transfer knowledge and gain synergies from the acquired subsidiary. 
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For the case studies, deficiency of target-specific experience was pivotal in their 
option for the partial stake at the time of entry. This enabled the case studies to 
retain local owners with local knowledge, build trust and as a means to gain capa-
bility on how to manage the operations in the local market. This is consistent with 
the application of the Uppsala internationalization process model. As suggested in 
the literature review, firms would opt for partial acquisition as a foothold strategy 
to gain valuable knowledge of the acquired firm business. An increase in com-
mitment decision is likely to be the outcome of the relationship in the presence of 
trust and commitment to the relationship (Johanson & Vahlne 2009).  
From the interview data, three case acquisitions (case 8, case 21 and case 23) did 
not possess host country capability and target-specific experience while undertak-
ing staged acquisition. These acquisitions were made in Turkey, an emerging and 
developing country, Norway and Estonia which are considered advanced econo-
mies. Market-seeking motives motivated these acquisitions. Host country capabil-
ity is needed to manage market-seeking FDIs successfully because such firms will 
have to deal with the local supply chain, local laws, and local customers. While 
host country capability is very important in acquisitions, it is even more crucial 
when such acquisitions are motivated for market-seeking. Rugman (2010) also 
suggest that host country specific advantages matters in market-seeking FDIs. 
Deficiency of host country experience influenced the acquiring firm’s decision for 
staged acquisition as a strategy en route to full acquisition.   
Case Study C (ATRIA) described their staged acquisition in Estonia (case 8) as a 
stepwise approach towards majority. Before the acquisition, the case study has 
been exporting meat to Estonia. However, the exporting operation was not ade-
quate to gain greater familiarity of the local competitor, intimate knowledge of 
the market and legitimacy. Marinova et al. (2004) also pointed out exporting op-
erations are limited in gaining intimate knowledge of the market and averting 
consumer discrimination in favor of local providers.  In addition, the case compa-
ny market growth motives compelled them to look for meat processing industrial 
companies in Estonia to process the same meat they are already exporting into 
Estonia thereby giving them the ability to improve the meat processing capacity 
in Estonia and same time gain market growth. The choice of staged acquisition 
was only “sort of a time issue” to make down payment when more information 
becomes available. 
According to COMPONENTA, the main motivation for the staged acquisition is 
risk sharing when entering a new and unknown market and to gain market 
knowledge.  “If you go to an unknown market or such market area where you 
have no access, and you want to enter the new market, basically it carries a big 
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risk and you may want to share the risk for example with the local firm in form of 
a joint venture and then make a contract that after 3 or 5 years there are some 
option arrangement in which you can buy the remaining equity out from the ac-
quisition. So, it is purely risk sharing but the secondary is to gain from the local 
partner in term of permits that are needed, market knowledge and access to local 
customer and so on.  
The staged acquisition of Case Study G (COMPONENTA) in Turkey (case 21) 
involved a call option. The acquiring manager cited that having the local partners 
during these years has provided them with key local knowledge of the host coun-
try especially in terms of risks sharing moreover, they would have still structured 
the deal in stages even if it did not involve a stock trade. 
Case Study H (FAZER) was also deficient in both host country capability and 
target-specific experience when entering the Norwegian market in 2002 (case 23). 
The interviewee expressed the reason for the staged acquisition with the follow-
ing statement: “Our reasons for staged acquisition especially with the case of 
Norway was that we were entering a new market area where we wanted to have 
some local partners, with whom we could trust and who can take care of the local 
business.  
From the interview data, deficiency of host country capability and target-specific 
experience propelled these MNEs to utilize staged acquisition en route to full ac-
quisition when entering these markets. Staged acquisition provides them the “sort 
of time” of acquiring market knowledge from the previous owners of the firm 
during a period and making down payment when more information becomes 
available. These MNEs commented that usually in cases where they have host 
country capabilities they opted for full acquisition. For example, FAZER subse-
quent full acquisition in Sweden (case 25) and Norway (case 26) are cases where 
they had host country capabilities or existing subsidiaries before the acquisition.  
Deficiency of Host Country Capability in Presence of Target-Specific Expe-
rience: The preceding findings discussed how the deficiency of host country ca-
pability in the presence of target-specific experience influences firm’s choice for 
staged acquisition. From our interview data, there were also firms that had target-
specific experience, but did not possess host country capability that opted for 
staged acquisition at the time of market entry. This was the case when the 
knowledge gained from the target (target-specific experience) equipped the ac-
quiring MNE about the underdeveloped nature of the target business and in cases 
where the MNE did not possess sufficient knowledge of doing business in the 
host country.  
 Acta Wasaensia     173 
  
There were two such cases (case 9 and case 17) involving Case Study D 
(KONECRANES) and Case Study F (KONE).  They possessed target-specific 
experience before embarking on staged acquisition. These two case studies were 
also deficient in host country experience before embarking on these acquisitions.  
The responding managers cited the importance of target-specific experience in 
their acquisition of knowledge needed to make informed decisions. According to 
them, target-specific experience is vital in several aspect of the acquisition pro-
cess from facilitating the deal completion to gaining knowledge of the acquired 
target assets and financial position.  
 “The important of existing relationship before making acquisitions reinforces 
itself in terms of making it easier to complete the acquisition negotiation because 
you are discussing with target firms you have been doing business for a while. I 
am sure we have not managed to complete any deals where we have not had an 
existing relationship with the acquisition. We have negotiated few, but we have 
not been able to close the deals. It is difficult because we don’t know the person. 
When they are core distributor, we get some operative financial information. We 
know exactly how many quantity or units they have sold and base on our visit we 
know what kind of operational quality they have. Thus, we have the information 
before starting discussing about possible acquisition. However, if it is a new tar-
get we do not know; we have to try to obtain genuine information during negotia-
tion. Frankly, having a four years or five years distributorship relationship, gives 
you knolwedge of the people, the operations, and everything. There is no way we 
can get the same information during a few months of negotiation” (KONE).  
Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 1423) ascribed target-specific experience as one that 
provides privileged access to information about the market, their relationship 
partners and their business networks which gives the firm insidership position 
which market research may be unable to identify. Target-specific experience fa-
cilitates deal completion because the acquiring firm is already familiar with the 
management team it will be negotiating acquisition terms with. In terms of target 
firm asset, the acquiring firm already has knowledge about the target firm assets 
through previous site visits and knowledge sharing exchanges which typically 
occurs in every strategic business relationships. In terms of financial information, 
the acquiring firm already has an estimate of the share of the target firm purchase 
volumes and value of their total sales.  Thus, target-specific experience makes the 
acquisition process faster and more certainty that the deal will be completed. 
More so, target-specific experience reduces integration challenges compared to 
cases with deficiency in target-specific experience.   
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Whereas target-specific experience should facilitate full acquisition, the experi-
ences from the target could also suggest the need to take a partial stake and align 
incentives towards the development of the business. For example, if the target 
firm business processes and structure (e.g. financial reporting) is either not in con-
formity or the actual financial position of the company is not clear due to un-
standardized business processes and reporting practices. The experiences from the 
target do not provide adequate host country capability in managing the operations 
of a subsidiary in a specific host country. To further acquire host country 
knowledge, the acquiring firms aligns incentives of the previous owners using 
earnout arrangements. “if you work for me, I will pay you more millions and keep 
you motivated throughout this period”  In cases where the previous owners were 
still willing to work for the acquiring MNE without having minority/majority 
ownership stake, these acquiring MNE opted for full acquisition. 
Case Study D (KONECRANES) was deficient in host country capability before 
entering the South African market (case 9). The deficiency of host country expe-
rience in terms of their inability to predict or interpret the impact of the broad-
based black economic empowerment” (B-BBEE) legislation led to their decision 
for staged acquisition when entering the South African market. “It was a risk 
avoidance strategy.” If they had host country capability before the acquisition, 
they could have been able to predict the impact of (B-BBEE) legislation on their 
business operation more accurately than they did.  B-BBEE is the legislation en-
acted by the successive government of ANC 1999, 2004 and 2009 aimed at over-
coming the economic legacy of apartheid and empowering “Blacks minorities to 
participate in economic activities through mandatory quotas” (Kruger 2011).  
Case Study F (KONE) described their staged acquisition as a strategy utilized 
when entering new country and the need to keep the previous owner of the firm to 
continue and be motivated to work part time in the company. “The strategic idea 
behind the staged acquisition at the time of market entry is for us to know the 
country or to know the market. And once under KONE kind of influence the oper-
ations and the platforms have developed to something okay, we can consider it as 
a KONE frontline, then we acquire it fully making it a KONE frontline” The ac-
quired targets (case 17) was their distributors in the host country before the acqui-
sition. Thus, the knowledge acquired from the target firm during the period of 
initial business relationship enhanced their informed decisions to opt for staged 
acquisition.  
Case Study F also pointed out that the outcome of the knowledge acquired from 
the target firm during the period of initial business relationship is pivotal in their 
decision for full or staged acquisition.  This is discussed in more details in the 
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discussion on the nature of target business in influencing the choice of staged and 
full acquisition. 
Deficiency of Target-Specific Experience in the Presence of Host Country 
Capability: Also, there are three cases (case 11, 13, 24) were the case studies 
were deficient in target-specific experience, but they still aimed at staged acquisi-
tion. The reasons cited for the staged acquisition were similar to the reasons cited 
in the cases where the case companies were deficient in host country capability 
but had target-specific experience. These cases also involved cases where the ac-
quisition was in a different market segment or new market segment different from 
their previous investments in the host country. Though they were market-seeking 
motives, but the business segment was totally different from their previous opera-
tions in the host country. Case Study H (FAZER) cited the need to retain the pre-
vious management to continue to work for them as their primary reason.  
 “For example in contract catering when we enter Denmark we bought 59% of 
the company, just for us to secure the management continues there and continu-
ous to the success of the company. The previous management still continued to 
work for us today. Prior to this deal, we had no contract catering business in 
Denmark but had had other subsidiaries (within Confectionery) since 80's” 
(FAZER).  
Case Study E (KEMIRA) stated that their choice of staged acquisition in the US 
(case 13), was because they were entering a new business segment, and they de-
cided to align the interest of the previous CEO to remain in the acquired subsidi-
ary to gain knowledge of the business in the host country. “We want to involve 
the existing CEO, the founder of the business that he will stay in the company and 
then we have the first period of this 15%, and later on we acquired the rest of the 
shares of the company”. This acquisition was a special case. They had an existing 
licensing arrangement with another firm PIONEER Chemicals which has owned 
the right to manufacture and sell Kemira Kemwaters water treatment products in 
North America since 1995 (Global Water Intelligence 2000). They acquired 15% 
equity in KEMIRON (case 13) and in turn KEMIRON acquired the entire equity 
of PIONEER chemical (ibid).  
A spin-off from Case Study E (KEMIRA) completed the staged acquisition in 
Russia (case 13). The reason for the staged acquisition was because they were 
entering into a new business segment not in terms of geographical location but in 
terms of business segment which they were not operating before the acquisition. 
They had host country capability because they already had subsidiaries in Russia 
but in different market segment. 
176      Acta Wasaensia 
 
These findings have three important implications. First, firms that are deficient in 
host country capability in the presence of target-specific experience opted for 
staged acquisition because of the unfamiliarity of the local business environment. 
Second, firms that possess host country capability but were deficient in target-
specific experience, were primary entering a new business market and thus opted 
for staged acquisition to align the incentives of the owners in order to have suffi-
cient time to gain knowledge of the business. In these acquisitions, it was also 
found out that the previous owners remained in the company aftermath of the 
completion of the staged acquisition. Third, firms that are deficient in both host 
country capability and target-specific experience also opted for staged acquisition. 
These firms that were deficient in both host country capability and target-specific 
experience were further motivated for market power consolidation.   
Market Power Consolidation: Market Power consolidation is a term coined by 
Chen (2008) describing Japanese’s MNEs motives for partial acquisition (equity 
less than 95%) in concentrated industries marked by oligopolistic rivalries among 
small number of players. Unlike Chen (2008), Chen and Hennart (2004) suggest 
that market power consolidation should more likely motivate full acquisition than 
partial acquisition in concentrated industry because the presence of local partner 
in partially acquired subsidiary hampers the flexibility of the Japanese parent in 
consolidating market power. From our interview data, those firms that did not 
possess host country capability and target-specific experience before embarking 
on staged acquisition were also motivated by market power consolidation. These 
findings reconcile Chen (2008) and Chen (2004) findings. 
Market power consolidation is aimed at consolidating fragmented industries while 
at the same time maintaining or consolidating a firm’s market position and com-
petitiveness in new and growth markets. Chen and Hennart (2004) and Chen 
(2008) accounted for the equity stake in the subsidiaries as at the time of their 
study. They utilized secondary data sources and quantitative methodology which 
in most cases does not account if the initial equity stake is in sequence to full ac-
quisition using earnout arrangements. Thus, they neglected if the equity stake was 
just a transition to full equity.  
The reason why market power consolidation was significant in both studies (Chen 
& Hennart 2004; Chen 2008) in predicting the choice of full and partial acquisi-
tion was because those acquisitions under study could have been acquired in stag-
es using earnout arrangements making them behave like entries via partial acqui-
sition in some cases and full acquisition in some other cases. The robustness test 
in Chen (2008) accounts for this variation. When the equity stake that constitute 
partial acquisition was reduced from cut-off 95% to not more than 50%, market 
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power consolidation became insignificant in predicting the choice of partial ac-
quisition in concentrated and growing industries. 
Chen (2008) also found that Japanese MNEs opted for full acquisition in the pres-
ence of host country experience. This is consistent with the findings of this study 
that Host country capability increases the likelihood of full acquisition. In this 
study, it is found that MNEs that do not have both target-specific experience and 
host country capability were further motivated or driven by market power consol-
idation. These firms are faced with increased price competition, declining growth 
due to maturity of their geographical market and need to remain global leaders in 
their industry, establish in new high growth market and consolidate the industry. 
These pressures create “leapfrogging behaviors” for these multinationals in cer-
tain markets as they seek rapid growth in new markets where they have little or 
no experience in the host countries. 
Case Study C (ATRIA) did have host country capability before their staged ac-
quisition in Sweden (case 7).  They opted for staged acquisition because it was a 
stock trade and was the only option available to acquire the case company.  Fur-
thermore, Case Study C did not have host country capability during the acquisi-
tion of case 8.  Case Study G (COMPONENTA) did not have host country capa-
bility and existing cooperation or ongoing business with the target firm before the 
staged acquisition in Turkey (case 21). The acquisition was a stock trade.  Case 
Study H (FAZER) in addition to the deficiency of partner specific experience, 
they did not have host country capability during the Norwegian acquisition in the 
year 2002 (case 23).  
Case Study C staged acquisition forms part of the company’s strategy of becom-
ing the leading food industry player in the Baltic Sea region. Driven by the pres-
sure of price competition due to the integration of markets in the European Union, 
declining market environment,  the company opted for acquisitions as alternative 
to sustain growth, consolidate their market power of been the number one food 
supplier and processing company in the Scandinavia and Baltic region. Case 
Study G described their staged acquisition to be motivated by the new business 
opportunity in Turkey and their motives of remaining one of the largest European 
suppliers of casting components and advanced solutions. The acquisition was a 
means to respond to price competition or reduce the risks arising from price com-
petition by transferring production and products to their newly acquired subsidi-
ary in Turkey. For Case Study H, their vision is to be the leading catering compa-
ny in the Norwegian market. This further resulted in their subsequent full acquisi-
tion in Norway (case 26). 
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Nature of Acquired Target Business, Market Structure, and Incentive 
Alignment:  Case Study F (KONE) further described that their choice of staged 
acquisition was also dependent on the nature of acquired target business and mar-
ket structure. This was the case for their acquisition in Bulgaria in a host market 
characterized by fragmented market players, and the target firm was prior to the 
time of acquisition not using standard reporting practices. Furthermore, their 
business processes needed further development to comply with the KONE WAY 
processes. Thus, while target-specific experience is one aspect that influences 
their choice of staged and full acquisition, the knowledge of the target business 
and market structure acquired from several years of business collaboration with 
the target firm enhances their decision for staged or full acquisition. In other 
words, their choice of staged and full acquisition is dependent on if the target 
business is well developed in terms of reporting standards and business processes 
and if the target market is fragmented or consolidated.  
When target firm business has very bad accounting (i.e. in terms of difficulty in 
knowing by facts what returns are to services and returns from general equipment 
installations) and if the market is fragmented, they opted for staged acquisition. 
As a consequence, they will align incentives with the previous owners of the firm 
using earnout provisions to keep them motivated and join them in the develop-
ment of the business and operations. The earnout provisions are such that “If you 
grow the company making it more profitable, I will give you more money, I keep 
you more motivated throughout the business. Moreover, the target owners in this 
situation are “kind of man on the ground to explain to us what is required to op-
erate in the market.” 
Thus far, it can be inferred that incentive alignment is interacting with the nature 
of the target firm business (developed business processes vs. underdeveloped 
business process) and market structure (fragmented vs. consolidated) to influence 
the choice of staged acquisition. Fragmented market structure entails a market 
with lots of small local players that often manufacture cheap, bad quality equip-
ment. Consolidated market structure entails a market where foreign players have 
gained a considerable amount of market share in the host country. The incentive 
alignment, in this case, is different from the incentive alignment in the case of 
partial acquisition. For this case, it was necessary to align the interest of the pre-
vious owners for a period due to the nature of their business processes and frag-
mented market structure. In the case of partial acquisition, it was necessary to 
align incentive with the previous owners, not limited to duration but due to the 
strategic motives for the investment.  
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In summary, staged acquisition is opted for in acquisitions involving stock trade, 
acquisitions in which the partner firm has target-specific experience but deficient 
in host country capability. It is also used in acquisitions were the target business 
is not developed, and the market structure is fragmented. Finally, it is a strategy 
used in acquisitions where the parent firm is deficient in either or both host coun-
try capability and target-specific experience. However, such firms that are defi-
cient in both host country capabilities and target-specific experience are further 
motivated by market power consolidation. Those cases where the firms have tar-
get-specific experience but deficient in host country capability, their option for 
staged acquisition is to gain host market knowledge. In cases where the case firms 
possess host country capability but deficient in target-specific experience, they 
opted for staged acquisition because the acquisitions were made in a different 
business sector or business portfolio in the host countries. 
6.3.3 Why do Firms opt for Full Acquisition Strategy? 
This section discusses major findings relating to the choice of full acquisition. 
Table 23 shows the summary of case companies, acquisition cases, target host 
country institutions, motives of the investments and major findings relating to 
their choice of full acquisition at the time of market entry.   
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Table 23. Full Acquisition Strategy, Characteristics of Cases and Major 
Findings 
Ca
se
s 
Co
m
pa
ny
 
Business Sector 
Target Host 
Country 
Formal 
Institutions 
Year of 
Entry Motives Major Findings 
2 A
  
self-adhesive label 
stock 
South Africa EMDC 2000 Efficiency- 
Seeking 
• Host country capabil-
ity 
• Size of the target 
3 A Wood Product 
Manufacturing 
Germany Advanced 
Economies 
2011 Efficiency- 
Seeking 
• Efficiency motives 
• Host country capabil-
ity 
• Target is a competitor 
5 B
  
Life Science Business 
(filtration & separa-
tion technology) 
Sweden Advanced 
Economies 
2012 MS + ES+  
SA 
• Nature of the target  
• Host country capabil-
ity 
• Megatrends & growth 
options 
10 D Cranes manufacturing 
& services 
Morocco EMDC 2007 Market-
Seeking  
• Target-specific expe-
rience 
• Cultural proximity 
• Retention of key 
management 
14 E Water treatment 
chemicals market 
Netherlands  
 
Advanced 
Economies 
2014 Market- 
Seeking 
• Host country capabil-
ity 
• Target is a competitor 
18 F Lift Manufacturing & 
Services 
Kenya EMDC 2013 Market- 
Seeking 
• Nature of target 
business  
• Market structure 
• Target-specific expe-
rience 
• Retention of key 
management 
19 F Lift Manufacturing & 
Services 
Israel Advanced 
Economies 
2013 Market- 
Seeking 
• Nature of target 
business  
• Market structure 
• Target-specific expe-
rience 
20 F
  
Lift Manufacturing & 
Services 
EU & US Advanced 
Economies 
Continu-
ously 
Efficiency- 
Seeking 
• Size of the target 
(<5M€) 
• Efficiency motives 
22 G Metallurgy Sweden Advanced 
Economies 
2012 Market- 
Seeking + 
Efficiency- 
Seeking 
• Target is a competitor 
• Efficiency motives 
• Size of the target 
(0,5M€) 
• Host Country Capabil-
ity 
25 H Food & Contract 
Catering 
Sweden Advanced 
Economies 
2011 MS +SA  • Host country Capabil-
ity 
• Efficiency Motives 
26 H
  
Food & Contract 
Catering 
Norway Advanced 
Economies 
2013 MS + ES • Host Country Capabil-
ity 
• Related Business 
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Efficiency-Seeking Motives and Host Country Capability: Efficiency-seeking 
motives are motives aimed at rationalizing production, distribution, and market-
ing activities through common governance of and synergy-building among geo-
graphically dispersed operations (Dunning 1993; Gorynia et al. 2007). Firms that 
opt for efficiency-seeking FDI’s aim to take advantage of the differences in the 
cost of factor endowments and to achieve economies of scale and scope (Dunning 
1993). As postulated in the literature efficiency-seeking motives occur sequential-
ly after firms have undergone market-seeking FDIs (Dunning 1993). The effi-
ciency-seeking motives of five case companies were all undertaken in advanced 
economies such as Sweden, Germany, US, Italy and Spain (exception to South 
Africa) and they actually occurred sequentially after firms have undergone mar-
ket-seeking FDIs in that specific host country. Case Study F has a continuous 
strategy of efficiency-seeking acquisitions on average of 20 transactions yearly in 
the developed economies of the USA and EU. For this reason, it was better to 
classify them as one acquisition case (case 20). Developed economies have estab-
lished transparent regulatory institutions; stable political environment and sup-
porting institutions that govern the rules of business thus reduce the bottlenecks 
and need for a local stake in foreign acquisitions. Developed economies also have 
less intervention in multinational operations compared to the level of intervention 
in less developed and developing economies (Poynter 1985). 
Case Study A (UPM) acquisition in South Africa (case 2) was aimed at expanding 
the production of Vynide which is a complement to UPM Raflatac's current prod-
uct range and to strengthen UPM Raflatac's global presence in the self-adhesive 
laminate business (Strömberg 2000). Also, UPM’s Myllykoski Oyj and Rhein 
Papier GmbH Acquisition in Germany were aimed at gaining economies of scale 
and efficiencies in graphic papers in a market that is declining. Case Study G al-
ready had an existing forging business operation in Sweden before the acquisition 
of the forging business of Arvika (case 22). The acquisition complements their 
existing forging operations in Wirsbo Sweden by providing them lot of cost syn-
ergies that allowed the case company to close down their smallest factory in Swe-
den and to achieve a significantly higher capacity utilization rate for their remain-
ing factory in Sweden. The products from case 22 are sold to Sweden and other 
European markets. Case Study F subsequent acquisitions in developed markets 
(case 20) are aimed at operational synergies that the interviewer referred to as 
“Density acquisitions” acquisitions that are made in areas where we already 
have our presence. Density means that all portfolios become denser; we have it 
smaller and closer to each other. The aim of the density acquisitions is to improve 
operational efficiency and cost. It cost less to service more installed elevators and 
escalators if they are close to each other.  
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Case Study B (AHLSTRÖM) acquisition of Munktell (case 5) in addition to effi-
ciency-seeking motives involved several other motives such as market-seeking 
and strategic asset-seeking motives. With respect to efficiency-seeking motives of 
Case Study B, the interviewee informed their motives with the following state-
ments “The main aim was to gain efficiency of scale, getting some volume dis-
counts on raw materials and having more efficient supply chain.”  
South Africa is characterized as emerging and developing country at the time of 
market entry of Case Study A into South Africa (case 2). Although South Africa 
has more developed infrastructures compared to other developing economies in 
Africa, South Africa also has challenges with regards to non-transparent regulato-
ry institutions in the form of administrative malpractices and corruption (Ncholo 
2000). Transparency International ranks South Africa as 5 out of 10 for both years 
2000 and 2001 representing the years prior to and year of Case Study A market 
entry into South Africa. As postulated in the literature review, the institutional 
environment should have greater interactions with efficiency-seeking acquisi-
tions. However, Case Study A did have host country capability before the case 
acquisition. Thus, they knew the South Africa market as they have been operating 
there for several years before the case acquisition.   
Also as discussed in the literature review, efficiency-seeking acquisitions could 
be in the form of market-seeking acquisition but the holistic motivation underly-
ing such acquisition is to increase a firm’s efficiency by exploiting the benefits of 
economies of scale and scope, or common ownership. This was the case with the 
acquisition of Vynide from Polifin Ltd (case 2) in South Africa by Case Study A, 
acquisition of Munktell (case 3) by Case Study B, several acquisition transaction 
of Case Study F in EU and US (case 20), acquisition of Arvika Smide AB in 
Sweden (case 22) by Case Study G, as well as the acquisition of Skandinavisk 
Mat Invest AS Norway (case 26) by Case Study H. Such acquisitions require tight 
integration to achieve the sole aim of economics of scale and scope. The aim of 
tightly integrating such subsidiaries is to ensure extensive sharing of all type of 
resources and the adoption of parent firm organizational processes while increas-
ing synergistic benefits (Pablo 1994; Slangen 2006). These efficiency-seeking 
FDIs took place in host countries that are open and have well-developed infra-
structures and are located in regionally integrated markets (Dunning 1993: 59). 
The choice of full acquisition is to enhance synergic benefits a prerequisite for 
achieving economies of scale and scope. 
In summary, efficiency seeking motives in the presence of host country capability 
influences the choice for full acquisitions of Finnish MNEs in advanced and 
emerging markets. 
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Size of Acquired Target:  An emerging theme from the case interviews is that 
the acquisitions were the target firm is very small in terms of the number of em-
ployees (between 5-50 employees) and the value of acquired target is less than 
5M€ were acquired fully. This was expressed in three case acquisitions in Sweden 
(case 22), South Africa (case 2) and density acquisitions of Case Study F in de-
veloped economies (case 20). Even though there are other alternative acquisition 
strategies such as partial and staged acquisition suitable in the host country, the 
interviewee stressed that the size influenced their decision for full acquisition. 
The size of acquired target relative to the size of the parent MNE is very signifi-
cant. The three case companies are MNEs with number of employees ranging 
from 3500 to 43,000 employees and net sales ranging from EUR 0.5 billion to 
EUR 6.9 billion. The target firm purchase price ranged between EUR 0.5 million 
to EUR 5 million. 
Case Study G reported in their 2012 financial statement that the case acquisition 
(Arvika Smide AB in Sweden) (case 22) was in a difficult financial state and be-
cause of this the purchasing price was less than the company’s net assets. The 
acquisition purchase price was EUR 0.5 million and the interviewer also pointed 
that because the value of the target acquisition was very cheap, then it makes 
sense to acquire it fully. Case Study F also expressed that the density acquisition 
(case 20) are usually less than EUR 5million, and they are usually acquired fully. 
The case company also has an acquisition policy of always aiming at 100% equi-
ty. However, there are cases staged acquisition is opted for especially when it 
concerns acquisition involving entries to new markets. Thus, the size of such 
“density acquisitions” also influences their choice of full acquisition. The inter-
viewee in Case Study A also expressed that the South African acquisitions (case 
2) in 2001 was a small acquisition and thus the need to acquire fully. The turnover 
of the acquired business is approximately ZAR 30 million (<2.5M€) and the 
company employs 30 people (Strömberg 2000).  
Target Firm is a Competitor: An emerging theme from the interview data is 
that acquisitions were the target firms are competitors tend to be acquired fully. 
The reason pointed out by the interviewee is competitive uncertainty. Competitive 
uncertainty entails that the parent MNEs is unaware of the strategies, plans, and 
tactical actions of their competitive firms and also do not know how competitors 
may respond to their actions (Alfred 2009). Literature exploring real options 
lenses has posit that competitive uncertainty often argues for acceleration of 
commitment decisions (Smit & Ankum 1993; Alfred 2009) due to competitive 
threat posed by rivals (Sanchez 1993; Alfred 2009). In the presence of competi-
tion, there is a strong incentive to avoid loss of growth options through competitor 
preemption (Kester 1984; Trigeorgis 1993; Trigeorgis & Mason 1987) and thus 
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the need to acquire full equity because competitors are willing to do so if and 
when the companies do not.  
Case Study G expressed that they were afraid that if they don’t acquire the com-
petitor (case 22) that other MNEs  will do so especially competitors from emerg-
ing markets having sufficient cash flows to enter the market and possibly chang-
ing the dynamics of price competition by offering low price to customers. This 
was expressed with the following comments: “There were rumors that some of 
the competitors might be willing to take it over. Especially, some emerging mar-
ket multinationals that were not yet operating in Swedish market. We were a bit 
worried that they might come and change the dynamics of the market. For exam-
ple, we were afraid of big companies from India. You know if you have a massive 
amount of money you can steal the customers with attractive pricing for the time 
being and then start to increase the pricing again once a year and beating the 
competitor.” 
Case Study A acquisition in Germany (case 3) was an acquisition involving a 
large competitor in the magazine papers within the graphic papers business in 
Europe and where the case company was already quite a large market player be-
fore the acquisition. The interviewee did inform that competition can influence 
their acquisition decisions in host country were the competitive players are large 
international players but not specifically the primary reasons for acquiring the 
case acquisition under study.  Case Study B expressed that the target acquisition 
(case 5) has been a serious competitor and for strategic reasons they decided to 
give up that specific business. It can be attributed that competitor’s preemption 
enhanced their decision to acquire it fully. Similarly, all the efficiency-seeking 
acquisition in this section involves targets that were competitors to the acquiring 
firm. However, competitive uncertainty was not cited as a primary reason for their 
choice of full acquisition. Although the degree of competitiveness of the target 
differs, especially when the competition comes from a small local niche player 
compared to when it comes from a similar size international market player. Most 
likely, when the target constitutes a significant threat to the parent MNEs, they 
are less than more likely to acquire partially.  Future studies can study more the 
effect of competitor uncertainty in acquisition strategies. 
Market-Seeking Motives and Host Country Capability: Market-seeking firms 
are firms motivated to enter the foreign marker with the aim of serving the market 
in that country with the sole aim to increase their market size, market growth and 
adapt to local standards and requirements (Dunning 1993). Acquisition aimed at 
market-seeking motives entails that the acquired firm is involved in major value 
chain activities such as procurement, production, marketing, and sales. It was ar-
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gued that because such acquired firms will require local responsiveness by adapt-
ing their goods to the needs and tastes of the local customers (Dunning 1993), the 
acquired firms will need to be strongly embedded in their local environment by 
maintaining stakeholder relationships such as close ties with their customers, par-
ticipate in local networks to obtain local market knowledge and access to distribu-
tion networks (Slangen & Beugelsdijk 2010). As a result, such acquired firms will 
need access to both host country institutions and business networks required for 
firm survival and legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 1977).  Local ownership provides 
the firm with access to complex institutional networks needed for firm survival. 
This is the case for acquisitions in both advanced economies and developing and 
emerging countries. Firms can also leapfrog the need for local ownership through 
the acquisition of host country capability. Host country capabilities are capabili-
ties derived from knowledge MNEs acquire by doing business in a specific coun-
try (host country experience) from the ongoing business operations in that host 
country. 
Case Study B expresses its market-seeking motives (case 5) with the following 
comments: “From the geographical point of view, we were strong in the USA but 
we are weak in Europe. This is also perfect transaction from that point of view 
that we can enter the European market. The acquisition was by far the best way to 
re-enter the European market. The acquisition provides us some critical mass to 
compete with the key competitors as we now able to join efforts in expanding in 
Asian and South American market the both companies has been trying to do.”  
Case Study D expresses its market-seeking motives (case 10) with the following 
comment: Our main driver was our footprint expansion. Morocco is to be used as 
a springboard on sales entries to other territories in Africa. Morocco hub is used 
for penetrating Sub-Saharan region from the North of Africa. 
Case Study E expresses its market-seeking motives (case 14) with the following 
comments: Basically the business of AkzoNobel's global paper chemicals is 
spread quite evenly across Europe and North America and APAC. North America 
and Europe we have already before this acquisition relatively strong market posi-
tion, but in Asia Pacific (APAC) it is a substantial increase in our market shares 
as we have never been there. The acquisition enhances our commitment to the 
industry by extending our geographical presence in EMEA, the Americas and 
especially APAC." This acquisition is a major step in implementing our growth 
strategy, and it significantly enhances our position, especially in the packaging 
and board industry and strengthens our presence in the Asia-Pacific region 
(Rosendal 2014). This also demonstrates our commitment to the industry by di-
versifying our offering to our customers around the world (Rosendal 2014). 
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Case Study F expresses its market-seeking motives (case 18) with the following 
comment: Expansion acquisitions are acquisitions in regions or countries where 
we are not present, i.e. entering new countries. The acquisitions of Marryat & 
Scott (Kenya) Ltd will help KONE expand its presence in the African market and 
improve the availability of KONE's people flow solutions in Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda and Tanzania (Liautaud 2014). 
Case Study G motives in the Swedish market had both market-seeking and strate-
gic asset-seeking motives (case 22). In terms of market-seeking motives, the in-
terviewee informed that the majority of the products were sold in the Swedish 
market and some outputs going to North Europe, Germany, Poland, Baltic coun-
tries and Greece.  In terms of strategic asset-seeking, the case interviewing man-
ager informed they were motivated to acquire a key competence in handmade 
fresh-baked artisan bread and high-quality pastry. Case Study H market-seeking 
motives in the acquisition of Skandinavisk Mat Invest AS (case 26) were aimed at 
making Fazer Food Services one of the leading contract caterers in Norway 
(Vitzthum 2013). 
Seven case acquisitions involving six case studies had market-seeking motives in 
their acquisitions in Sweden (3 cases), Morocco, Netherlands, Kenya, and Israel. 
As predicted from the literature review, the need for local ownership was averted 
because the firm did possess host country capability before embarking on these 
acquisitions. This was the case for case 5, case 14, case 22, case 25 and case 26. 
The firms that did not possess host country capability in market entries into de-
veloping and emerging countries compensated for their deficiency by ensuring the 
retention of key management and key employees to continue to work in the ac-
quired subsidiary. This was in addition to their target-specific experience they’ve 
gained with the targets over several years as distributors of case companies in 
these host countries before the acquisition. This was the case with Case Study F 
acquisition in Kenya (case 18) and Case Study D acquisition in Morocco (case 
10). For Case Study F acquisition in Israel (case 19), they compensated for their 
deficiency of host country capability by granting the subsidiary independence to 
continue to operate under its current name and brand Isralift (Liautaud 2013). The 
interviewee also cited the need to exploit the strong local brand of the target firm 
as a reason for the subsidiary independence. 
Nature of Target Business and Market Structure: An emerging theme from 
the interview data is that the nature of the target business and market structure 
also influences the choice of full acquisition. When target business is immature in 
the sense that it is still developing in terms of business process, financial report-
ing, acquiring firms tend to opt for staged acquisition. However, when the target 
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business is well developed in terms of reporting, business process and financial 
reporting, the acquiring MNEs tend to opt for full acquisition. This is, however, 
possible in the presence of target-specific experience and consolidated host coun-
try market structure. In terms of target-specific experience, for example, inter-
viewing manager of Case Study F said,  
 “We never consider making a partial acquisition in Kenya (case 18) but full ac-
quisition. Even though, it is a new market for us but in that case we acquire the 
distributor that we already know. They know and the former MD agreed to stay 
with us for two years and so is kind of providing consultancy on how the opera-
tion are done, but we never consider partial acquisition.  
By consolidated host country market structure, it means that the market is consol-
idated, i.e. “there are large international players already present in the host 
country market or the large market structure in the host country is not constituted 
by fragmented local players (Interviewee Case Study F & Case Study A)”  
The interviewee for Case Study F expressed that when such firms have good sys-
tems and practices, it is easy to know by facts how much the targets make money 
from service and how much they make from general equipment service. Also, the 
interviewee informed that when the market is mature, then it makes sense to ac-
quire fully. This was the case with their full acquisition in Kenya and Israel (case 
18 and case 19). 
 “Isralift was a big, substantial company, and it was very well established com-
pany, they have good reporting, they have good management processes, they are 
very profitable, they have about 12000 lifting service. Then in that case, it makes 
sense to buy 100% of the company” Similarly, for the Kenya acquisition, the in-
terviewee informed “I think Kenya operations were more developed, and they 
were reaching a point that the distributor structure was actually no more work-
ing. They have very high number of units they sold per year and their Lift in Ser-
vice, Elevator and Maintenance contract was growing and their internal re-
sources were so limited that it would have started to hamper the growth”. 
The interviewee for Case Study B informed that “If the company is mature and if 
the business is mature then in most of them and also the geographic, we are stud-
ying all these. For most of them it makes sense to acquire the full company be-
cause then you can get all the synergies out of the transaction. Assuming that the 
business is similar to what we already have, then you can cut down overheads by 
acquiring all the shares in the company. In most cases, it makes sense.” 
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In summary, the nature of the target firm business and the host country market 
structure influences a firm’s choice for full acquisition. However, attention must 
be paid to the conditions under which this holds. This acquisition involves cases 
where the acquiring MNEs already had an existing business relationship with the 
target firm before the acquisition and also the target business is related to the par-
ent MNEs. This is in line with recent studies that found that the likelihood of par-
tial acquisition over full acquisition becomes lower in acquisitions in related in-
dustries (Contractor et al. 2014).   
Formal Institutional Environment of Host Countries: From the literature re-
view, formal institutions comprises of regulatory institutions, regulatory transpar-
ency and failure in formal institutions. From institutional theory, it was predicted 
that non-restrictive regulatory institutions, transparent regulatory institutions, 
non-failure in formal institutions will lead to a greater propensity for full acquisi-
tion than partial acquisition. From the interview data, firms that made full acquisi-
tion in advanced economies did not mention formal institutional structures as ne-
cessitating their decisions for full acquisition. Primarily, this was because formal 
institutions did not negatively impact their intended strategies. Thus, firms input 
the impact of formal institutions only in market entries where it has an impact on 
their intended strategies. The interviewing managers did not point to any influ-
ence of formal institutions on their decisions for full acquisition in any of the ac-
quisition in advanced economies. They merely mentioned that the only formal 
institutional issue they went through is that the acquisition has to be approved by 
the National competition authority and European competition authority.   
On the contrarily, in developing and emerging economies, there were findings 
related to the impact on institutions on their intended strategies. Those were the 
cases reported in the partial acquisition findings discussed in the previous sec-
tions. In developing and emerging economies, there were also findings related to 
full acquisition in these host countries. This is the case with KONE acquisitions in 
Kenya (case 18), KONECRANEs acquisition in Morocco (case 10) and UPM 
acquisition in South Africa (case 2). In all these acquisitions, though there are 
political risks and transparency issues, the case companies was still able to make 
full acquisition by responding to these institutional constraints by factoring the 
impact of the institutional constraints on the acquisition purchase price. Thus, not 
necessarily host country capability as predicted by this study. However, in addi-
tion to having adequate knowledge of the partner they factored in the impact of 
the host country institutions on their intended strategies. See comments from 
KONE below. 
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INTERVIEWER: Could you just talk about some factors such as institution-
al factors, for example, regulatory factors, corruption and political risk that 
might influence your choice for partial or full acquisition? 
INTERVIEWEE: This type of risks relate to our acquiring or making partial or 
full acquisition. They are very evident in country like Kenya, it is a complete new 
market for us, we need to be extremely conservative in our estimate of how do we 
actually can run business in a country where is clearly, not necessarily political 
risk, but mainly risks related to code of conduct. Because KONE is a kind of listed 
company, we have kind of no tolerance for actions that are not compliant. Espe-
cially in Kenya where bribes and such conduct are like a norm of how things are 
done, we need to estimate in our evaluation of the target that when we stop these 
activities how would it affect the business? With this estimation, we build our 
evaluation based on the anticipated volumes under the KONE operating stand-
ards.  
A similar comment was made by the interviewee for Case Study A when asked 
about the impact of regulatory institutions. “If we understand the impact of regu-
lation on the business we are acquiring. We factor in the impact of the regulation 
on the acquisition price. For example if regulations have an impact on lowering 
the level of the profitability of the acquisitions, we factor the impact of this regu-
lations into the acquisition purchase price.” 
When I consider the motives of the acquisition, the strategies of keeping previous 
management team played across Advanced and Emerging and Developing Econ-
omies suggesting that keeping previous management is more related to gaining 
more knowledge of the business and market rather than knowledge of dealing 
with regulatory and formal institutional failures. This is because when MNEs ac-
quire such firms in developing economies they want to implement their code of 
conduct and truly ensure that the code of conduct is applied.  They abolish other 
ways of doing business not in conformity to the company code of conduct. As a 
result, knowledge sort by retention of key managers has to do with gaining 
knowledge about the business, customers and market structure and networks ra-
ther than knowledge on how to deal with regulatory frameworks in ways not in 
accordance with the MNEs code of conduct practices.  
From the interview data, eight cases were made in developed economies but no 
mention of formal institutional environment that influenced their intended strate-
gies. However, for those that ventured in emerging and developing economies of 
Kenya, Morocco, and South Africa they mentioned the impact of formal institu-
tions. For Kenya (case 18), the impact was factored into the acquisition purchase 
price.  
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Though Morocco has political risks, but they do not have transparency issues 
because transparency issues deter us from market entry (Case study D).  
The CPI index for Morocco was (3.5/10) at the year Case Study D market entry 
into Morocco. Morocco ranked 72 out of 179 far beyond South Africa that ranked 
43rd (5.1/10). The interviewee further informed that Morocco, on the other hand, 
has been an open country that is why it was very easy to operate in the country 
and because they had a kind of French business culture. “They are close to Spain 
and have French culture. We are quite very much familiar with French culture. 
That was a kind, easy issue to acquire fully”. It should be noted that Case Study 
D already had target-specific knowledge before the case acquisition, thus the 
proclamation of having knowledge about the Moroccan culture might have been 
made possible after several years of the distributorship relationships with the ac-
quired target.  
Emphatically other case companies also stressed cultural issues as to having 
knowledge of the culture when they either have target-specific experience or host 
country capability and stressed deficiency of cultural knowledge when they have 
not been present in the host country prior to the acquisition or do not have target-
specific experience. Also, Case Study D ensured the retention of personnel’s and 
top management to continue to work for the acquired subsidiary. For South Afri-
can acquisition (case 2), Case Study A already had a market presence before the 
acquisition.   
For Case Study H acquisition in Norway (case 26), they also had a market pres-
ence in Norway before this acquisition. Thus, they had host country capability 
before this case acquisition. 
On one hand, formal institutions did not directly influence the choice of full ac-
quisition in advanced economies. On the other hand, in emerging and developing 
economies it did influence the acquisition strategies. However, firms responded to 
these institutions through host country capability, target-specific experience, fac-
toring the impact of formal institutions into the acquisition purchase price and 
retention of top management personnel. While several studies exploring institu-
tional theory tend to find support for the influence of low formal institutions on 
full acquisition in advanced economies (Arslan & Larimo 2011; Brouthers 2013). 
In contrast, the finding of this study shows that low formal institutions do not 
have any significant impact on the MNEs decisions for full acquisition in ad-
vanced economies. This finding is in line with Contractor et al. (2014) who found 
no significant relationship between low formal institutional distance and MNEs 
preference for full acquisition.  
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Furthermore, the finding of this study also suggests that institutions significantly 
influence acquisition strategies in high formal institutional distance countries such 
as emerging and developing countries. This is in line with Contractor et al. 
(2014). However, MNEs can respond to the high formal institutional distance 
constraints and acquire fully when they possess host country capability, target-
specific experience and ensure the retention of top management personnel of the 
acquired target. This explains why Contractor et al. (2014) found a positive rela-
tionship between MNEs from advanced economy entering institutional distance 
countries and their choice of full acquisition. Although they argued that the 
choice of full acquisition was because high institutional distance raises apprehen-
sions regarding transferability of management practices, procedures, techniques, 
and routines from the home economies to the host economies owing to different 
rules and laws characterizing the latter. As a result, MNEs from institutionally 
distant home countries, facing unfamiliar emerging market contexts, may not 
wish to share control and prefer to resort to full acquisition (ibid). In this study, 
the choice of full acquisition is because the MNEs have acquired capabilities on 
how to deal with institutionally distance home countries. 
6.4 Acquisition Entry Strategies: The Role of Motives 
of Market Entry. 
This section discusses the role of entry motives on the choice of partial, staged 
and full acquisition at the time of entry thus provides answers to research question 
2.  
From the literature review, it was expected that the motives of market entry will 
have an influence on the acquisition strategies utilized by multinationals when 
entering foreign countries. This was explored by the integration of institutional 
theory and literature on foreign entry motives (Dunning 1988; 1993) and host 
country capability. 
Four summaries were drawn from the literature review concerning the impact of 
motives on acquisition strategies. The first summary from the literature is that 
MNEs from developed economies entering host countries characterize by non-
transparent regulatory institutions, regulatory restrictions, high political risks, and 
corruption will prefer partial and staged acquisition rather than full acquisition for 
market-seeking and resource-seeking motives. Table 24 shows all the market-
seeking and resource-seeking acquisitions in emerging and developing econo-
mies. 
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Table 24. Market and Resource-Seeking Motives (EMDC) 
Ca
se
s 
Co
m
pa
ny
 
Host 
Country Equity Stake 
Year of 
Entry M
ot
iv
es
  
Major Findings 
1 A Russia  60% 1988 MS • Deficiency of target-specific 
experience 
• Deficiency of host country capa-
bility 
6 C Russia 49,5% 2010 RS • Import restrictions 
• Political risks avoidance  
• Secure sources of raw material 
9 D South Africa 19%-100% 2007 MS  • Target-specific experience 
• Deficiency of host country expe-
rience 
• Mild regulatory framework 
10 D Morocco 100% 2007 MS  • Target-specific experience 
• Cultural knowledge 
• Retention of key management 
11 E Russia 70%-100% 2006 MS  • Deficiency of target-specific 
experience 
• Host country capability 
15 F Egypt 49,5% 2011 MS • Negotiation complexities 
• Year of acquisition 
16 F Saudi Arabia 40% 2007 MS • Regulatory restrictions 
18 F Kenya 100% 2013 MS • Nature of target business  
• Market structure 
• Target-specific experience 
• Retention of key management 
21 G Turkey 55%-93,6% 2006 MS • Deficiency of host country expe-
rience 
• Deficiency of target-specific 
experience 
• Market power consolidation 
There were eight market-seeking acquisitions and one resource-seeking acquisi-
tion made in emerging and developing countries. Out of these eight acquisitions 
three was acquired partially, three was acquired in staged and two was acquired 
fully. The interaction of market-seeking motives with host country institutional 
environment resulted in partial acquisition in cases of negotiation complexities 
(case 15), regulatory restrictions (case 16), and deficiency of both target-specific 
experience and host country capability (case 1). The staged acquisition (9, 11) 
was deficient in either one of target-specific experience and host country capabil-
ity.  On the contrarily, the two cases involving full acquisition (case 10 and 18) 
were made possible because of the presence of target-specific experience and re-
tention of key management of the acquired firm. The only case of resource-
seeking acquisitions (case 6) was acquired partially to secure sources of raw ma-
terials for the case company as a strategy of political risks avoidance(sort of non-
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transparency regulatory issues) which came to limelight as a result of the import 
restrictions placed by the host country government on meat importation into Rus-
sian Federation. 
Based on the foregoing, it can be argued that the prediction from the literature 
review holds in the context that case firms are deficient in target-specific experi-
ence, host country capability and did not ensure retention of key management 
personnel of the target firm. That is, MNEs from developed economies entering 
host countries characterize by non-transparent regulatory institutions, regulatory 
restriction and high political risks and corruption will prefer partial and staged 
acquisition rather than full acquisition for market-seeking and resource-seeking 
motives if at the time of their market entry they are unable to achieve the reten-
tion of key management or owners of the firm, and are deficient in either target-
specific experience or host country capability. The reason for partial and staged 
acquisition is one hand, the only option available for the parent MNEs to enter the 
market in the case of regulatory restrictions or acquisitions involving a stock 
trade. One the other hand, it is a risk sharing objective in unknown markets as a 
strategy to gain more knowledge of the market and the partner. As a result, they 
structure the acquisition contract using earnout arrangements (Weber 2010; Han-
dler & Hirsch 2014); such that if the underlying asset or market is a lemon, it will 
reflect the final purchase price and the seller would not avoid it if the underlying 
assets of the firm are a “lemon” (Chen & Hennart 2004). 
The second summary from the literature review is that MNEs from developed 
economies entering host countries characterize by transparent regulatory institu-
tions, stable political environment, and less corruption will have preference for 
full acquisition than partial and staged acquisition for Strategic asset-seeking and 
Efficiency-seeking motives. Table 25 shows all efficiency and strategic asset-
seeking investments made in advanced economies. 
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Table 25. Strategic Asset and Efficiency-Seeking Motives in Advanced 
Economies 
Ca
se
s 
Ca
se
 C
om
pa
ny
 
Target Host 
Country 
Equity 
Stake 
Year 
of 
Entry M
ot
iv
es
 
Major Findings 
3 A Germany 100% 2011 ES • Efficiency motives 
• Host Country Capability 
• Target is a competitor 
 
4 B USA 45% 2011 SA • Motives & incentive alignment 
5 B  Sweden 100% 2012 ME+
ES+ 
SA 
• Nature of the target  
• Host Country Capability 
• Megatrends & life science and laboratory 
as growth options 
12 E Italy 100% 2013 SA • Exploitative strategic asset-seeking 
20 F EU & US 100% Cont. ES • Size of the Target (<5M€) 
• Efficiency motives 
22 G Sweden 100% 2012 MS+
ES 
• Target is a competitor 
• Efficiency motives 
• Size of the target (0,5M€) 
• Host Country Capability 
25 H Sweden 100% 2011 ME+
SA 
• Host Country Capability 
• Exploitative Strategic asset-seeking 
26 H Norway 100% 2013 ME 
+ ES 
• Host Country Capability 
• Related Business 
From the table, there are eight cases of acquisitions made in advanced and devel-
oped economies. These acquisitions were motivated by strategic asset-seeking 
and efficiency-seeking motives. Although some were motivated by more than one 
entry motive, the presence of these motives in the scope of acquisition transaction 
makes it significant to analyze them in one and every motives they fall into ac-
cording to the prediction of the literature review. 
Out of seven acquisitions, six were acquired fully. Only one was acquired partial-
ly. However, an emerging theme of this dissertation is that there are two types of 
strategic asset-seeking motives, one in which the technology/strategic asset is 
already proven in the market (e.g., brands, product & process technology, key 
technological innovative competences etc.) referred to as exploitative-strategic 
asset-seeking motives and one that the strategic seeking-asset is still under devel-
opment referred to as “explorative strategic asset-seeking”. The partial equity was 
made in explorative strategic asset-seeking motives and the reasons for partial 
equity were to align the interest of the owners and to retain the key personnel. 
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This is because in such acquisition, without the retention of these key personnel’s 
and incentives to keep them motivated, the realization and the development of the 
strategic seeking-asset will be utmost impossible.  In the context of exploitative 
strategic-asset-seeking investments, the prediction of the literature review holds. 
That is, multinationals from developed economies entering host countries charac-
terize by transparent regulatory institutions, stable political environment, and less 
corruption will have preference for full acquisition than partial and staged acqui-
sition for Strategic asset-seeking and Efficiency-seeking motives.  
The third summary from the literature is that MNEs from developed economies 
entering informal institutional distant countries would prefer full acquisition over 
partial and staged acquisition for Strategic asset-seeking and Efficiency-seeking 
acquisitions. The measure of informal institutional environment discussed in this 
study is specifically focused on contractual complexities. The assumption is that 
contractual complexities will rise disproportionately in culturally distance coun-
tries (Ionascu et al. 2004). Contractual complexities are expected to rise when a 
parent firm from an individualistic culture acquires a target in from a collectivist 
culture (McDevitt 2006). The argument from the literature cannot be validated 
because the case acquisitions did not consist of strategic asset-seeking and effi-
ciency-seeking acquisitions made in informal institutional distance hence the host 
countries were all from individualistic cultures similar to Finland.   
Also, the case firms did not inform any issues with regards to culture. For exam-
ple, with regards to Case Study B acquisition in Sweden (case 5), the interview 
stressed that Sweden is cultural close to Finland and thus culture was not an issue. 
With regards to the Case Study B acquisition in the United States (case 4), the 
interviewee response was thus: 
 “We are strong in the USA market and we nominated three members. One of 
them is American, one of them is Finnish, but he has lived in the USA and still 
lived in the USA for a long time and he knows the USA culture and we have one 
free person who has also worked in America for 40 years also. So, the cultural 
difference was not an issue.”   
Based on the above discussion, no inference can be drawn with regards to the 
prediction that MNEs from developed economies entering informal institutional 
distant countries would prefer full acquisition over partial and staged acquisition 
for Strategic asset-seeking and Efficiency-seeking acquisitions. This is because of 
the non-availability of efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking investments 
in informal institutional distance countries within the cases selected for this study. 
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Table 26 shows the market-seeking and resource-seeking motives and their re-
spective informal institutional dimensions. It was summarized from the literature 
that multinationals from developed economies entering informal institutional dis-
tant countries would prefer partial and staged acquisition over full acquisition for 
resource-seeking and market-seeking FDIs. 
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Table 26. Market-Seeking and Resource-Seeking Motives in Informal Insti-
tutions 
Ca
se
s 
Co
m
pa
ny
 
Host 
Country 
Informal 
Institu-
tions 
Equi-
ty 
Stake 
Year 
of 
En-
try M
ot
iv
es
  
Major Findings 
1 A Russia  collectivist  60% 1988 MS • Deficiency of target-specific Experi-
ence 
6 C Russia Collectivist 49,5% 2010 RS • Import Restrictions 
• Political risks avoidance  
• Secure sources of raw material 
9 D South 
Africa 
individualis-
tic 
19%-
100% 
2007 MS  • Target-specific experience 
• Deficiency of host country experience 
• Mild regulatory framework 
10 D Morocco Collectivist 100% 2007 MS  • Target-specific experience 
• Cultural Proximity 
• Retention of key management 
11 E Russia Collectivist 70%-
100% 
2006 MS  • Deficiency of target-specific experi-
ence 
15 F Egypt collectivist  49,5% 2011 MS • Negotiation complexities 
16 F Saudi 
Arabia 
Collectivist 40% 2007 MS • Regulatory Restrictions 
17 F Bulgaria Collectivist 
 
60%-
100% 
2011 MS • Deficiency of host country experience 
• Target-specific experience 
• Nature of  target business 
18 F Kenya collectivist  100% 2013 MS • Nature of target business  
• Market structure 
• Target-specific experience 
• Retention of key management 
19 F Israel individualis-
tic + collec-
tivist 
100% 2013 MS • Target-specific experience 
• Nature of target business 
• Strong Local Brand & Subsidiary 
Independence 
21 G Turkey Collectivist 55%-
93,6% 
2006 MS • Deficiency of host country experience 
• Deficiency of target-specific experi-
ence 
• Market power consolidation 
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Although all the market-seeking and resource-seeking investments were made in 
collective cultures (Israel is both collective and individualistic culture) their ac-
quisition strategies reflected both partial and staged acquisition for eight case ac-
quisition and three cases of full acquisition.  It was argued that hence Finland is 
an individualistic culture it will sort for integrative or win-win negotiations while 
other collectivistic countries of Russia, Morocco, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Saudi Arabia and Kenya will sort for win-lose negotiations giving rise 
to negotiation failures (McDevitt 2006).  
From the interview data, only case 15 in Egypt experienced contractual failures. 
In Turkey (case 21), the call options procedure to squeeze out the remaining 
shareholders is still undergoing but has so far been challenging. In Saudi Arabia 
(case 16), it was more of regulatory restrictions. Cultural issues were not men-
tioned in three partial and staged acquisitions in the informal institutional envi-
ronments of Bulgaria (case 17), South Africa (case 9) and Russia (case 6). In 
these cases, the acquiring firm had target-specific experience (case 17 and 9); as a 
result it was easier for the acquiring firm to structure the acquisition using earnout 
arrangements for the case of Bulgaria (case 17). The Atria acquisition in Russia 
(case 6), the case company already had host country capability but decided to opt 
for partial acquisition to secure sources of raw material to avoid political risks. 
Case Study D used staged acquisition in South African (case 9) due to the mild 
black empowerment regulations from the host country government. Deficiency of 
target-specific experience and knowledge of working in the Russian environment 
was the reason for the partial and staged acquisition of Case Study A and Case 
Study E acquisitions in Russia (case 1 and 11). This deficiency could be attributed 
to cultural issues as well. Three cases of full acquisition in Kenya (case 18), Mo-
rocco (case 10) and Israel (case 19) involved cases where the case firms already 
had target-specific experience before the acquisition. 
All things been equal, if the effects of target-specific experience, host country 
capability, regulatory restrictions are excluded, it is possible to infer that informal 
institutional environment i.e. there is a likelihood of contractual failure leading to 
MNEs decision for partial and staged acquisition in acquisitions motivated by 
market-seeking and resource-seeking motives. Though there is a more support if 
the measures are based mainly on secondary data sources based on Hofstede di-
mensions (individualistic vs. collectivist cultural dimensions). The interview data 
only points to a mild support and in the context of all other factors (e.g. target-
specific experience, host country capability, regulatory restrictions) been negligi-
ble. 
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6.5 Determinants of Equity Changes in Acquired 
Foreign Subsidiaries 
This section discusses the determinants of equity changes in acquired foreign sub-
sidiary and provides answers to research questions 3.  
By integrating institutional theory and internationalization process theory, four 
summaries were drawn with regards to the determinants of equity changes in for-
eign markets. First, it was argued that host country capability increases the firms’ 
propensity to increase equity commitment in acquired foreign subsidiaries be-
cause they have acquired both the market knowledge and knowledge about their 
partner business, network value, and institutional knowledge needed to operate, 
respond to institutions and gain legitimacy in the host country. Second, it was 
summarized that through this ongoing business relationship, trust building will 
increase MNEs propensity to increase their equity commitments in acquired sub-
sidiary. Third, it was argued that the attractiveness of the market is needed in ad-
dition to partner specific knowledge to enhance MNEs propensity to increase 
their equity stake in acquired foreign subsidiary. It was further argued that host 
country institutions do not remain static. Consequently, changes in host country 
institutions in the form of relieving foreign ownership restrictions, the establish-
ment of transparent regulatory institutions and non-failure in formal institutions 
will likely enhance MNEs decisions to increase their equity stake in acquired for-
eign subsidiaries. Finally, it was argued that increasing foreign ownership re-
strictions, the unattractiveness of the market would increase the likelihood that 
parent MNEs will decrease their equity stake in acquired subsidiaries.Table 27 
shows the equity changes from the case acquisitions and the findings related to 
the changes in equity. 
Table 27. Determinants of Equity Changes from Case Acquisitions 
Ca
se
s 
Co
m
pa
ny
 
Host 
Country 
Formal 
Institutions 
Equity 
Stake 
Year Entry-
Changes M
ot
iv
es
  
Major Findings 
1 A Russia  EMDC 60%-100% 1988-2004 MS • Host Country Capability 
• Trust Building 
6 C Russia EMDC 49.5%-0% 2010-2013 RS • Market Unattractive-
ness 
16 F Saudi 
Arabia 
EMDC 40-50% 2007-2014 MS • Relieving Ownership 
Restriction 
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Relieving Ownership Restriction: As predicted from the literature review, re-
lieving foreign ownership restrictions will likely enhance MNEs decisions to in-
crease their equity stake in acquired foreign subsidiaries. There was clearly one 
case of relieving ownership restriction and the choice for increasing equity stake 
in the acquisition. Case Study F acquired 40% equity in the Saudi Arabian subsid-
iary (case 16) due to foreign ownership restrictions. The Saudi Arabian Govern-
ment announced in 2013 that it was relieving its foreign ownership restriction for 
foreign parents by 10%. Consequently, Case Study F increased its ownership of 
the subsidiary by 10% and also arranged to gain formal control at the beginning 
of December 2013 (KONE press release 2014). Case Study F has an acquisition 
policy aiming for full ownership and control, yet the restrictive ownership laws in 
the host country gave them no other alternative than to opt for partial acquisition 
and increase their equity when ownership restrictions are relieved. 
Host Country Capability: Host country capability is the capability derived from 
knowledge MNEs acquire by doing business in a specific country. It was predict-
ed from the literature that on one hand the deficiency of host country capability 
led firms to opt for partial and staged acquisition at the time of market entry. On 
the other hand, staged acquisition could also serve as sort of “time issue” to gain 
the needed host country capability needed to operate effectively in the host mar-
ket. Consequently, as firms acquire the needed host country capability, they will 
most likely increase their equity stake to full acquisition to enable the parent 
MNE gain control needed to ensure acquisition integration and ease of decision 
making in managing the local subsidiaries.  
All the staged acquisition cases (Except case 21 with small minority owners) are 
today fully owned subsidiaries of the parent MNE entailing that the sole aim of 
using earnout arrangement was achieved. Also, Case Study A implied that the 
acquisition of host country capability made the need to have a local partner to 
outlive its purpose. “We have established a way of operating locally in that envi-
ronment with other stakeholders around the business. In this case, the purpose of 
having the local partner has outlived its purpose. Also the minority owners or 
partners also did not see it as important to retain the minority ownership of a 
manufacturing facility within a larger business in Case Study A: Thus, the bene-
fits from both partners and sides of having the partnership in place had outlived 
the original motives. Thus it became easy to decide for both parties to dissolve 
and fully acquire the business for Case Study A” Thus, the acquisition of host 
country capability is more likely to increase MNEs choice to increase their equity 
commitment to that of full acquisition. 
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Market Attractiveness: The literature proposes that increase in equity commit-
ment will most likely result in the presence of market attractiveness. While Case 
Study A decided to increase their equity because they have established a way of 
working in the local environment. The case company would have not opted to 
increase their equity stake to 100% if the markets were unattractive. In contrarily, 
the unattractiveness of the market will also result in decreasing equity stake. This 
was the case with Case Study C acquisition in Russia (case 6).  
 “Well actually, first of all, we made some changes in our industrial structure and 
then we pulled out from one part of the business which was not profitable, that is 
the consumer packed meat. As a result, we did not need much meat. Moreover, 
then there was and still is swine flu disease in the location of the meat farm. It 
was such that we actually couldn’t utilize anymore at all the materials from these 
farms. So, it did not make any sense for us to be involved anymore, and it is still 
the situation that these regions are blocked from other regions that they cannot 
transfer any meat between the regions. It becomes a big limitation. Though Atria 
had host country capability before this acquisition, the market unattractiveness 
was as a resulted of the unforeseen circumstances as was initially thought at the 
time of market entry. Also, there was also the issue of the unprofitability of the 
consumer packed meat business portfolio that enhanced their decisions to divest 
the business. This finding is consistent with the literature, i.e. MNEs will increase 
their equity stake when the market is attractive (Magnusson 2007) and will also 
decrease their equity stake or exit the market when the market is unattractive 
(Magnusson 2007; Song 2014) 
6.6 Performance of Partial, Staged, and Full 
Acquisition 
This section discusses differential performance returns to partial and full acquisi-
tion and thus provides answers to research questions 4.  
One of the central arguments of this dissertation is that partial, staged, and full 
acquisition are unique acquisition entry strategies firms should utilized when en-
tering foreign markets. The findings so far shows that partial acquisition are 
unique strategies utilized as a result of firms deficiency in target-specific experi-
ence, regulatory restrictions, informal institution (negotiation complexities), re-
source-seeking motives in non-transparent regulatory institutions and the need to 
align interest in explorative strategic asset-seeking acquisitions.  
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Staged acquisition is utilized as a result of acquisitions involving stock trade, de-
ficiency of host country capability in market-seeking acquisitions and the need to 
align incentive in fragmented host country market structure and in acquiring tar-
gets with under-developed business. Finally, full acquisition is utilized as a result 
of acquisition of host country capability, efficiency-seeking motives, relative size 
of the acquired target compared to the acquiring parent, Target is a competitor, 
acquisitions in advanced host country institutions, developed business and host 
country market structure. While the reasons for these strategies have been estab-
lished, the literature review shows that the returns to partial acquirer’s remain 
unclear as well as the institutional context were partial acquisition performs better 
or is the optimal strategy than full acquisition. As a result, it is necessary to inves-
tigate if these strategies do confer different performance returns on the acquiring 
parents or does the institutional context that depicts these choices at entry confer 
different performance returns on these strategies?  
To explore this question, I started by asking the managers if they understood why 
and if they evaluate why it is right to make the right acquisition entry strategies at 
the time of market entry with the questions below. The next section discusses the 
findings from the interview data. 
6.6.1 Performance Differentials between Returns to Partial and Full 
Acquisition 
QUESTION: Have you had a case where you had made full acquisition and 
when you made assessment, then you came to think, if you had known from begin-
ning we would have done partial acquisition or conversely have you had a situa-
tion where you have started with partial stake, and when you made the final as-
sessment you said if we had known we should have made full acquisition? 
Paying a Premium on Acquisition Purchase Price and Loss of Management 
Resources: The interview data show that different acquisition strategies have an 
impact on the performance returns of the parent firms at the time of entry. This is 
because a mismatch of the strategy could lead to paying more cash at a later time. 
This would be the case if the parent firm opted for a partial acquisition rather than 
full acquisition at the time of market entry. For example, staged acquisition usual-
ly comes with earnout arrangements were the final cash payment is fixed based 
on the performance of the target firm after a period of years.  During integration, 
some managers expressed that when they noticed the amount of synergies created 
at the initial integration, it makes them regret their initial strategy of taking a par-
tial stake at the time of market entry which will make them pay more money at a 
later time. Case Study G had the following response. 
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“Yes, of course, it is always a bit tricky. At the beginning of integration imple-
mentation in cases where we started with partial acquisition and we had success 
already in the beginning, we always blame ourselves. Why we didn’t take it over 
100% on the first call because typically we could have probably paid less rather 
than making fantastic result first 3 years and then the price for the remaining part 
would be higher. Moreover, the same goes the other way around if we make full 
acquisition immediately, and for some reason integration goes wrong. We blame 
ourself that why in heaven sake we did it this way. However, decisions are made 
based on the best possible information  available at that time.  Also, very often it 
depend on the management resources available in the  company. If there are 
more talented management, a prudent manager can be send to pick two to three 
years to ensure that integration goes well.  Not all company has this type of luxu-
ry. This might also be one of the reasons we sometimes have  to consider whether 
it could be best to do it in a staged way or full acquisition. 
It is always important for firms to utilize the right acquisition strategy at the time 
of market entry to avoid paying extra premium on the acquisition purchase price. 
Also, there were cases where partial acquisition or staged approach would have 
been the optimal strategy for the case company but the use of full acquisition re-
sulted in paying huge premiums and the loss of previous management staffs as 
they were not motivated to work for the company anymore.  
 “There have been cases where we have made full acquisition and lost the earlier 
management. There have also been cases where it would have been better to have 
a smooth transition period instead of full acquisition in those cases where we 
have been substantive carrots for the earlier owners.  In most of the cases, it has 
had a huge impact (Case Study H)” 
In summary, not opting for the right strategy could incur a substantial loss of syn-
ergies and paying an additional premium for the purchase price. 
Loss of Integration Synergies in Partially Acquired Subsidiaries: Integrating 
partial acquired subsidiaries is very challenging and almost impossible because of 
the existence of the previous owners. If the previous managers/owners have ma-
jority ownership stake, they control the decision-making. As a result, they will 
hinder the full integration plans of the acquiring firm. In cases where they are 
minorities, they could object and make it difficult for the implementation of the 
integration plans of the acquiring MNE. The case firms informed the challenges 
with regards to integrating partially acquired subsidiaries. The challenges men-
tioned include the presence of previous owners working against or delaying the 
pace of the integration plan. For example, most MNEs in the case studies often 
have integration strategies that aim at reaping the synergies of their acquired sub-
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sidiaries within the first 100 to 180 days. Consequently, having previous owners 
as minorities in some cases hinders the achievement of the integration plan. 
“There have been cases where for example we did not realize during the acquisi-
tion process how big the synergies would be, or we did not realize the actions 
needed for raising the synergies. We had a partially acquired subsidiary and the 
sellers are still alone with their stake. Raising the strategic goals of the subsidiary 
would require combine production. However, it is often too difficult to actualize 
because the old owners have been there actively working against full integration. 
In such cases, we usually have had a second thought of what we could have done 
initially (Case Study H)” 
The interview data also shows that some firms are looking beyond the perfor-
mance differentials of returns to partial and full acquisition. Thus, rather than ex-
ploring how these strategies have failed, they are looking at how best to manage 
the acquisition strategies in the event of performance failures. 
“Difficult to say, I said there need to be strong reasons why we have chosen 
staged acquisition. When we acquire in staged, we take some 3 to 5 years before 
acquiring fully. However, to compare the structural approach it is difficult to say. 
Of course, it might reveal that the target firm that we have selected ultimately was 
not the correct on (Case Study E)”  
 “When you face a case that wasn’t that successful, then you always ask what you 
could have done differently. However, I would not say that. We often look forward 
and how we could then manage the situation. The decision had been made at that 
time based on the best knowledge, studies and considerations. Learning now and 
going back to think that different approach would have made it more successful, I 
do not think so. I cannot now recall a case I would say that gosh we should have 
done it as partial instead of full because it is now a history” (Case Study D).  
These responses shows that the different acquisition strategies confers different 
performance outcomes because a mismatch of the strategy could lead to paying 
more cash at a later time and facing integration setbacks from previous manage-
ment if the parent firm had opted for a partial acquisition rather than full acquisi-
tion. Similarly, opting for full acquisition instead of a partial acquisition could 
entail the loss of parent firm resources in terms of money and time. Although 
some firms are looking beyond the performance differentials of returns to partial 
and full acquisition, it is, however, important to weigh the opportunity cost of 
each strategy at the time of market entry. 
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6.6.2 Differences in Institutions and Performance of Acquisition Strategies 
From the literature, it was argued that formal institutions of host countries influ-
ence firm’s performance. This is because MNEs whose home country regulatory 
institutions are very similar to that of the host country targets will incur less cost 
due to the possibility to export home country knowledge about policy and regula-
tory institutions (McGahan & Victer 2010). In contrarily, MNEs entering dissimi-
lar regulatory institutions will incur additional cost of doing business in the host 
country due to their liability of foreignness (Eden & Miller 2004) and liability of 
home (Steven & Shenkar 2012) which increases the cost of adaptation of business 
practices. Similarly, it was argued that transparency influences firm performance 
due to the ineptitude of regulatory agencies in enforcing legislation in punishing 
offenders and protecting minority shareholders in non-transparent host countries 
(Mohamad 2002). Finally, political risks and corruption evident in institutional 
different host country influences firm performance. This is because, on one hand, 
they incur additional cost for doing business in a foreign country (Eden & Miller 
2004). On the other hand, failure to comply with corrupt ways of doing business 
creates a loss of competitive advantage in the institutional distant host country 
(Mobarak & Purbasari 2006; Steven & Shenkar 2012). Complying with corrupt 
ways of doing business in such host country can incur reputation and brand dam-
age for the parent MNE (Fan 2007). The findings from the interview data are dis-
cussed below. 
Acquisition Failure and Additional Cost in Institutional Distance Host Coun-
tries:  The data reveals an important finding with regards to the impact of institu-
tional differences on acquisition performance. The case firms did state that insti-
tutional differences have an impact on their acquisition performance supporting 
the assumption of institutional theory. However, because of the industry they are 
operating, the impact as predicted by institutional theory was not always the case. 
Case Study C informed that while there are no institutional differences in the EU, 
there are differences in developing and emerging markets of Russia. However, 
because they are operating in Russia as a Russian firm, the impact of host country 
institution is not felt.  
 “Within the EU where we are operating, there are no institutional difference and 
no impact. They are treating us as any other company in that host country. We do 
not have any regulations as anybody else. We are pretty much on the same lin. 
Russia is, of course, another case because there you are excluded from one part 
of the market. You are allowed to make tenders, but you never can win it. This is 
peculiar in the public sector market, but that is not actually why we went into the 
Russian market. So in that respect we do not have any restriction because we are 
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operating there as a Russian company in Russia, and we are not facing any other 
kind of restrictions than anybody else in the market.” 
Institutional differences incurs additional cost for management as predicted by the 
literature review because management will have to make additional payments 
which is the cost of adaptation of their business practices in institutionally dis-
tance countries to due to their liabilities of home (Steven & Shenkar 2012) and 
liabilities of foreignness (Eden & Miller 2004). Case Study G points to this fact. 
“Of course, I am not going to name any country but there are countries that re-
stricts dividend payment and restricting management fees, charging any type of 
brand or trademark license fees or  royalty and so on. This type of regulations  
can be very difficult in these countries. However, if you have done your home-
work very well before entering into such a transaction, you should know what 
exactly you are doing and what sort of risk you are taking. For me at least it is 
very clear that if there are such a big risk that it might be a complete failure and I 
might be in a position to be forced to divest such an acquisition in couple of 
years’ time, it would be better not to enter such countries because it is a massive 
amount of management work and time that is needed.” 
Case Study H discusses how differences in institutions impact their decisions to 
divest their investment in Russia due their loss of competitiveness. “There are 
different kinds of law we are obeying, for example if we have policy that we play 
according to the rules, and we realize that most of the players are not playing 
according to the rules, we have no other option than to leave the market. For ex-
ample, we enter contract catering business in Saint Petersburg in 2005 but we 
exist from there in 2011 due to the fact we realized that the other players were not 
playing according to the rules. We are not competitive, we were obeying taxes 
like we should, we were obeying social security payment like we should; well we 
notice that our competitors are not. The market price level was set by the compet-
itors whose cost track was wider than ours. 
Responses to the Impact of Formal Institutional Distance on Acquisition Per-
formance: The interview data also points to both pre and post-acquisition man-
agement strategy in operating in institutional different host countries. Firms that 
initially understand the impact of institutional differences stated that they can fac-
tor in the impact of the institutional difference on the acquisition purchase price. 
For example, the market value of the acquired firm is calculated under normal and 
legal operating standards. 
 “If we understand the impact of regulation on the business we are acquiring. We 
factor in the impact of the regulation on the acquisition price. For example if 
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regulations have an impact on lowering the level of the profitability of the acqui-
sitions, we factor the impact of this regulations into the acquisition purchase 
price. We keep to our standards globally. It may have an impact on our acquisi-
tion performance. We keep our standard. However, history has it that if you do 
not follow transparency or standards like ethical things, lack of performance that 
benefits you ends up hurting you” (Case Study A). 
To accomplish the above, extensive market research is required for which having 
an existing business relationship with the firm before the acquisition would make 
it easier. Most of the negative impact of institutions was only mentioned with 
regards to acquisitions in developing countries. However, the data shows that 
though institutional differences influence the performance of acquisitions, the 
impact of these institutions is context-specific depending on the motives, the in-
dustry, and the strategic response.  
Acquisitions in Institutional distant countries can lead to loss of competitiveness 
and divestment of the acquired subsidiary. Acquisition in Institutional distance 
country may also not be as predicted by institutional theory because it could be 
motive specific or industry specific. For example, Case Study C acquired a Rus-
sian target partially (case 6) as a result of import restrictions on meat. The motive 
of this case acquisition was resource-seeking which, without this acquisition, se-
curing import license from the Russian Federation would have been challenging. 
In another case involving same company in Russia, not one of the case acquisi-
tions chosen for this study, the manager informed that institutions did not have an 
impact on their business because they are not operating in the public sector mar-
ket. Firms are, rather than not making market entries into such institutions, are 
looking at ways of managing the impact of such institutions on their performance. 
They do this by calculating the impact of institutions on their business and factor-
ing in the impact on the acquisition purchase price.  
The finding of this study is also self-evident that firms are moving into emerging 
markets with full acquisition as against the prediction of institutional theory. Fig-
ure 16 shows the twenty-six acquisition entries made by Finnish Parents into for-
eign markets. In Figure 16a, all staged acquisition are classified as full acquisition 
while in Figure 16b all staged acquisition are classified as partial acquisition. The 
reason for this classification is to view the implication of this classification from 
different lenses as staged acquisition can behave like partial acquisition at the 
time of market entry and also behave as full acquisition in later years. 
Figure 16a shows when staged acquisition is classified as full acquisition. Out of 
Sixteen acquisitions made by Finnish firms in advanced economies, fifteen were 
made by full acquisition while only one was made via partial acquisition. In 
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emerging and developing countries, there were five partial and full acquisitions 
respectively. Figure 16b shows when staged acquisition is classified as partial 
acquisition. In advanced economies, the number of full and partial acquisition 
becomes nine and seven respectively while in emerging and developing countries 
the numbers are three and seven respectively.   
 
Figure 16. Finnish Firms Acquisition Strategies Advanced and Emerging Econ-
omies 
Irrespective of how the classification is done, the figure shows that Finnish multi-
nationals utilize more of partial acquisition in emerging and developing countries 
than advanced economies. Similarly, they utilize more of full acquisition in de-
veloped economies than in emerging and developing countries. The acquisitions 
in emerging and developing countries took place in Russia, South Africa, Kenya, 
Turkey, Morocco, and Egypt. Although the theoretical prediction stands clear 
from this data, however, the evidence that full acquisition is also used in develop-
ing economies points to an important limitation of institutional theory and thus 
Brouthers (2013) decade award winning paper.  
All the acquisition cases achieved their targets when the question was posed to 
the responding managers with exception of the strategic asset-seeking acquisition 
in the USA (case 4) and resource-seeking investments in the Russian Federation 
(case 6) whose reasons were far from the predictions of institutional theory. If 
case 4 were acquired fully, taking into consideration that the United States is a 
developed institution, the amount of management resources that would have been 
lost would have been enormous. Also, the failure could have been attributed to 
the loss of motivation or incentive alignment. The incentives were there, and thus 
the entry strategy was not the issue but just the riskiness of such explorative-
strategic seeking investment that turns out to be a failure. 
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Finally, the findings of this study suggest that full acquisition in emerging and 
developing countries is made possible due to the ability of managers to factor the 
impact of institutions on the acquisition purchase price. The acquisition of host 
country capability also played a significant role in the choice of full acquisition in 
emerging and developing economies. With the exception of case acquisition 21( 
Turkey) which was a stock trade, these firms either had host country capability 
(case 2) or target-specific experience (Case  9, 10, 17, 18) before undergoing 
staged or full acquisition in these countries. Thus, the experiential learning prior 
to these acquisitions gave the case firms the capability to manage such firms in 
institutional distance countries.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This section focusses on the conclusions of the study.  First, it discusses the sum-
mary and findings of the study. Second, it discusses the theoretical and empirical 
contributions. Third, it discusses the managerial significance of the study, the 
limitations, and the direction for future studies. 
7.1 Summary and findings of the study 
Acquisitions are an option for MNEs to remain competitive in the global market. 
They provide MNEs abilities to gain faster market entry into new markets, ac-
quire new competencies (e.g. technology, and skills), and to remain competitive 
in declining markets. They also help to increase the profitability of MNEs in an 
era of globalization.  
The objective of the present study is to understand how and why MNEs opt for 
the choice of partial, staged and full acquisition at the time of market entry. This 
objective was approached by four research questions: (1) How do host country 
institutions and MNEs host country capabilities influence the choice of partial, 
staged and full acquisition at the time of entry? (2) How do the motives of acqui-
sitions influence MNEs strategic choice for partial, staged and full acquisition at 
market entry? (3) Why do multinationals increase or decrease their equity com-
mitment in international acquisitions at post-market entry? (4) How do returns to 
partial acquirers differ to returns on staged and full acquirers?  
The dissertation explored seven chapters to provide answers to the research objec-
tive. Chapter one discusses the background of the dissertation, the research gaps 
from previous studies and set out the research objectives and questions. Haven 
explored the research gaps, the study then discusses the potential expected contri-
bution of the study. Next, the chapter highlights the key concepts utilized in the 
study. It concludes by positioning the study compared to previous studies.  
Chapter two discusses the theoretical background of the study. First it discusses in 
more detail literature on acquisition strategies, acquisition motives, and perfor-
mance. Discussions moved on to the main theories utilized for the study. From 
institutional theory, formal institutional environment was extended from regulato-
ry institutions to include transparency and failure in formal institutions. Informal 
institutions were focused on the contractual difficulties that may arise in acquisi-
tion negotiations the more informal institutional distance between the home coun-
try of the parent MNE and the host country of the acquisition target. From the 
Uppsala internationalization process theory, the study highlights how the Uppsala 
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model can be used to explain international acquisitions.  Dunning motives of FDI 
was discussed and how the motive of foreign market entry should influence the 
acquisition entry strategies. The chapter summarizes by clarifying the choice of 
theory chosen for the study, their theoretical underpinnings, theoretical bounda-
ries and link to the research questions.  
Chapter three and chapter four integrates the literature review in chapter two to 
provide the constructs that are used in the empirical setting. The constructs are 
regulatory restrictions, regulatory transparency, failure in formal institutions, con-
tractual complexities, host country capability, target-specific experience, market-
seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, strategic asset-seeking and 
(un)favorable market conditions. From these constructs, fourteen predictions were 
drawn from the literature. This is also presented in the conceptual framework of 
the study. 
Chapter five presented the methodological aspect and philosophical assumption 
of the study. Critical realism was the chosen philosophical assumption of the 
study. The chapter shows how case study is a research strategy and not a data 
collection method. The chapter went on to discuss how case study research can be 
utilized in theory building and also presented a model of theory building that will 
be utilized in the study. The model presents how the cases were selected. The 
focus of the cases is on the actual acquisition cases using embedded case study 
design methodology. The model also shows the data gathering techniques, prepa-
ration of data collection and actual data collection. It also shows the data analysis 
and how the finding of the study was reported. Finally data evaluation approach 
utilized to ensure validity was also presented which are in conformity with real-
ism stance.  
Chapter six presented the background of the cases selected for the study. It dis-
cusses the characteristics of the acquisition cases in terms of institutions, year of 
entry and acquisition strategies utilized. It discusses the characteristics of the cas-
es in terms of the motives of the acquisitions, achievements of the strategic mo-
tives for market entry. The chapter also presented within case and cross-case 
analysis of the acquisition cases. The cross-case analysis enhanced the generaliza-
tion and contextualization of the findings of the study. Thus, answers to why 
firms opt for acquisition strategies at the time of market entry were presented. 
This is followed by a presentation of the role entry motives on acquisition entry 
strategies. Next, findings on the determinants of changes in acquired foreign sub-
sidiary, differential performance returns on acquisition strategies is presented.  
Chapter seven presents the conclusions of the study. The summary of the litera-
ture predictions in Table 4 and conceptual framework (Figure 12) were applied in 
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the empirical setting to answer the research questions. The findings of the study 
are summarized in the following discussions. 
The findings of the study suggest that MNEs do respond to institutions at the time 
of market entry and host country institutional environment do not remain static. 
The key findings are that Finnish MNEs opt for partial acquisition rather than 
staged and full acquisition in five contexts specifically: (a) In the presence of host 
country regulatory restrictions; (b) acquisitions made prior to late 90’s without 
earnout arrangements; (c) high informal institutional environment; (d) explora-
tive strategic asset-seeking acquisitions were the target strategic assets is still 
under-development; (e) resource-seeking investments in non-transparent regula-
tory formal institutions. Also, Finnish MNEs opt for the choice of staged acquisi-
tion rather than partial and full acquisition in five contexts specifically: (a) on 
acquisitions involving stock trade; (b) when the MNEs do not possess either host 
country capability or target-specific experience or the MNEs possesses either the 
latter or the former respectively; (c) when the nature of the acquired firm busi-
ness requires extensive improvements and the target host market structure is 
fragmented; (d) when the parent MNE seeks for market power consolidation even 
in markets where they are deficient in both host country capability and target-
specific experience.  
Finnish MNEs opt for the choice of full acquisition rather than partial and staged 
acquisition in five contexts specifically: (a) when the parent MNE possesses host 
country capability in market-seeking and efficiency-seeking acquisitions  (b) size 
of the acquired target is relatively very small compared to the acquiring MNE; 
(c) when the target is competitor (d) when the nature of the acquired firm busi-
ness is well developed and the target host market structure is consolidating (e) 
when the Finnish parent MNE possesses host country capability, target-specific 
experience and ensure the retention of top management personnel’s of the ac-
quired target even in high formal institutional distance  countries (non-
transparent regulatory institution & failure in formal institutions); (f) when the 
Finnish parent MNE is seeking for exploitative strategic asset-seeking acquisi-
tions. 
Furthermore, the motives market entry of Finnish MNEs influences their deci-
sions for these acquisitions strategies. Specifically on the motives of market entry, 
there are three findings in addition to those described above: (a) Finnish MNEs 
entering host countries characterize by transparent regulatory institutions, stable 
political environment, and less corruption will have preference for full acquisi-
tion than partial and staged acquisition for Strategic asset-seeking and Efficien-
cy-seeking motives; (b) Finnish MNEs entering host countries characterize by 
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non-transparent regulatory institutions, regulatory restriction and high political 
risks and corruption will prefer partial and staged acquisition rather than full 
acquisition for market-seeking and resource-seeking motives if at the time of their 
entry they are unable to achieve the retention of key management or owners of the 
firm, and are deficient in either target-specific experience or host country capa-
bility (c) If all other things been equal, that is, if the effects of target-specific ex-
perience, host country capability, regulatory restrictions are excluded, it is possi-
ble to infer that in informal institutional environment there is a likelihood of con-
tractual failure leading to Finnish MNEs decision for partial and staged acquisi-
tion in acquisitions motivated by market-seeking and resource-seeking motives.   
Specifically on the determinants of equity changes in acquired foreign subsidiary, 
three key findings emanated from the study. (a) Finnish MNEs increases their 
equity stake in acquired foreign subsidiary when host country relieves their regu-
latory restrictions; (b) Finnish MNEs increases their equity stake when they have 
acquired host country capability and have gained trust with their partially ac-
quired targets; (c) Finnish MNEs decreases their equity stake or exit from the 
market when the host country market becomes unfavorable.  
Finally, the study finds that there are performance differentials between returns on 
partial and full acquisition and that differences in institutions influences the per-
formance of acquisitions in foreign markets. Specifically, the key findings suggest 
that opting for the wrong acquisition strategy results in: (a) paying a high premi-
um on the acquisition purchase price at later time and the loss of management 
resources if the MNE opted for partial and staged acquisition instead of full ac-
quisition at the time of market entry; (b) the loss of integration synergies in par-
tially acquired subsidiaries that would have been attained if the acquisition was a 
full acquisition; (c) failed acquisitions and the additional cost in institutional dis-
tance host countries; (d) Strikingly, a key finding of this section is that MNEs are 
responding to the impact of high formal institutional distance on their acquisition 
performance by factoring in the impact of institutions on the acquisition purchase 
price and through the acquisition of host country capability. 
The study further proposes several measures on acquisition performance that will 
further research in the performance of acquisitions. MNEs often include other 
motive-based KPIs in assessing the performance of acquisitions. Although finan-
cial measures are primarily the main KPIs on acquisitions, MNEs also access ef-
ficiency-seeking motivated acquisitions with cost synergies, market-seeking mo-
tivated acquisition with market share and sales growth, strategic asset-seeking 
motivated acquisitions with competencies and skills, new product qualification 
and resource-seeking motivated acquisitions with sourcing related performance 
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(availability and price of raw materials). Accounting for some of these varying 
measures should bridge the gap in M&A performance research. For example 
scholars researching M&A, performance should focus on one acquisition motive 
or incorporate the actualization of these motives in their operationalization of 
M&A performance.  
Figure 17 below shows the summary of findings on partial staged and full acqui-
sition and why MNEs increase and decrease their equity in acquired targets. 
 
Figure 17. Findings on Partial, Staged and Full Acquisition and Changes in  
Equity 
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Partial, staged, and full acquisitions are acquisition strategies utilized by MNEs 
when entering into foreign markets. Partial acquisition is takeover transactions 
where the acquiring firm acquires less than 100% but not less than a 15% owner-
ship in the target firm without a legal option to acquire completely over several 
years (Eyssell 1989; Shahrur 2005). Staged acquisition is an acquisition entry 
strategy at the time of entry that requires phased transaction using call options or 
earnout arrangements aimed at acquiring completely after several years (Modified 
from Dapena & Fidalgo 2003; Meyer & Tran 2006; Meyer & Estrin 2007; Jakob-
sen 2008).  Full acquisition is takeover transactions where the acquiring firm ac-
quires 100% ownership in the target firm (Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2007; 
Zhu et al. 2011; Contractor et al. 2014).  
Also, MNEs acquiring foreign targets aim for different acquisition motives such 
as market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, explorative strategic 
asset-seeking motives and exploitative strategic asset-seeking motives. Market-
seeking firms are firms motivated to enter the foreign market with the aim of 
serving the market in that country with the sole objective to increase their market 
size, market growth and adapt to local standards and requirements (Dunning 
1993). Resource-seeking motives are firms that naturally aim to access specific 
resources in foreign host country at lower cost levels than they achieve at present 
in their country of origin (Dunning 1993). Efficiency-seeking motives are motives 
aimed at rationalizing production, distribution, and marketing activities through 
common governance of and synergy-building among geographically dispersed 
operations (Dunning 1993; Gorynia et al. 2007). Explorative strategic asset-
seeking motives are motives aimed at acquiring strategic assets in which the tech-
nology/strategic asset is under development and not proven in the market (e.g., 
brands, product & process technology, key technological innovative competences 
etc.). Exploitative strategic asset-seeking motives are motives aimed at acquiring 
strategic assets in which the technology/strategic asset is already proven in the 
market. 
There are certain contexts where each of these strategies is optimal for MNEs 
acquiring foreign targets. In the presence of restrictive regulations on foreign 
ownership stake in targets firms, the acquiring MNEs has no other options than to 
acquire partially that is, comply by acquiring the ownership stake permitted by 
law. Partial acquisition is also utilized when MNEs motivated for resource-
seeking acquisitions aimed at gaining access to target firm host country raw mate-
rials, natural resources and semi-skilled labor especially in institutions character-
ized by non-transparent regulatory institutions. Such institutions are marked by 
corruption as they require illegal fees to facilitate the regulative process of obtain-
ing for example import & export permits. 
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In terms of corruption, they facilitate the access to permits through indirect means 
that may require bribery. MNEs avoid such bribery and guarantee the sources of 
supply by opting for a local partner via partial acquisition. Furthermore, partial 
acquisition seems also to be an option for MNEs in high informal institutional 
environment because, in such environment, cultural ambiguity increases cross-
cultural communication failure and the likelihood of contractual failure in acquisi-
tion negotiations. However, these are likely the case for acquisitions made prior to 
late 1990s when earnout provisions were not utilized. 
One of the emerging themes from the study is that there are two types of strategic 
asset-seeking investments, one involving exploitative strategic asset-seeking and 
the other involving explorative strategic asset-seeking investments. It was found 
that MNEs opt for partial acquisition in explorative strategic asset-seeking in-
vestments, that is investments in which the technology/strategic asset is under 
development and not proven in the market (e.g., brands, product & process tech-
nology, key technological innovative competencies, etc.). The nature of the stra-
tegic assets in terms of its failure rates makes partial acquisition a viable option. 
The choice of partial acquisition provides a framework for the acquiring MNE to 
align the interest of the target firm owners and retain the key personnel.  Without 
the retention of key personnel’s and incentives to keep them motivated the acqui-
sition is most likely doomed to fail. 
The provisions of earnout arrangements have made the impact of informal institu-
tions manageable. MNEs are able to bridge valuation differences with the acquir-
ing firm by opting for staged acquisition which allows them to make down pay-
ments on the acquisition purchase price and to tie the final payment based on fu-
ture performance within a certain number of years. Furthermore, it was found that 
when MNEs do not have target-specific experience (e.g. collaborative relation-
ship in the form of a distributor, customer collaboration, supplier, and franchise) 
before the acquisition they tend to opt for staged acquisition as a means to build 
trust, learn from the target about the local business and gain market knowledge.  
Similarly, MNEs that do not have host country capability (knowledge about host 
country institutions and market knowledge through ongoing business in the host 
market) also opted for staged acquisition to gain market and institutional 
knowledge. There were also cases involving MNEs that are deficient in both host 
country capability and target-specific experience or possessed either of host coun-
try capability or target-specific experience but opted for staged acquisitions. Spe-
cifically in cases where the MNEs possessed host country capability without tar-
get-specific experience, the acquisition was in a new business segment different 
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from their existing subsidiary in the host country. Also, the MNEs ensured the 
retention of key management personnel.  
There were cases the MNEs possessed target-specific experience but deficient in 
host country capability. Specifically on this cases, the nature of acquired firm 
business required extensive improvements similar to brownfields (extensive im-
provement in operational and accounting systems to standards of the acquiring 
MNE) and the market structure of the target host country is fragmented with very 
few global players and poor quality local  business providers. Cases were the 
MNEs were deficient in both host country capability and target-specific experi-
ence they were motivated for market consolidation due to pressures of global 
competition, maturity, and declining markets within the Eurozone. These pres-
sures makes them exert leapfrogging behavior. Such acquisitions engulf extensive 
management resources and use of external advisers and may often entail paying a 
high premium. 
Finally, staged acquisition is often utilized in an acquisition involving a stock 
trade. This involves acquiring a majority stake from the blockholders that legally 
requires the acquiring MNE to make call option for the remaining equity. 
While deficiency of host country capability and or target-specific experience lead 
to the choice of staged acquisition, MNEs that possessed host country capability 
and target-specific experience often opted for full acquisition. When they pos-
sessed host country capability, they were primarily motivated for market-seeking 
and efficiency-seeking acquisitions. While market-seeking acquisitions are acqui-
sition aimed at entering a foreign market to serve the local market and increase 
the firm market size and growth and adapt to local standard requirements. Effi-
ciency-seeking acquisitions are aimed at achieving economies of scale and scope 
by rationalizing production, distribution and marketing activities. These motives 
require extensive knowledge about the host country institutions and market (host 
country capability) for its successful management and operation. Market-seeking 
requires knowledge about the distribution networks, customer needs, local re-
quirements and knowledge of the host country laws. Efficiency-seeking requires 
knowledge of the host country institutions and laws as well as its distribution 
networks. When the MNEs possessed target-specific experience they opted for 
full acquisition in cases where the business of the acquiring target was performing 
very well and the target firm had developed operational and accounting systems, 
and the market structure of the target host country is consolidating (i.e. the num-
ber of global market players gaining market share were increasing).  
Furthermore, it was found that MNEs are developing effective strategies to cush-
ion the effect of formal institutional environment on their acquisition strategies as 
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they seek to remain competitive in the global marketplace by gaining faster entry 
into emerging and developing markets. MNEs opted for full acquisition in high 
formal institutional environment (non-transparent regulatory institution & failure 
in formal institutions) through the acquisition of host country capability, target-
specific experience and ensuring the retention of key management personnel.  
There were also two emerging themes on the choice of full acquisition. MNEs 
opted for full acquisition when the size of the acquired target is relatively very 
small compared to the size of the acquiring MNE. Acquiring MNEs opted for full 
acquisition because the value of the acquiring target was very small and financial-
ly negligible compared to the parent firm value. MNEs opted for full acquisition 
when the target is a competitor. When the acquired target is a competitor of the 
acquiring MNE, there is always a competitive preemption from the parent MNE 
that if they don’t acquire the competitor, their competitors will do so triggering 
their choice for full acquisition.  Finally, it was also found that MNEs opted for 
full acquisition in exploitative strategic asset-seeking investment (target firm 
technology/strategic asset is already proven in the market (e.g., brands, product & 
process technology, key technological innovative competencies, etc.).  
The motives of the acquisition were found to have a significant impact on the 
acquisition strategies utilized by the parent MNEs. It was found that when host 
country regulatory institutions are transparent, and the formal institutions are less 
corrupt and stable, Finnish MNEs are more likely to opt for full acquisition than 
partial and staged acquisition in exploitative strategic asset-seeking and efficien-
cy-seeking acquisitions. The reason for full acquisition is because, on one hand, 
the host country institutions are developed. On the other hand, efficiency-seeking 
acquisition requires developed institutions and regionally integrated markets to 
ensure efficient distribution networks across their geographic market presence. 
More so, exploitative strategic assets tend to be concentrated in developed econ-
omies, and developed economies have developed formal institutional environ-
ment.  
The study reveals that firms that do not possess host country capability, target-
specific experience and  was unable to ensure the retention of key management 
personnel’s entering institutional host countries characterized by non-transparent 
regulatory institutions, regulatory restriction and high political risks and corrup-
tion will prefer partial and staged acquisition rather than full acquisition for mar-
ket-seeking and resource-seeking motives. The reason for the choice of partial 
and staged acquisition is because, on one hand, the MNEs are deficient in host 
country market knowledge and institutional knowledge required for successfully 
managing market-seeking acquisitions. On the other hand, local partner stake is 
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required for resource-seeking acquisition because of its ties to host country gov-
ernment. It was also found that in resource-seeking and market-seeking acquisi-
tions in informal institutional environment, contractual failure is likely to occur 
leading to MNEs option for partial and staged acquisition. However, this is the 
context that the effects of target-specific experience, host country capability, 
regulatory restrictions are not taking into cognizance.  
Finally, it was found that there are consequences of not opting for the optimal 
acquisition strategies at the time of market entry. First, acquiring MNE will pay 
an enormous premium on the acquisition purchase price at a later date and waste 
scarce management resources if they opted for partial and staged acquisition at 
the time of market entry while they were supposed to opt for full acquisition. 
With regards to partial acquisition, they will be required to make new round of 
negotiations with the target often at high premiums because the target may have 
gained more knowledge about the true value of its assets and such renegotiations 
may often be unsuccessful due to the valuation differences between the acquiring 
parent and target firm. For staged acquisition, the final down payments will often 
be high due to wrong valuation estimate or market assessment initially conceived 
by the parent MNE. 
Second, acquiring MNE that opted for partial acquisition where full acquisition 
would have been the optimal strategy are prone to loss integration synergies that 
would have been attained if it were a full acquisition. Opting for partial acquisi-
tion always makes integration more complex due to the existence of previous 
owners that may object or delay the full integration of the parent MNE operation-
al and control systems. As a consequence, the synergies that should be attained 
will either be impossible, delayed or postponed to when the parent MNE have 
acquired full control of the acquired firm. Finally, opting for full acquisition in an 
institutional host country where partial acquisition is the optimal strategy could 
result in failed acquisition and additional cost to the organization. Finnish MNEs 
often abide by their code of conduct and play according to the rules of the game 
in all institutional environment. When they opted for full acquisition in dissimilar 
institutions where local competitors are not playing or abiding by the same rules, 
they may realize that their competitiveness has eroded because the local competi-
tors set the market price. Consequently, they will have no other alternative than to 
divest the acquired subsidiary.   
While opting for non-optimal acquisition strategy will incur cost and losses to the 
parent MNE, the parent MNEs are still able to develop certain capabilities such as 
host country capabilities, target-specific experience and retain target top man-
agement personnel’s to manage their operations in highly dissimilar institutions 
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(institutional distance countries). More so, in such institutions, it was found that 
MNEs can determine the impact of the institutions on the target firm. Based on 
this, they can factor in this impact on the target valuation. The impact of institu-
tions could include additional profitability of the firm that are not under operating 
standards of the MNE e.g., business contracts obtained due to close ties to politi-
cians in host countries or contracts or deals obtained through illegal facilitation by 
top management personnel’s of the target firm. Gaining such knowledge about 
these types of activities may require target-specific experience and host country 
capability before undergoing such acquisitions.   
7.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions 
The current study is positioned within the business dynamics and strategy para-
digm in international business research (see, for example, Griffith, Cavusgil & Xu 
2008). Within this paradigm, extant research has focused on entry mode strategy, 
the internationalization process, knowledge management and exporting (Griffith 
et al. 2008). The current study is specifically situated within two sub-themes, en-
try mode strategy, and internationalization process. Specifically on entry mode 
strategy, it addresses a yet neglected entry mode strategy in extant literature “par-
tial and staged acquisitions”. Specifically, on internationalization process, it 
showcases that these strategies are “in process-like” as firms can change their 
intended and actualized strategy during the internationalization process based on 
host country institutional environments, firm-specific motives and by the exploi-
tation of its networks of business relationships. 
Within the paradigm focus of this study, there were several theoretical, empirical 
and managerial contributions. Theoretically and empirically, the dissertation 
makes five significant contributions to theory and research in acquisition entry 
strategies and performance through:  
(1) Extending the institutional base view of international business by 
accounting for additional constructs.  
(2) Extending Uppsala model and its application in acquisition.  
(3) The establishment of cause of effect explanation on why firms opt for 
different acquisition strategies in foreign markets. 
(4) Through the developments of constructs that explains the choice of 
acquisition strategies, changes in equity stake and differential performance 
returns on acquisition strategies.  
(5) The advancement of IB research from institutional influences to strategy 
development, to strategy development in response to institutions. 
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The first theoretical contribution of this study is that it extends the institutional 
theory by accounting for additional measures of institutions that influences acqui-
sition entry. The formal aspect of institution is extended to include institutional 
transparency (Alford et al. 1993; Ball et al. 2000; Zhou et al. 2007; Moskalev 
2010; Child & Marinova 2014) and failure in formal institutions (Miller 1992; 
Howell & Chaddick 1994; Bremmer 2005; Abidde 2009: 25; Baek 2011; Al 
Khattab et al. 2012; Child & Marinova 2014). The informal aspect of the institu-
tion is focused on the manifestation of cultural issues (negotiation complexities) 
in acquisition decision (Drew 1997; Jakobsen 2008; Dina 2010). By accounting 
for an additional measure of formal institutions, the study provides other aspects 
of institutions that influence acquisition entry decisions and how firms respond to 
these institutions at the time of market entry. Thus, regulatory formal institutions 
are not the only aspects of host country formal institutional environment that in-
fluences entry strategies of MNEs in foreign markets as reported for example Yiu 
and Makino (2002); Deng (2003); Khanna and Palepu (2010). In addition to for-
mal regulatory institutions, how transparent these institutions are and the political 
and corrupt nature of the business environment influences MNEs entry strategies.  
Most emerging markets have already established economic liberation policies 
within the last two decades, and they are said to have market conforming values 
(Arslan 2011). Ownership restrictions are fairly better today compared to then 
(ibid). Institutional challenges in emerging markets have moved from ownership 
restrictions to one of transparency and stability of political institutions and cor-
ruption. Consequently, IB studies exploring institutional theory should account 
for these additional aspects as they delineate main aspects in determining entry 
strategies of MNEs in foreign markets. They also enable IB studies to understand 
aspects of the host country institutions MNEs develop specific capabilities in re-
sponse to the institutional constraints they posed at the time of market entry. Dis-
aggregating the institutional dimensions into these various categories is appropri-
ate than aggregating them all as formal institutions because even though they im-
pact on each other, one category may have a stronger influence in predicting entry 
strategies. For example, Saudi Arabia has autocratic regime and failure in formal 
institutions. However, regulatory restrictions were more predictor of entry strate-
gies in Saudi Arabia. 
Second, a remarkable theoretical contribution of this study is that it extends the 
application of Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne 2009) to acquisitions. This is 
the first study to apply Uppsala model empirically to explain international acqui-
sitions. Clarifying the critics of the Uppsala model (Reid 1981; Young & Wil-
kinson 1989; Melin 1992; Andersen 1993; Oviatt & McDougall 1994; 2005), the 
study showed that through the development of target-specific experience and host 
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country capability an acquisition is more likely to be successful. While Johanson 
and Vahlne (2009) argues that previous relationship with the target before an ac-
quisition is more likely to increase the success of the acquisition. This study ar-
gues that not limited to previous relationship with a target, the existence of an 
earlier subsidiary with an ongoing business operation is more likely to increase 
the success of subsequent acquisitions in a particular host country because the 
acquiring MNE would have acquired experience on how to work with the host 
country culture.  
Also, by viewing acquisition as one that comprises a continuum of increasing and 
decreasing equity stake, it is possible to explain the continuum through the state 
and change variables in the Uppsala model. It is shown that partial acquisition and 
staged acquisition can serve as foothold strategy were both partners can learn 
about each other and build trust. Knowledge opportunities are said to be the out-
come of these learning that leads to the next commitment decisions (full acquisi-
tion). Also, it was shown that under unfavorable learning (unfavorable market 
condition), firms can decrease their equity stake or exit from the market. 
Third, a strong empirical contribution of this study concerns the findings that 
firms utilize three acquisition strategies when entering into foreign markets. This 
study is one of the first studies to empirically study partial, staged and full acqui-
sition in one study as distinctive acquisition strategies utilize by MNEs when en-
tering into foreign markets. There are two streams of studies on entry mode strat-
egies of MNEs. The first stream focuses on the choice of acquisition vs. green-
field investments (Wilson 1980; Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Padmanabhan & 
Cho 1999; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000; Hennart & Park 1993; Hennart, Larimo 
& Chen 1996; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000; Larimo 2003; Chen & Zeng 2004). 
The second stream of study focuses on the choice between full and partial acqui-
sition (Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2004; Hennart & Chen 2004; Chen 2008; 
Jakobsen 2008; Arslan 2011; Arslan & Larimo 2011; Contractor et al. 2014). This 
study extends these stream of study by showing that partial and staged acquisition 
are unique entry strategies utilized by firms when entering into foreign markets.  
It also showed that these strategies are not only influenced by the host country 
formal and informal institutions, but they are also influenced by the motives of 
the acquisition, size of the acquired target, target is a competitor, nature of target 
business and the acquisition of target-specific experience and host country capa-
bility prior to the acquisition.  
This study specifically supports Jacobsen (2008) and Chen (2008) who found that 
subsequent investment of foreign parent with direct investments in host country 
are less likely to be partial acquisition rather than full acquisition. Also, the find-
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ings of this study contradict Jacobsen (2008) who found that prior host market 
knowledge is positively associated with entry by partial acquisition. Prior host 
market knowledge is gained via target-specific experience. The findings of the 
study suggest that prior host market knowledge gained via target-specific experi-
ence is likely to result in staged acquisition especially when the target business is 
well developed, profitable, and the host market structure is consolidating.  
While Chen found support for other strategic motives to drive partial acquisition, 
this study found support that resource-seeking motives drive partial acquisition. 
While Arslan (2011) and Arslan and Larimo (2011) found that high formal insti-
tutional distance led to the choice of partial acquisition. This study found that 
regulatory restrictions (one of the constructs of the formal institutional environ-
ment) led to the choice of partial acquisition. In addition, unlike Arslan and Lar-
imo (2011) who found that high informal institutional distance between home and 
host countries of parent and target firms led to the choice of full acquisition, this 
study complements Contractor et al. (2014) that in high informal institutional dis-
tance MNEs are more likely to opt for partial acquisition rather than full acquisi-
tion. The measure of informal institutional distance differs in both studies. In this 
study, the informal institutional environment is captured based on negotiation 
complexities more related to individualism vs. collectivism aspects of culture. 
Contractor et al. accounts for uncertainty avoidance dimension of culture.  
Finally, while Contractor et al. (2014) found positive relationship between high 
formal institutional distance and MNEs preference for full acquisition, this study 
finds that in high formal institutional environment, MNEs opt for both partial 
acquisition and staged acquisition in the context  of market-seeking and resource-
seeking motives and at the time of their entry they are unable to achieve the reten-
tion of key management or owners of the firm, and are deficient in either target-
specific experience or host country capability. Furthermore, this study found that 
MNEs opt for full acquisition in high formal institutional environment when they 
possess host country capability, target-specific experience and ensure the reten-
tion of key management personnel. 
Finally, the dissertation contributes to the stream of studies that shows that acqui-
sition entry strategies influence subsidiary performance (Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-
Canal 2007; Zhou et al. 2007). Alongside Brouthers (2013) that showed that firms 
whose entry strategies can be predicted by institutional theory tend to perform 
better than firms whose strategies cannot be predicted by institutional theory. This 
dissertation complements Brouthers (2013). However, it argues that the finding 
that institutional theory predicted entry mode choice performs better than non-
institutional theory predicted entry mode is necessary but independently insuffi-
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cient. The dissertation shows that MNEs have moved beyond the predictions of 
institutional theory on entry mode choice and are developing capabilities such as 
host country capabilities that enables them to effectively manage their operations 
and determine the right degree of integration in institutional distance markets. For 
example, MNEs with host country capability that opt for full acquisition in insti-
tutional distance countries as against the prediction of Brouthers (2013) still 
achieved their strategic motives for setting up the subsidiary.   
7.3 Practical and Managerial Implications 
While a firm's institutional environment influences its chosen strategies (Xu & 
Shenkar 2002; Peng 2002; 2003; Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn 2007; Estrin et al. 
2009; Peng & Khoury 2009; Arslan 2011; Arslan & Larimo 2011; Santangelo & 
Meyer 2011) and performance (Gaur & Lu 2007; Dhanaraj & Beamish 2004; 
Markides & Ittner 1994; Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2007; Pattnaik & Choe 
2007; Aybar & Ficici 2009; Brouthers 2013). It is important not just for MNEs to 
understand how these institutions influence their entry strategies and performance 
but also how to develop capabilities and what capabilities is needed to respond 
and manage the impact of institutions on their chosen strategies and performance.  
Acquisitions are multifaceted activities. They engulf enormous scarce resources 
both financial and human resources that the risks of failure should be at the fore-
front of managerial considerations before making acquisition deals. Managers are 
often confronted with the optimal strategy for entering into foreign market. The 
academia has often been at the forefront of proposals for managerial decision 
making. So far, it has been suggested that when the MNE product is not related to 
that of the target firm, a greenfield investments should be selected (Hennart & 
Park 1993; Hennart, Larimo & Chen 1996; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000; Larimo 
2003; Chen & Zeng 2004; Wang 2014). Furthermore, the academia has also sug-
gested that greenfields should be selected when the parent firm is deficient in in-
ternational experience (Wilson 1980; Barkema & Vermeulen 1998; Padmanabhan 
& Cho 1999; Brouthers & Brouthers 2000).  
Every manager understands that technologies and innovations are dispersed glob-
ally, and their sources are not limited to organic growth. Opting for greenfield 
ventures when the acquired product is unrelated to parent MNE product suggest 
that managers should limit their sources of new products technologies to organic 
growth. Nowadays, technologies are breaking industry boundaries and product 
boundaries such that unrelated and un-competing industries are today competing 
(Accenture 2015). When parent MNE product or capabilities are unrelated to tar-
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get products and capabilities, MNEs still have the option to opt for partial and 
staged acquisition. Through these acquisition strategies, MNEs are able to pre-
serve the innovative capabilities of the acquired firm by aligning incentives of the 
key personnel’s and also preserve the structural autonomy of these companies 
which made them innovative at the first place (Puranam et al. 2006; Puranam & 
Srikanth 2007; Puranam et al 2009). Competencies from the acquired targets can 
be gained by sending key personnel’s of the parent MNEs to learn the capabilities 
of the newly acquired firm. 
Furthermore, if organic growth such as greenfields are the only viable growth 
options when MNEs are deficient in international experience, then the interna-
tionalization of born global would be different from empirical observations (Ovi-
att & McDougall 1994; 2005).  Managers should take into cognizance that when 
their organization is deficient in international experience they still have an option 
for staged acquisition especially in market-seeking acquisition irrespective of the 
institutional context. Through staged acquisition, they can make down payments 
and  bind the final down payment based  on the performance of the targets after 
several years. Staged acquisition helps to bridge valuation differences more espe-
cially in informal institutional environment where cultural complexities can mag-
nify the abilities to reach a deal on the acquisition purchase price. Additionally, 
through staged acquisition the acquiring firm can retain local owners with local 
knowledge, build trust, gain legitimacy and acquire capability on how to manage 
the operations in the local market.  
Managers are confronted with what optimal acquisition strategy is suitable in the 
different institutional context. The findings of this study suggest that, the optimal 
acquisition strategy depends on the institutional context, the capabilities of the 
organization, and the motive of the acquisition and the characteristics of the target 
firm (e.g. firm size, developed/profitable business and host market structure). 
Managers from developed economies that already have existing relationship with 
the target firm (e.g., distributor collaborative relationship, supplier collaborative 
relationship, competitor collaborative relationship, customer collaborative rela-
tionship & other strategic alliances) located in high formal institutional distance 
countries (institutions characterized by political risks, corruption and transparen-
cy) should opt for full acquisition when the motives of their investment is for 
market-seeking motives and  in the context that the target firm operational and 
control systems are developed according to standards of the acquiring firm and 
the target firm host market is consolidating.  
Similarly, they should opt for full acquisition if prior to the recent acquisition, 
they already have existing functional subsidiary in the host country. However, 
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when they are deficient in host country capability and target-specific experience, 
partial and staged acquisition is the optimal acquisition strategy. However caution 
must be taken when acquiring partially. Acquiring partially without the use of 
earnout arrangements could make it even more challenging when renegotiating to 
acquire the remaining equity from the target firm managers because the sellers 
reverse asymmetric information problem may make them prefer to retain a stake 
in the enterprise to ensure that they get a share of the increased value of the firm 
(Jakobsen 2008), thus making the transition to full ownership unattainable or at a 
very high premium. 
More so, when the target firm is relatively small compared to the parent firm size 
or the target firm is a competitor, it makes sense to acquire fully. It is often easy 
to absorb a small sized company into a multinational corporation than to integrate 
and absorb a large company of relatively similar size. Where target firm is a com-
petitor, it is often optimal to acquire fully, because of the relatedness and potential 
synergies that it creates to the parent MNE and potential competitiveness the firm 
may lose because other competitors will acquire it if they fail to do so. 
Institutions play a less significant impact on the acquisition strategies of MNEs 
from developed economies acquiring target firm located in developed countries. 
For these MNEs, the motives and the target firm characteristics are the contexts 
that determine the optimal acquisition strategies. Managers confronted with deci-
sions regarding the optimal acquisition strategy should opt for full acquisition 
when the motives of acquisition are to gain economies of scale and scope and 
they seek to rationalize production, distribution, and marketing activities in their 
global or regionally dispersed operations. Such acquisition requires tightly inte-
grating the acquired firm that will be defeated if the target firm management re-
tains their stake in the acquired subsidiary.  
Finally, managers may often be confronted with how best to acquire technology 
focused companies or startups whose technologies are either established in the 
market or still in research and development. The findings of this study suggest 
that partial acquisition is the optimal acquisition strategy when the technology is 
still developing because it provides a better risks sharing platform and incentive 
alignment of the technology resources of the acquired firm. Such technology ac-
quisition has high rates of failure because of the nature of technologies but also 
yields disruptive competencies that could keep the organization at leading edge 
technologies compared to its competitors (Graebner, Eisenhardt & Roundy 2010). 
Contrarily, when the technologies are well developed, it makes sense to acquire 
fully. For example, it is easier to estimate the value of proven technologies and its 
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future trajectories or life cycle returns than in cases where the technology is un-
dergoing research & development. 
7.4 Direction for Future Research 
IB scholars have recently been concerned if IB field is running out of steam be-
cause the significant research questions IB scholars are engaged have been tack-
led, and no distinctive topic has emerged since then (Buckley 2002). Within the 
business dynamics and strategy paradigm in international business research (Grif-
fith, Cavusgil & Xu 2008), scholars have also been concerned if we need more 
entry mode studies especially when trajectory of recent studies suggest they are 
more of the same (e.g. Shaver 2013). In response to this, several other scholars 
have posited several future research areas in entry mode studies. For example, 
Hennart and Slangen (2015) suggest that we need more entry mode studies and 
future research areas should focus on (1) the determinants of evolution of opera-
tions resulting from suboptimal mode choices (2) causes of replication of past 
entry mode choices, (3) how entry decision process is structured. On one hand 
this study contributes to this research agenda, and on the other hand, it extends the 
call for future research on entry mode studies to more explicit research areas. 
The current study somewhat addresses some of the above research agenda by ar-
guing that the causes of replication of past mode choice is as a result of host coun-
try capability of the MNEs. For instance, the empirical findings suggest that firms 
that previously had a subsidiary in host country opted for full acquisitions. This 
suggests a replication of full acquisition strategies by acquiring MNEs in host 
countries where they already have a subsidiary. Thus, host country capability is a 
requisite for replication, not just an outright replication. Similarly, the motivation 
and findings of this study suggests that entry mode decisions are structured induc-
tively (Hennart & Slangen 2015: 119) in such a way that MNEs systematically 
omit other entry mode from their decision process rather focuses on acquisitions 
because acquisitions have become an increasingly important mode of foreign ex-
pansion (Ghemawat & Ghadar 2000; Brouthers & Dikova 2010; Zander & Zander 
2010; Hennart & Slangen 2015). 
First, both managers and researchers often mix up IJVs as partial acquisitions and 
vice versa. Although they are similar in the sense that it involves shared owner-
ship, they are also distinct (Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal 2004). It would be sig-
nificant for researcher to include IJVs in future studies and to explore what differ-
entiates IJVs and partial acquisition and the context where any is optimal. This 
would require cases studies of MNEs that have explored both partial acquisitions, 
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IJVs and full acquisitions and the context why and how each was explored as 
unique entry strategies in foreign markets. 
Second, as argued in the limitations of this study, the boundaries between the mo-
tives of FDIs/acquisitions are not so clear. Future studies should explore the 
boundaries of these motives and identify how these motives can be used in entry 
mode studies in explaining managerial motivations for acquisitions. Dunning par-
adigm suggest a general motives of FDIs which are somewhat contradictory (e.g. 
strategic asset-seeking and resource-seeking motives) and in some cases firms 
combine all these motives in entry mode strategies. Chen (2008) suggests capabil-
ity procurement and other motivations (e.g. speeding up entry into rapidly grow-
ing markets, control capacity expansions in mature industries and market power 
consolidation) to drive acquisitions. Strategy and finance scholars suggest syner-
gy, agency and hubris motives to drive acquisitions (Davidson, Cheng, Rowe & 
Singh 2004; Torabzadeh & Dube 2007). Future studies should explore the mana-
gerial decision-making process leading to acquisition decision to uncover the true 
motivations that drive acquisition decisions. Such studies should focus on case 
studies utilizing qualitative-action science research approach rather than quantita-
tive studies that rely on secondary data sources. 
Third, entry mode research in the manufacturing sector have been heavily re-
searched than the service sector and empirical evidence suggest that entry mode 
of service differs from those of manufacturing firms (Sanchez-Peinado, Pla-
Barber & Hebert 2007). Though, the boundaries between a service MNE and 
manufacturing MNE is becoming blurred because product-oriented MNEs are 
restructuring their operations to focus on service business. Also, services today 
are seen under the auspices of S-D logic where goods are viewed as distribution 
mechanisms for services (Vargo & Lusch 2004; Penttinen, 2007; Ng, Parry, 
Smith, Maull, Briscoe 2012). However, the degree of servitization differs. For 
example, the degree of servitization in knowledge intensive service MNEs differs 
from those of manufacturing MNEs. Consequently, the motives of the acquisition 
strategy of knowledge intensive service MNEs would be far from resource-
seeking motivations that may drive manufacturing MNEs. Future research should 
explore the motives and acquisition strategies of knowledge intensive service 
MNEs specifically to understand if their acquisition strategies and motives differ 
from those of manufacturing sector.  
Fourth, Hennart and Slangen (2015) call for future research to focus on the de-
terminants of the evolution of operations resulting from suboptimal mode choices. 
They suggest that IB studies lack knowledge of the determinants of longevity, 
dissolution or governance change in foreign operations arising from suboptimal 
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mode choice. This study suggests that such scholarship is not needed to advance 
IB field because MNEs have moved beyond theoretically predicted entry mode 
choice to the management of entry mode choices in foreign market through the 
development of specific capabilities.  
As the empirical findings suggest, organizations are entering foreign market 
without theoretically predicted entry mode choices. Rather, they rely on their or-
ganizational capabilities in managing their acquired subsidiaries in foreign mar-
kets. In other words, firms are looking beyond the predictions of institutional-
performance relationship (Markides & Ittner 1994; Dhanaraj & Beamish 2004; 
Gaur & Lu 2007; Pattnaik & Choe 2007; Aybar & Ficici 2009; Brouthers 2013); 
to institutional management-performance relationship (Boddewyn & Brewer 
1994; Schuler 1996; Oh 2008; Bruckman et al. 2013; Aklamanu 2014) to manage 
their operations in different institutional context. Consequently, it is argued that 
IB scholars should look beyond institutional theory from the auspices of how in-
stitutions influence firms strategies but rather, on how firms develop strategies in 
response to different institutional contexts. In other words, IB scholars should 
move from institutional response to strategy development to strategy development 
in response to institutions. This would, not limited to the latter, but also entail 
focusing on how firms manage their operations in different institutional context.  
Finally, while this study contributes to process perspective in IB with regards to 
the internationalization process of a firm, it is worth nothing that it does not in-
clude process data in the process theorizing (See Welch & Paavilainen-
Mantymaki 2014). To uncover the actual mechanisms leading to the acquisition 
decision will require process data as both process focused research requires a pro-
cess data (ibid). Future research should explore the decision making process lead-
ing to acquisition strategy decision. Such study should utilize longitudinal data 
from the inception of the acquisition target, subsequent negotiations leading to the 
acquisition decisions as well as the subsequent decision making process leading 
to changes in equity stake. This may require other research methodology such as 
action science research approach. Such an approach can observe acquisition nego-
tiation decisions in different institutional context and identify how each institu-
tional context is different in the acquisition decision and the actualized acquisition 
strategies.   
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Appendix 2  Interview Questionnaire 
 
A. Background Questions: 
1. Could you please describe how long you have worked for this company, po-
sitions you have held before, and other job experiences you held similar to 
your current role in the company? 
B. Interviewee relevance to research questions: 
2. Have you been involved in an acquisition that was acquired partially or fully? 
3.  Have you been involved in an acquisition that was acquired in staged i.e. 
partially and gradually acquired fully or was acquired fully and later reduced 
the equity to that of partial acquisition? 
C. Questions related to research Objective: 
4. How will you define partial acquisition, staged acquisition and full acquisi-
tion from your organization perspective? 
5.  What are the organizational and strategic characteristics of partial, staged 
and full acquisition as unique international expansion strategies? Please dis-
cuss why these acquisition strategies are utilized? 
6.  Does your organization have any policy or strategic choice in any region or 
location implying that a specific acquisition strategy should always be used? 
D. Questions related to the specific acquisition that you were involved 
7. Describe the acquisition process in your organization: In essence, what are 
the activities, functions, processes that are undertaken when your firm is en-
gaging in deciding firms to acquire and how much equity should be acquired? 
8. What were the motives when acquiring partially, staged and full acquisition? 
How did your motives for market entry aid your decision to acquire partially, 
fully or in staged? 
9. Before market entry into a specific market that you were involved as the ac-
quisition manager or decision maker, did your organization had any direct or 
indirect previous relationship with the target firm? (If answer is no, go to 11) 
10. If yes, describe what type of previous relationships your organization had 
with the target firm before deciding to acquire the target firm and the choice 
of acquisition type (staged/full/partial)? How long has your firm been doing 
business in the host country before the acquisition? (go to 12) 
11. Hence your firm had no previous relationship with the acquired firm before 
the acquisition, why the acquisition strategy used? What challenges did you 
encounter and what learning experience did it provide to your organization? 
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12. How would you describe the pre-existing knowledge in your organization 
that you seem was relevant when deciding to acquire the target firm? What 
factors (internal and external/institutional factors) did your organization con-
sider before making the acquisition decision? Could you discuss any regula-
tory, institutional factors, cultural/negotiation complexities, country and po-
litical risks that influenced your decision to acquire partially, fully or in 
staged? Describe if there were any role of market uncertainty, competition, 
technologies of the parent firm and general valuation of the target firm assets 
in aiding your decision to acquire partially, fully and in staged? 
E. Specific case of Increasing and Decreasing Commitments in acquisitions 
13. Discuss the motivations and reasons for changes in equity commitments if 
there have been instances where your organizations have increased or de-
creased equity in foreign acquisitions? 
14. Discuss any constraints/challenges encountered at the time of entry that was 
relieved subsequently and thus triggered changes in equity commitment?   
F. Performance of Acquisitions 
15. Describe how your organization measure the performance of your acquired 
subsidiary for which there are several distinct motives as highlighted in the 
earlier stage of this interview? How would you access the performance of 
these acquisitions? 
16. Diff in regulations impact on performance 
17. How would you described overall performance and achievements of strategic 
motives of these acquisitions we discussed 
18. Describe what factors necessitated the performance outcomes of these acqui-
sitions or the challenges that hindered the performance of these acquisitions? 
19. Describe if the initial motives of market entry influence your headquarter as-
sessment of subsidiary performance or return on investments? 
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Appendix 3  Anonymity and Confidentiality Confirmation 
 
